New England Expedition-Providence, LLC v. City of Providence

• Decision Date: 19 June 2001
• Docket Number: No. 2001-89-Appeal.,2001-89-Appeal.
• Citation: 773 A.2d 259
• Parties: The NEW ENGLAND EXPEDITION-PROVIDENCE, LLC v. CITY OF PROVIDENCE et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

773 A.2d 259

The NEW ENGLAND EXPEDITION-PROVIDENCE, LLC v. CITY OF PROVIDENCE et al.

No. 2001-89-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 19, 2001.

Present WILLIAMS, C.J., LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.

Robert Corrente, Charles D. Blackman, Providence, for Plaintiff.

Richard G. Riendeau,/Deming E. Sherman, John T. D'Amico, Jr.,/Charles R. Mansolillo,/Albin s. Moser, Providence, for Defendant.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This case came before the Supreme Court on May 17, 2001, pursuant to an order directing both parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After hearing the arguments of counsel and reviewing the memoranda submitted by the parties, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown. Therefore, the case will be decided at this time.

The plaintiff in this action, The New England Expedition-Providence, LLC (NEE or plaintiff), has appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court that declared NEE's development project a "Land Development Project" as defined by G.L.1956 § 45-24-31(37) of the Rhode Island Zoning Enabling Act (enabling act), and thus, review and approval from the Providence City Plan Commission (plan commission) was required before demolition or building permits were issued.¹

The following facts are pertinent to this appeal. The plaintiff sought to develop a retail shopping center, to be known as "Providence Commons" (shopping center), on 13.01 acres in the City of Providence. The property consisted of thirty-one contiguous parcels bordered by Valley Street, Atwells Avenue and Eagle Street. The plaintiff indicated that the shopping center would be used solely for commercial purposes.

In November 2000, after it was informed by John Palmeri (Palmeri), city director of planning and development, that the project was a "Major Land Development Project" and that plan commission approval was mandatory, NEE applied to the plan commission for approval of this project as a land development project. The plan commission conducted hearings on NEE's application on November 21, 2000, and December 19, 2000. During the hearings, codefendants Raphael Lyon (Lyon) and the Providence Preservation Society (PPS) publicly expressed their strong opposition to the project. At the conclusion of the hearings a motion to approve the proposal failed on a tie vote and the matter was continued for the January 2001 session. Faced with what in all likelihood would be an adverse decision, NEE sought a different result. Enter Ramzi Loqa (Loqa), director of the Department of Inspection and Standards, who, at plaintiff's instance, issued an opinion that plan commission approval was not necessary to obtain permits for the project. Apparently energized by Loqa's determination, NEE abandoned its quest before the plan commission and turned to the Superior Court, seeking a declaratory judgment that, pursuant to § 421 of chapter 27 of the Providence Zoning Ordinance, plan commission review and approval was not necessary for this project.² The declaratory judgment action was heard on February 12, 2001, in Providence County Superior Court. During the hearing, NEE argued that projects planned exclusively for commercial uses were excluded from the definition of "Major Land Development Project" pursuant to the third sentence of § 421 and that plan commission review and approval was not required for NEE's proposed development. The thrust of plaintiff's argument was that single-use projects were excluded because, by its terms, the ordinance provided that the "purpose of a Major Land Development Project is to allow for the creation of multifamily, mixed use developments OR primary through secondary schools through careful site planning" and presumably, because NEE's project was designed solely of a commercial use, it did not need such "careful site planning." See Providence Zoning Ordinances, ch. 27, § 421. Further, plaintiff argued that if single-use projects, such as a commercial-use-only project, are considered to fall within the purview of § 421 then the third sentence of the definition would be reduced to mere surplusage. Consistent with his earlier assessment, defendant Loqa, although a named party, agreed with NEE's position and asserted that the city was ready to issue a building permit without approval by the plan commission.

Conversely, defendants Lyon and PPS urged the trial court to read § 421 in its entirety and not confine itself, as did plaintiff and defendant Loqa, to a piecemeal interpretation of the ordinance. The defendants argued the city and NEE ignored the first two sentences of § 421 and placed undue emphasis on the final sentence to support their contention. The defendants asserted that plaintiff's interpretation would produce an absurd result and would permit the development of a massive project spanning a multitude of contiguous properties, many of which needed to be leveled, causing the careful site planning."demolition of numerous buildings of historical significance, without any review by the city plan commission or any other planning agency.³

In making his decision, the trial justice recognized that § 45-24-31 of the state enabling act specifically provides that the definitions contained within chapter 24 of title 45 "are controlling in all local ordinances created under this chapter." Based upon this statutory mandate the trial justice determined that the Providence Zoning Ordinances must be read in conjunction with the enabling act; and, that such an interpretation classifies NEE's project as a major land development project requiring approval of the plan commission. A judgment was entered on February 21, 2001, and plaintiff filed a timely appeal.

On appeal, plaintiff argued that the trial justice committed reversible error with respect to three issues. First, NEE argued that the court erred when it found that the definitions contained in § 45-24-31 of the enabling act trump the narrower zoning provision. Second, plaintiffs asserted that the trial justice erred by not deferring to the city's administrative officer responsible for interpreting the zoning ordinance and by failing to construe the ordinance in accordance with its historical interpretation. Lastly, NEE averred that the court erred by ignoring the express language of § 421 and failed to give effect to the clearly stated intent of the local legislature. We are of the opinion that the trial justice correctly determined that to the extent it conflicts with the state act, the local ordinance is superseded by the enabling act, and, therefore, NEE's project requires plan commission approval.

We recognize that the sole issue before us is one of statutory interpretation. A trial justice's finding concerning statutory interpretation presents a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Levine v. Bess Eaton Donut Flour Co., 705 A.2d 980, 982 (R.I.1998)

. In discerning the meaning of a statute, our ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the Legislature. Matter of Falstaff Brewing Corp. Re: Narragansett Brewery Fire, 637 A.2d 1047, 1049-50 (R.I. 1994).

As a general rule, a local ordinance "is pre-empted by statewide legislation `if it disrupts the state's overall scheme of regulation * * *.'" Munroe v. Town of East Greenwich, 733 A.2d 703, 710 (R.I.1999) (quoting Town of East Greenwich v. O'Neil, 617 A.2d 104, 109 (R.I.1992)). In addition, we have consistently held that statutes must be interpreted to avoid absurd...