Nelson v. State
Decision Date | 26 February 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 96-1506,96-1506 |
Citation | 688 So.2d 971 |
Parties | 22 Fla. L. Weekly D529 Michael Eugene NELSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Joseph R. Chloupek, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Aubin Wade Robinson, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
Appellant's conviction for first degree murder is affirmed. We find no reversible error in the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress Appellant's confession or its failure to make a more specific inquiry and finding as to the race-neutral basis for the state's peremptory challenge of a minority juror.
During the voir dire, in response to defense counsel's inquiry, a prospective juror indicated she could be fair but that "some things I don't like, like murder on T.V., sometimes I can't take it ... I don't particularly like looking at violent shows." The defense objected to the state's exercise of a peremptory challenge as to that juror on the grounds that the challenge was racially motivated.
The prosecutor responded that his objection to the juror was that she "tends to think emotionally and she thinks that emotions would get in her way or at least she had a reasonable doubt about it." The prosecutor also asserted to the trial court that case law required Appellant to show a pattern of conduct establishing racially motivated challenges. In overruling the defense objection, the court noted that there were a number of black female jurors whom the state had not challenged. The court thus concluded that the challenge was not racially motivated.
Appellant's taped confession was admitted at trial. The defense's motion to suppress claimed that Appellant's statements were not voluntarily given because they were the result of threats of the electric chair and promises of leniency. During the interrogation, Appellant gave conflicting versions concerning the circumstances surrounding the victim's death. Appellant claimed that he purchased beer and marijuana and went to the motel room where the victim and the victim's girlfriend lived. Appellant and the girlfriend had also been romantically involved. Appellant initially claimed that this was the last time he saw the victim.
The tape reflects that the interrogators informed Appellant that they had evidence which incriminated him, including blood soaked clothes found in his washing machine, and a statement from the girlfriend and other witnesses. Appellant changed his story to claim that when he left the motel room the victim and the girlfriend were arguing and that Appellant left his gun with the girlfriend.
The interrogators continued to reiterate the evidence they had against Appellant. Appellant denied his involvement and Deputy Maney said "you know they have the death penalty in the State of Florida don't you ... You know that premeditated first degree murder, they'll kill you ... It's time to be honest." The interrogators then told Appellant their theory of the case and Appellant continued to assert his innocence. Deputy Maney then stated "And you think they don't kill people in this state, look at Bundy ... Do you want to die?" They told Appellant that his cooperation "could help" although they "wouldn't guarantee it."
Appellant then offered a third version of the story, that all three traveled to the crime scene, where the girlfriend shot the victim. The interrogators, still skeptical, pointed out inconsistencies in Appellant's story and told Appellant the girlfriend's fingerprints were not on the murder weapon. After a break of more than half an hour, the interrogators repeated Miranda warnings, and obtained a written waiver of Appellant's Miranda rights. They then asked if anyone promised Appellant anything while off the tape. Appellant replied "yes" and stated that Detective Woods said "He'll help me with the Judge ... Speak-talk to the Judge."
Appellant then confessed to the murder, stating that the victim was jealous of him, and worried that the girlfriend would "kiss [Appellant] behind his back." Then the girlfriend allegedly told Appellant to "take him out." Appellant took the victim to the crime scene where he shot him twice and threw the body out of the vehicle. When Appellant returned to tell the girlfriend what happened, she did not believe him. Appellant then took her to the scene. After Appellant returned home, he put his bloody clothes and shoes in the washing machine, where police later recovered them. Police also found the victim's blood in Appellant's car.
At trial, Appellant claimed that he shot the victim in self-defense. He told the jury that his confession to interrogators was the product of promises and threats. Appellant alleged that the interrogators told him that he would receive the death penalty unless he confessed his involvement with the murder, and turned the lights in the interrogation room on and off to simulate the use of the electric chair. Appellant also claimed the interrogators said they would talk to the judge in exchange for his cooperation, to try to get leniency, but admitted that the officer who said he would speak to the judge also stated that he could not promise anything. Appellant explained that he did not discuss his self-defense claim because the officers did not raise the subject.
The trial court's finding that the confession was freely and voluntarily given is clothed with a presumption of correctness. Acensio v. State, 497 So.2d 640 (Fla.1986). In determining whether there was police coercion, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances. Hawkins v. Wainwright, 399 So.2d 449 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); State v. Sawyer, 561 So.2d 278 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).
Appellant admitted at the hearing on his motion to suppress that no one made any promises to him. A detective stated on tape that, Although the officers made some general statements that they would communicate Appellant's cooperation to the judge, these comments fall far short of making a bargain with Appellant. See Bruno v. State, 574 So.2d 76, 79-80 (Fla.) (statements suggesting leniency if confession is made are only objectionable if they establish an express quid pro quo bargain for the confession), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 834, 112 S.Ct. 112, 116 L.Ed.2d 81(1991). Appellant admitted that he did not interpret these representations as specifically promising a particular outcome.
A police questioner's indication to a suspect that he or she would benefit from cooperation does not, itself, constitute coercion. Maqueira v. State, 588 So.2d 221 (Fla.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 918, 112 S.Ct. 1961, 118 L.Ed.2d 563 (1992). A confession is not rendered inadmissible because the police tell the accused that it would be easier on him if he told the truth. Bush v. State, 461 So.2d 936, 939 (Fla.1984), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031, 106 S.Ct. 1237, 89 L.Ed.2d 345 (1986); State v. Mallory, 670 So.2d 103 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Bova v. State, 392 So.2d 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), modified on other grounds, 410 So.2d 1343 (Fla.1982); Hawkins.
Appellant asserts that the mention of the death penalty was unduly coercive, citing Brewer v. State, 386 So.2d 232 (Fla.1980) and Martinez v. State, 545 So.2d 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). However, the statements made in Brewer and Martinez were significantly more threatening than the statement made in the instant case when weighing the evidence most favorably for the state. Here, the interrogators' objectionable comments occurred within the first thirty minutes of the interview, and Appellant continued to deny any part of the shooting for another two hours. 1 In addition to weighing credibility and the force of the evidence reflected on the tape, the judge found that when Appellant finally did confess to the murder, his voice sounded The judge, considering the totality of the circumstances, determined that Appellant's statements were not coerced.
We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in coming to this conclusion. The constitution does not bar the use by investigating officers of any statement that could be construed as a threat or promise, but only those which constitute outrageous behavior and which in fact induce a confession. United States v. Guerrero, 847 F.2d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir.1988); United States v. Barnett, 814 F.Supp. 1449, 1456 (D.Alaska 1992). See also United States v. Kolodziej, 706 F.2d 590, 594 (5th Cir.1983) ( ); United States v. Davis, 912 F.Supp. 245 (S.D.Tex.1995) (same). There must be a causal nexus between the improper police conduct and the confession. United States v. Kelley, 953 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir.1992). Merely informing a suspect of realistic penalties and encouraging him to tell the truth does not render a confession involuntary. United States v. Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir.1992) ) , cert. denied, 506 U.S. 964, 113 S.Ct. 436, 121 L.Ed.2d 356 (1992); Lindsey v. Smith, 820 F.2d 1137, 1150 (11th Cir.1987) ( ). See also Milton v. Cochran, 147 So.2d 137 (Fla.1962) (...
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