Roberts v. City of Geneva, CIV. A. 99-D-638-N.

• Decision Date: 07 September 2000
• Docket Number: No. CIV. A. 99-D-638-N.,CIV. A. 99-D-638-N.
• Parties: Danny Ray ROBERTS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF GENEVA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

114 F.Supp.2d 1199 Danny Ray ROBERTS, Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF GENEVA, et al., Defendants. No. CIV. A. 99-D-638-N. United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division. September 7, 2000.

Page 1200

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Page 1201

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Page 1202

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Page 1203

Johnny B. Davis, Dothan, AL, for Plaintiff.

R. Todd Derrick, Steadman Shealy, Jr., Cobb, Shealy & Crum, PA, Dothan, AL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DE MENT, District Judge.

Before the court is the City of Geneva ("the City"), Frankie Lindsey ("Lindsey"), Max Motley ("Motley"), and Tim Barney's ("Barney"), (collectively "Defendants"), Motion for Summary Judgment ("Mot."), together with a supporting Memorandum Brief ("Defs.' Br."), filed on July 27, 2000. On August 22, 2000, Plaintiff Danny Ray Roberts ("Plaintiff") filed a Memorandum In Opposition To Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, which the court construes as a Response ("Pl's Resp."). Defendants submitted a Reply on August 30, 2000. After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law, and the record as a whole, the court finds that Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment is due to be granted in part and denied in part.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). The Parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

On a motion for summary judgment, the court is to construe the evidence and factual inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Summary judgment can be entered on a claim only if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). As the Supreme Court has explained the summary judgment standard:

[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)).

The trial court's function at this juncture is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine

Page 1204

whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir.1989).

The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and of establishing, based on relevant "portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,'" that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). The mechanics of satisfying the initial burden vary, however, depending upon which party, the movant or the nonmovant, bears the burden of proof at trial. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir.1993) (detailing the nature of the parties' responsibilities when preparing or defending against a motion for summary judgment).

Once this initial demonstration under Rule 56(c) is made, the burden of production, not persuasion, shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his or] her own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)). In meeting this burden, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). That party must demonstrate that there is a "genuine issue for trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 56; see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. An action is void of a material issue for trial "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff resides in Geneva, Alabama. The property upon which Plaintiff resides is owned by Curtis and Mildred Speinger.¹ Plaintiff alleges that in June and July of 1997, the City, Lindsey, as chief of police of the City of Geneva, and police officers Barney and Motley² removed the following vehicles from the property where Plaintiff resides:

(a) 1981 Oldsmobile Cutlass;

(b) 1975 Chevrolet Luv Pickup Truck³;

(c) 1965 Nash Rambler;

(d) 1969 Rambler; and

(e) 1975 Triumph.

(Compl. at ¶ 3.)

Defendants allege that the vehicles in Plaintiff's yard presented a clear risk to the people in the neighborhood due to the possibility of rodents, snakes, and insects, as well as the possibility of entrapment of children in the junk vehicles. (Def. Br. at 3-4; C. Speigner Aff., M. Speigner Aff., Lindsey Aff., Barney Aff., Motley Aff.) Defendants contend that the vehicles were removed to protect the health, safety, and

Page 1205

welfare of the citizens who live in the neighborhood. (Def. Br. at 5; Lindsey Aff.; Barney Aff.; Motley Aff.) Further, Defendants aver that the City and officers acted in accordance with local ordinance 10-69-02 which reads, in part, as follows:

Section 4. Disposition of wrecked or discarded vehicles. No person in charge or control of any property within the City of Geneva or it's [sic] police jurisdiction, whether as owner, tenant, occupant, lessee or otherwise, shall allow any partially dismantled, non-operating, wrecked, junked or discarded vehicle to remain on such property for a longer time than 10 Days; and no person shall leave any such vehicle on any property within the City of Geneva or police jurisdiction for a longer time than 10 Days; except that this ordinance shall not apply with regard to a vehicle in an enclosed building; a vehicle on the premises of a business enterprise; or a vehicle in an appropriate storage place or depository maintained in a lawful place and manner by the City of Geneva.

Section 5. Impounding. The Chief of Police or any member of his department designated by him is hereby authorized to remove or have removed any vehicle left at any place within the City of Geneva or Police jurisdiction which reasonably appears to be in violation of this ordinance or lost, stolen, or unclaimed. Any vehicle so taken up and removed shall be stored in a suitable place provided by the City of Geneva. A permanent record giving the date of the taking of each vehicle, the place where found and taken, and a description of the vehicle shall be kept by the Chief of Police.

(Defs.' Br. at 5; Attach. C of Lindsey Aff.)

Plaintiff contends that the vehicles removed were not hazardous or junk. (Pl.'s Resp. at 6.) Plaintiff claims that each of the vehicles was simply in need of repairs, and that he was working on making the repairs up until the time Defendants removed them. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff argues that this was simply another event in a chain of harassment by the City and the Geneva police, dating back to 1980. (Id. at 4-7.)

Since their removal, the vehicles have been stored by Ronald Elmore. (Defs.' Br. at 4.) Plaintiff contends that, although he has inquired of the City several times about where the vehicles were located, he did not learn that the vehicles were being stored by Ronald Elmore until Defendants filed their Motion For Summary Judgment. (Pl.'s Resp. at 9.) Plaintiff alleges that his vehicles have been damaged and vandalized while in storage. (Pl.'s Resp. at 8.) Defendants contend that the vehicles have not been damaged, and in fact are in substantially the same condition as they were in when removed from Plaintiff's property. (Defs.' Br. at 4; Elmore Aff.; Lindsey Aff.; Barney Aff.) Defendants claim that the police periodically check on the vehicles to ensure that they are in the same condition as they were when moved, and that the vehicles have been clearly marked to ensure that no damage is done to them. (Defs.' Br. at 4; Lindsey Aff.; Barney Aff.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff is free to retrieve the vehicles at any time so long as he makes the vehicles operable and/or stores them outside the city limits. (Defs.' Br. 4-5.) Defendants claim that, with the exception of the Chevrolet Luv pick-up, Plaintiff has expressed no interest in retrieving the vehicles. (Id. at 5.)

As a result of the impoundment of the vehicles, Plaintiff filed a seventeen-count Complaint.⁴

Counts One and Two assert federal constitutional claims as enforced by § 1983. Count One alleges that the City violated

Page 1206

Plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth amendment rights by entering Plaintiff's homestead and converting the previously stated chattels of Plaintiff.

Count Two states that Lindsey, Motley, and Barney, "under color of law," did trespass on Plaintiff's...