Neutzel v. Ryans

• Decision Date: 16 May 1919
• Citation: 211 S.W. 852,184 Ky. 292
• Parties: NEUTZEL, COUNTY CLERK, v. RYANS.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

211 S.W. 852

184 Ky. 292

NEUTZEL, COUNTY CLERK, v. RYANS.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

May 16, 1919

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County, Common Pleas Branch First Division.

Suit for mandamus by Lewis Ryans against Fred O. Neutzel, Clerk of the County Court of Jefferson County, Ky. From judgment granting the writ, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

J. Matt Chilton and Nat C. Cureton, both of Louisville, for appellant.

Selligman & Selligman, of Louisville, and H. M. Brock, of Harlan, for appellee.

QUIN J.

The appellee, Lewis Ryans, filed with the appellant, clerk of the county court of Jefferson county, his notification and declaration to the effect that he would be a candidate of the Republican party for the office of representative from the Fiftieth legislative district, constituting the Tenth ward in the city of Louisville, at the election to be held in November, 1919, and for which nominations would be made at the primary to be held in August, 1919, at the time and in the manner prescribed by law.

Appellant having notified appellee that he would not place his name on the ballot as a candidate for the office aforesaid, this suit was filed asking a writ of mandamus against the appellant requiring him to receive appellee's application for a place on the ballot at the primary to be held in August 1919, and, if he received his party's nomination, to have his name placed on the ballot for the November election.

In passing upon a demurrer to the petition as amended, the lower court granted the writ of mandamus and directed appellant to receive appellee's petition and place his name upon the ballot as a candidate for the nomination by the Republican party at the primary to be held in August, 1919, and, if nominated in said primary, to place his name on the ballot as the Republican nominee for the House of Representatives in the Fifty-Eighth legislative district for the November, 1919 election.

Section 33 of the Constitution provides that the First General Assembly, after the adoption of the Constitution, shall divide the state into 100 representative districts, as nearly equal in population as possible, which districts shall constitute the representative districts for ten years, and at the expiration of which time and every ten years thereafter the state shall be redistricted.

Under the Redistricting Act of May 3, 1893 (Laws 1893, c. 193), the Tenth ward of the city of Louisville constituted the Fiftieth legislative district, and no attempt was made to change these districts until the legislative session of 1918, by an act approved March 26th of that year. Laws 1918, c. 45.

By reference to the last-named act it appears that the Fifty-First district is composed of all of Jefferson county outside of the corporate limits of the city of Louisville, the Thirty-Sixth precinct of the Eleventh ward, the Thirty-Second to the Forty-Third precincts, inclusive, of the Twelfth ward, and certain other enumerated precincts in the city of Louisville. The Fifty-Seventh district is composed of all of the Eleventh ward except the Thirty-Sixth precinct and all of the Twelfth ward except the Thirty-Second to Forty-Third precincts, inclusive, of the city of Louisville. The Fifty-Eighth district embraces the territory of the Eleventh and Twelfth wards of the city of Louisville.

The bill redistricting the state is entitled "An act dividing the commonwealth of Kentucky into one hundred representative districts," and is known as "House Bill No. 38," and by reference to the Journal of the Senate for the year 1918, vol. 2, p. 1970 et seq., we find that in the bill, as originally drafted and introduced in the House, the Fifty-First district embraced the territory outside of the corporate limits of the city, the Fifty-Seventh district embraced the Tenth ward, and the Fifty-Eighth district the Eleventh and Twelfth wards.

In its consideration of said House Bill the Senate proposed certain amendments thereto. Those pertinent to this case are as follows: The Fifty-First district to be the same as in the enrolled bill first hereinabove referred to, namely: All of Jefferson county outside of the corporate limits of the city of Louisville, the Thirty-Sixth precinct of the Eleventh ward, the Thirty-Second to the Forty-Third precincts, inclusive, of the Twelfth ward, and certain other enumerated precincts in the city of Louisville; the Fifty-Seventh district to embrace the Tenth ward, and the Fifty-Eighth district to embrace those precincts of the Eleventh and Twelfth wards not included in the Fifty-First district.

