New England Dairies, Inc. v. Commissioner of Agriculture

• Decision Date: 17 March 1992
• Docket Number: No. 14245,14245
• Citation: 604 A.2d 810,221 Conn. 422
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: NEW ENGLAND DAIRIES, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE.

Page 810

604 A.2d 810

221 Conn. 422

NEW ENGLAND DAIRIES, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE.

No. 14245.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 4, 1991.

Decided March 17, 1992.

Sylvia M. Ho, with whom was Richard C. Robinson, Hartford, for appellant-appellee (plaintiff).

David H. Wrinn, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, Atty. Gen., and Joseph Rubin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee-appellant (defendant Com'r of Agriculture).

Frank J. Silvestri, Jr., Bridgeport, with whom were Andrew A. Wittenstein, pro hac vice, and, on the brief, Stuart I. Friedman, pro hac vice, New York City, for appellee-appellant (defendant Farmland Dairies).

Before SHEA, CALLAHAN, GLASS, BORDEN and BERDON, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Justice.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether a hearing held by the department of agriculture constituted a "contested case" pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq. The intervening defendant, Farmland Dairies (Farmland), a New Jersey based dairy manufacturer and supplier of milk and other dairy products, applied to the Connecticut department of agriculture for a license to sell and distribute milk in this state. The defendant, the commissioner of agriculture (commissioner), granted a license to Farmland. Thereafter, the plaintiff, New England Dairies, Inc., a Connecticut based milk dealer, appealed the commissioner's decision to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183(a). ¹ On December 31, 1990, the Superior Court dismissed the appeal. The plaintiff then appealed to the Appellate Court, and the defendants each cross appealed. ² We transferred the case to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

The briefs of the parties reveal the following undisputed facts. In January, 1989, Farmland applied to the department of agriculture for a license to sell and distribute milk in Connecticut. In the course of reviewing Farmland's application, the department of agriculture inspected Farmland's New Jersey dairy plant in August, 1989, and again in June, 1990. The inspectors determined that, at those times, Farmland's facilities did not conform to the requirements of the Connecticut department of agriculture. On December 8, 1989, the plaintiff sent a letter to the commissioner describing conduct by Farmland that the plaintiff believed should be considered by the commissioner prior to the issuance of a Connecticut milk dealer's license to Farmland. Specifically, the plaintiff maintained that it possessed information indicating that Farmland was in violation of General Statutes § 22-231(7), ³ and should not be granted a license. The commissioner informed the plaintiff that it would hold a hearing on Farmland's application, and that the plaintiff's concerns would be among the issues addressed at the hearing. Prior to the commencement of the hearing, the plaintiff requested that it be granted party status at the proceedings. The hearing officer designated by the commissioner denied that request, but granted the plaintiff intervenor status.

On November 1, 1990, the hearing commenced before the hearing officer. Shortly after the opening of the hearing, the department of agriculture announced that its inspectors had reinspected Farmland's facilities, and that Farmland had passed the inspection. On November 5, 1990, prior to the introduction by the plaintiff of any evidence of the alleged misconduct by Farmland, the commissioner issued a license to Farmland to sell and distribute milk and dairy products in Connecticut. Since the hearing no longer had a purpose, it was adjourned by the hearing officer.

On November 7, 1990, the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court pursuant to § 4-183(a) claiming that the hearing was improperly terminated. Farmland successfully moved to be joined as a party defendant in the appeal. Subsequently, both defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's appeal, claiming that the Superior Court was without jurisdiction to hear the appeal because: (1) the hearing before the department of agriculture was not a "contested case" pursuant to § 4-183(a) and General Statutes § 4-166(2) and (3); ⁴ and (2) the plaintiff was not aggrieved pursuant to § 4-183(a). Farmland raised a third ground for dismissal in its motion, claiming that the plaintiff's appeal should be dismissed because the plaintiff had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies as required by § 4-183 and General Statutes § 22-248. ⁵ The Superior Court concluded that the plaintiff had been aggrieved, and that it had exhausted its administrative remedies, but the court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal concluding that it had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the plaintiff had not appealed from a "contested case."

The plaintiff argues that the Superior Court improperly dismissed its appeal because the hearing before the department of agriculture was a contested case from which it had a right of appeal. We agree with the trial court that the plaintiff had not appealed from a contested case.

The UAPA grants the Superior Court jurisdiction over appeals of agency decisions only in certain limited and well delineated circumstances. General Statutes § 4-183(a). Generally, the UAPA requires that an appeal be taken from a "final decision." Section 4-166(3) defines a final decision as: "(A) the agency determination in a contested case, (B) a declaratory ruling issued by an agency pursuant to section 4-176 or (C) an agency decision made after reconsideration." The plaintiff's sole contention in its appeal to this court is that the commissioner's decision to grant a milk dealer's license to Farmland was a final decision because it constituted a "determination in a contested case" as contemplated by § 4-166(3)(A). "A 'contested case' is defined as 'a proceeding ... in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by statute to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing or in which a hearing is in fact held....' " (Emphasis in original.) Rybinski v. State Employees' Retirement Commission, 173 Conn. 462, 469, 378 A.2d 547 (1977); General Statutes § 4-166(2). Furthermore, we have determined that even in a case where a hearing is "in fact held," in order to constitute a contested case, a party to that hearing must have enjoyed a statutory right to have his "legal rights, duties or privileges" determined by that agency holding the hearing. Herman v. Division of Special Revenue, 193 Conn. 379, 383 n. 5, 477 A.2d 119 (1984); Rybinski v. State Employees' Retirement Commission, supra, 173 Conn. at 469-73, 378 A.2d 547; Taylor v. Robinson, 171 Conn. 691, 697, 372 A.2d 102 (1976). In the instance where no party to a hearing enjoys such a right, the Superior Court is without jurisdiction over any appeal from that agency's determination.

The plaintiff asserts that the hearing in this case was mandated because the commissioner is statutorily required to conduct a hearing on an application for a milk dealer's license when he is presented with a "reasonable basis" to believe that grounds for refusing that license "may exist." The plaintiff further asserts that the allegations in its letter to the commissioner presented a reasonable basis upon which to deny Farmland's application for a license. General Statutes § 22-234 provides in relevant part: "Before refusing to grant or renew, or before suspending, revoking or refusing to transfer, a license, the commissioner of agriculture shall afford the applicant or licensee an opportunity to be heard before him or his designated agent." General Statutes § 22-231 sets forth specific bases upon which the commissioner may "refuse to grant or renew a license, or may suspend, revoke or refuse to transfer a license already granted...." ⁶ By its plain language, § 22-234 entitles an applicant for a license to a hearing only prior to an action by the commissioner that would detrimentally affect the applicant. Nothing in § 22-234, or any provision of the UAPA, however, entitles any party to a hearing concerning an application for a milk dealer's license prior to the granting of such application.

The plaintiff claims that the legislature, in adopting §§ 22-231 and 22-234, intended to obligate the commissioner to conduct a hearing on an application for a milk dealer's license if reasonable grounds upon which the license could be refused were presented. The plaintiff asserts that any other interpretation of those statutes would lead to the bizarre circumstance in which the commissioner could decide not to hold a hearing, despite evidence tending to indicate that an applicant should not be issued a license. Such a result, it contends, would harm both consumers of dairy products and dairy...