Nemeth v. Shore, 86-2610

Decision Date04 September 1987
Docket NumberNo. 86-2610,86-2610
Citation511 So.2d 1118,12 Fla. L. Weekly 2145
Parties12 Fla. L. Weekly 2145 Ronald NEMETH, Appellant, v. R.B. SHORE, as Clerk of the Circuit Court of Manatee County, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

David W. Wilcox, Bradenton, for appellant.

Edwin T. Mulock, Bradenton, for appellee.

DANAHY, Chief Judge.

In this review of an order denying a request for writ of mandamus directed to the Clerk of the Circuit Court, we address the question whether the clerk may properly enter a default on the twenty-first day following personal service of process on a party against whom affirmative relief is sought, when the clerk's file reflects no timely response from that party.

The problem arises from the fact that a response must be served within twenty days after service of original process. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.140. Service may be accomplished by mail and is deemed complete upon mailing. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.080(b). Therefore, a timely served-by-mail response may arrive for filing with the clerk several days after the expiration of the twenty-day period. Case law makes it clear that under such circumstances the default must be set aside. Unfortunately, in ruling that the default must be set aside the courts have given as a reason that the default was "erroneous," "premature," or "improper." E.g., Gavin v. Gavin, 456 So.2d 535 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Mo-Con Properties, Inc. v. American Mechanical, Inc., 289 So.2d 744 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). In Trawick's Florida Practice & Procedure (1986 ed.), at section 25-2, the author states that since the adverse party may have mailed a paper, postal delivery time must be added to the time for responding. He concludes that it is improper to ask the clerk to enter a default prematurely and for him to do so; that at least five days should be given for mail delivery after the return date.

In the present case, the appellant (the petitioner) filed a civil action in the Circuit Court of Manatee County. Personal service of process was properly made on all defendants. On September 11, 1986, the twenty-first day after service, the petitioner presented the appellee (the Clerk) with a motion for default. The Clerk accepted the motion but refused to enter a default until an additional five days had passed.

On September 12, 1986, the petitioner asked the trial court to issue a writ of mandamus compelling the Clerk to enter a default. That petition was denied on September 15, 1986. On the twenty-sixth day following service of summons on the defendants in the original action, September 16, 1986, the Clerk entered the default.

Thus the issue before us is technically moot. Nevertheless, we choose to address the issue because it is a recurring problem and because the clerks in this district apparently are following different procedures. Most are willing to enter a default on the twenty-first day after service of process but some others insist on waiting until the twenty-sixth day. Since this issue would nearly always be moot by the time it reached this court, unless we address it here the issue will escape appellate resolution. The matter is one of public interest and our opinion will provide guidance to the clerks in this district. Accordingly, we will consider whether the trial judge should have granted mandamus in this case. Walker v. Pendarvis, 132 So.2d 186 (Fla.1961); Times Publishing Co. v. Burke, 375 So.2d 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).

We certainly cannot fault those clerks who insist on waiting until the twenty-sixth day before entering default, since they have been told by the courts and other sources that to do so earlier would be improper, erroneous, or premature. We also recognize...

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2 cases
  • State v. Florida Parole Com'n, 92-3089
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 3 Septiembre 1993
    ...1983-88 period. See Times Pub. Co., Inc. v. City of St. Petersburg, 558 So.2d 487, 491 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Nemeth v. R.B. Shore, 511 So.2d 1118 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). In support of their petitions, Appellants rely largely on Washington v. Dowling, 92 Fla. 601, 109 So. 588 (1926), to argue that......
  • Mr. Martinez of Miami, Inc. v. Ponce De Leon Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 89-2875
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 13 Marzo 1990
    ...five days should be allowed by clerk for mail delivery after a return date, before default is entered). See also Nemeth v. R.B. Shore, 511 So.2d 1118, 1119 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (rejecting five-day waiting period and recognizing that "there are known delays in mail delivery and should the cler......
2 books & journal articles
  • Chapter 1-4 Defaults
    • United States
    • Full Court Press Florida Foreclosure Law 2022 Chapter 1 The Life of a Mortgage Foreclosure in Florida
    • Invalid date
    ...(even a letter sent by a defendant prevents the entry of a default without notice of application for default).[32] Nemeth v. Shore, 511 So. 2d 1118, 1119 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) ("We certainly cannot fault those clerks who insist on waiting until the twenty-sixth day before entering default, sin......
  • Chapter 1-4 Defaults
    • United States
    • Full Court Press Florida Foreclosure Law 2020 Title Chapter 1 The Life of a Mortgage Foreclosure in Florida
    • Invalid date
    ...(even a letter sent by a defendant prevents the entry of a default without notice of application for default).[31] Nemeth v. Shore, 511 So. 2d 1118, 1119 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) ("We certainly cannot fault those clerks who insist on waiting until the twenty-sixth day before entering default, sin......

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