In his certification to the House of Representatives of these proposed amendments, the chief clerk of the Senate thus erroneously reported them:

"(3) Amend H. B. 38 in the Senate by striking out all of lines 58 and 59 on page 3, and all of lines 50 to 73, inclusive, on page 4, and insert in lieu therefor the following:

Fifty-First District. All of Jefferson County out-side of the corporate limits of the city of Louisville, and the Forty-Second to Fifty-Third precincts, inclusive, of Third ward, Twenty-Seventh and Twenty-Eighth precincts of Fifth ward, Forty-Ninth and Fiftieth precincts of Seventh ward, Thirty-Sixth precinct of Eleventh ward and the Thirty-Second to Forty-Third precincts, inclusive, of the Twelfth ward of the city of Louisville.

Fifty-Second District. First to Fifteenth precincts, inclusive, of the First ward of the city of Louisville.

Fifty-Third District. All of Second ward and all of Third ward except Forty-Second to Fifty-Third precincts, inclusive, of Third ward of the city of Louisville.

Fifty-Fourth District. All of Fourth ward and all of Fifth ward except the Twenty-Seventh and Twenty-Eighth precincts of the city of Louisville.

Fifty-Fifth District. All of Sixth ward, and all of the Seventh ward except the Forty-Ninth and Fiftieth precincts of the Seventh ward of the city of Louisville.

Fifty-Sixth District. Of the county of Jefferson embracing the territory of the Eighth and Ninth wards of the city of Louisville.

Fifty-Seventh District. All of the Eleventh ward except the Twenty-Sixth precinct, and all of the Twelfth ward, except the Thirty-Second to Forty-Third precincts, inclusive, of the Twelfth ward, city of Louisville."

The proposed amendment to the Fifty-First district was correctly reported, but the errors in the certification consist: (1) In the elimination of the Tenth ward; (2) substituting the proposed boundary of the Fifty-Eighth district for that of the Fifty-Seventh district; and (3) the omission of the Fifty-Eighth district.

Without detecting the mistake thus made, the House concurred in the amendments as certified, with the result that all the precincts in the Eleventh and Twelfth wards are included in the Fifty-First or Fifty-Seventh districts (as certified), the Tenth ward is entirely eliminated, and, since the proposed change of the Fifty-Eighth district did not reach the House, it remained as in the bill as first introduced, namely, as embracing the entire Eleventh and Twelfth wards. Thus it will be seen we have: (1) A duplication of the representation of the Eleventh and Twelfth wards; (2) no representation for the Tenth ward; and (3) in reality only 99 legislative districts, whereas the Constitution requires a total of 100.

It is inconceivable that the Legislature intended any such a result. The title of the bill is evidence of the intention to divide the state into 100 representative districts, as enjoined by the Constitution.

The Tenth ward was included in the first draft. The Senate merely proposed a rearrangement of these divisions. The error was clearly unintentional.

It is a well-settled rule of construction that the letter of a statute will not be followed when it leads to an absurd conclusion. The reason for the enactment must enter into its interpretation, so as to determine what was intended to be accomplished by it. The purpose is to give effect to the legislative intent. The will of the Legislature, not its words, are the law.

The object sought to be attained by the enactment of a statute being ascertained, it furnishes a most excellent aid in determining whether or not the words used convey the meaning intended by the Legislature. When they do not, and from the context, the attendant circumstances, and the object sought to be accomplished, this fact is made to appear, then the words may be modified consistent with the legislative intent. See Sams v. Sams, Adm'r, 85 Ky. 400, 3 S.W. 594, 9 Ky. Law Rep. 24; James, Auditor, v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 133 Ky. 299, 117 S.W. 406.

In Endlich's Work on the Interpretation of Statutes, § 295, the rule is thus stated:

"Where the language

...