Neville v. Highfields Farm, Inc.
Decision Date | 13 December 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 97–159.,97–159. |
Citation | 744 A.2d 89,144 N.H. 419 |
Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Parties | Richard NEVILLE and others v. HIGHFIELDS FARM, INC. and another. |
Sheehan Phinney Bass + Green, P.A., of Manchester (Stephen E. Weyl on the brief and orally), for the plaintiffs.
Cooper, Deans & Cargill, P.A., of North Conway (Randall F. Cooper on the defendants' joint brief), Upton, Sanders & Smith, of Concord (Russell F. Hilliard and Barton L. Mayer on the defendants' joint brief, and Mr. Hilliard orally), for the defendants.
The defendants, Highfields Farm, Inc. (Highfields) and the Town of Conway (town), appeal from a Superior Court (Mohl , J.) order finding a circumvention of the Town of Conway Planning Board's (planning board) authority and granting the plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief.
The plaintiffs, Richard Neville, September Neville, Edwin L. Neville, Jr., Whitney Harvey, and Charles Harvey, cross-appeal, arguing that the court erred in holding: (1) that the town's approval of Article 42 was not ultra vires; and (2) that the town did not enter into an unlawful indemnity agreement. We reverse in part and affirm in part.
This case arises from the relocation of a section of Baird Hill Road in Conway. The following facts were adduced after a bench trial and view of the property at issue. In 1972, Baird Hill Road was designated a scenic road and, therefore, became subject to restrictions regarding reconstruction as set forth in RSA 231:158 (1993).
Highfields owns property on Baird Hill Road and wished to relocate part of the road. The proffered reason was that the road's configuration and drainage system caused a nuisance and hazard to Highfields' property. Twice in 1991, Highfields sought approval from the planning board to relocate part of Baird Hill Road. The planning board denied both requests. Highfields did not appeal the planning board's decisions. Instead, it sent the board of selectmen a proposed warrant article (Article 42) for inclusion in the warrant for the 1992 town meeting.
At Highfields' expense, the town selectmen engaged the services of an independent engineering firm to make specific recommendations with respect to the relocation. The firm submitted its recommendations with a proposed location entirely on Highfields' property. In 1993, the defendants executed a relocation and indemnity agreement to relocate part of Baird Hill Road. After the work was completed, the town issued a release deed to Highfields.
The plaintiffs own property abutting Highfields' property on Baird Hill Road. They sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the relocation. The trial court denied their request. Pursuant to Article 42, the defendants relocated Baird Hill Road. Again, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief that would void Article 42 and the actions taken pursuant to it, and restore Baird Hill Road to its original location. The trial court ruled for the plaintiffs on their alternative argument that the selectmen circumvented the planning board's authority. The trial court therefore granted the plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief and ordered that the defendants restore Baird Hill Road. The defendants appealed, and the plaintiffs cross-appealed.
The defendants raise a number of issues on appeal. We need, however, address only one: whether the court erred in finding that a circumvention of the planning board's authority occurred. On cross-appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in holding that: (1) the acts precipitated by Article 42 were not ultra vires and did not violate RSA 231:158 ; and (2) the indemnity agreement into which the town entered was proper. We address these issues in turn.
"On appeal, we sustain the findings and rulings of the trial court unless they are lacking in evidential support or tainted by error of law." Quirk v. Town of New Boston , 140 N.H. 124, 128, 663 A.2d 1328, 1331 (1995) (quotation omitted). When ascertaining whether a circumvention of authority has transpired, we inquire whether the administrative agency whose authority is allegedly being circumvented had jurisdiction. See , e.g. , Cloutier v. Epping Water & Sewer Comm'n, 116 N.H. 276, 280, 360 A.2d 892, 895–96 (1976) ( ); Buxton v. Town of Exeter , 117 N.H. 27, 29, 369 A.2d 188, 189 (1977) ( ).
"Although the general function of the [planning] board is to prepare a master plan for the development of the municipality, the powers of the planning board are not limited solely to its preparation." Town of Freedom v. Gillespie , 120 N.H. 576, 579, 419 A.2d 1090, 1092 (1980) (quotation omitted); see RSA 674:1, I (1996). Once having created a planning board, a town may delegate additional authority to the board to enable it to promote municipal planning. RSA 674:1 ; Town of Freedom , 120 N.H. at 579, 419 A.2d at 1092. In addition, once a planning board is created and a statute grants exclusive jurisdiction to the board over a particular subject matter, the range of issues the town may consider relative to that subject matter becomes severely narrowed. See Ehrenberg v. City of Concord , 120 N.H. 656, 661, 421 A.2d 128, 131 (1980) ( ); see also Mudge v. Precinct of Haverhill Corner, 133 N.H. 881, 885, 587 A.2d 603, 605 (1991) ; Levasseur v. Board of Selectmen , 116 N.H. 340, 342, 358 A.2d 665, 666 (1976).
Where a town duly appoints an entity to handle specified matters and later attempts to overturn a decision of that entity by town vote, we have found a circumvention, rendering the town's decision invalid. See Cloutier , 116 N.H. at 280, 360 A.2d at 896. "Such a state of affairs would exist in derogation of a statutory framework that requires comprehensive land use planning as the major tool of growth regulation." Ehrenberg , 120 N.H. at 661, 421 A.2d at 132. The planning board, however, "has only those powers granted to it; it cannot usurp powers belonging to another town body or the town as a whole." Beck v. Town of Auburn
, 121 N.H. 996, 998, 437 A.2d 289, 291 (1981).
The plaintiffs argue that RSA 231:158 required the defendants to obtain approval from either the planning board or "any other official municipal body." The plaintiffs contend that because no other municipal body was designated, the planning board was the sole entity vested with jurisdiction to approve the removal of trees and stone walls.
We disagree with the plaintiffs' contention that the mere creation of the planning board divested the town of jurisdiction to vote on Article 42. "This court, of course, is the final arbiter of the legislature's intent as expressed in the words of the statute as considered as a whole." Pope v. Town of Hinsdale , 137 N.H. 233, 237, 624 A.2d 1360, 1362 (1993). We interpret the words of a statute according to their plain meaning. New London Land Use Assoc. v. New London Zoning Board , 130 N.H. 510, 514, 543 A.2d 1385,...
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