New York Casualty Co. v. Lawson

• Decision Date: 01 March 1930
• Citation: 24 S.W.2d 881,160 Tenn. 329
• Parties: NEW YORK CASUALTY CO. v. LAWSON.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

24 S.W.2d 881

160 Tenn. 329

NEW YORK CASUALTY CO. v. LAWSON.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

March 1, 1930

Appeal from Chancery Court, Marion County; T. L. Stewart Chancellor.

Suit by the New York Casualty Company against C. C. Lawson. Decree for defendant, and complainant appeals. Reversed and rendered.

Charles A. Noone, of Chattanooga, for appellant.

S. P Raulston and Tom C. Kelly, both of Jasper, for appellee.

WILLIAMS Special Justice.

This is a suit to enjoin the enforcement of a judgment at law. The defendant demurred to the bill; the chancellor sustained the demurrer; and the complainant has brought the case by appeal to this court.

The bill set forth the proceedings and exhibited the record in the action wherein the judgment attacked was obtained. Such proceedings were substantially as follows:

On September 17, 1928, C. C. Lawson caused an attachment to be issued by a justice of the peace against the property of Robert Harris and the Bird Motor Company. No ground was stated to authorize the issuance of the attachment. The affidavit upon which it issued merely alleged that Robert Harris and the Bird Motor Company were justly indebted to C C. Lawson in the sum of $1,000 damages for injury to his car done by a certain Buick car driven by Robert Harris. While both the affidavit and the attachment stated that suit had been commenced by a summons and that the amount laid therein was $1,000, no summons actually issued. The Buick car was seized under the attachment by the sheriff. No publication was made to bring either Harris or the motor company before the court.

However, on September 26, 1928, Robert Hurst, as principal, and the New York Casualty Company, as surety, made what they inaccurately styled a forthcoming bond, payable to the sheriff and C. C. Lawson in the sum of $1,000. It referred to the attachment proceedings and the seizure of the Buick car thereunder, stated that the car was the property of Robert Hurst, who had been misnamed as Robert Harris in the attachment proceedings, and asserted that such proceedings were illegal and void and that no appearance was made therein except to challenge their validity and to obtain possession of the car pending a determination thereof. The condition of the bond was that, in the event the attachment was sustained, Robert Hurst should restore the car or its reasonable value to the sheriff to satisfy any judgment the court might pronounce. The bond was taken and the car turned over to Robert Hurst.

Thereafter, on October 4, 1928, Robert Hurst, by his attorney, filed a written motion to quash the attachment, stating therein that he appeared specially and solely for that purpose. The grounds of the motion were that the court had no jurisdiction to issue the attachment, that no ground therefor was stated in the affidavit upon which it issued, and that it was neither original process nor ancillary to any pending cause. Thereupon Lawson moved the court to be permitted to amend the attachment so as to reduce the amount therein laid from $1,000 to $500, and to allege that at the time of the injury the Buick car was being willfully run in excess of 30 miles per hour upon the highway, and that the defendant to the attachment was about secretly to move his property out of the county. The justice of the peace granted the motion to amend, overruled the motion to quash, and gave judgment orally in favor of Lawson for $500, but without making any record entry thereof. Filing the oath in lieu of bond, Robert Hurst appealed the case to the circuit court.

Further than to appeal, Robert Hurst did not appear in the circuit court, but allowed the action there to proceed without making any defense to it. On February 28, 1929, the circuit court rendered judgment, sustaining the attachment, and awarding Lawson a recovery of $499.99 against Robert Hurst, principal, and the New York Casualty Company, surety, upon the replevy bond. The judgment provided that, if within twenty days the Buick car should be delivered to the clerk of the circuit court to be sold by him, the proceeds of such sale would be credited on the judgment and the defendant therein released to that extent. The car was not delivered to the clerk, and he issued execution on the judgment on March 29, 1929. After collecting by garnishment $10.09 of Robert Hurst, the sheriff made a nulla bona return May 29, 1929.

Lawson then advised the commissioner of insurance and banking of the refusal of the New York Casualty Company to pay the judgment against it, and asked that its license to do business in Tennessee be revoked on account of such refusal; and the commissioner notified it that its license would be revoked unless it either paid the judgment or took proper steps to test its validity.

Thereupon it filed the present bill, detailing the proceedings above set out and insisting that the judgment was void for the following reasons: (1) No ground was stated to warrant issuance of the attachment; (2) there was no summons or publication to bring defendants before the court; (3) the attachment being fatally defective in matter of substance could not be amended so as to cure it; (4) the amount claimed in the attachment, being $1,000 damages, was in excess of the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace, and consequently in excess of the appellate jurisdiction of the circuit court; (5) the amendment reducing this amount to $500 merely reduced the amount laid in the attachment, without reducing the amount claimed in the suit incident to the attachment; and (6) the justice of the peace did not sustain the attachment or render any judgment thereon, and therefore the circuit court did not acquire any jurisdiction of the proceedings by reason of the attempt to appeal to that court. The prayer of the bill was that the judgment be declared void, and that C. C. Lawson be perpetually enjoined from proceeding to enforce it as against complainant.

The grounds of defendant Lawson's demurrer to the bill were: (1) The judgment, if not a proper one, was at most merely erroneous and not void, and the chancery court, not being a court of review, had no jurisdiction to interfere with the enforcement of the judgment; (2) since complainant's principal on the bond, Robert Hurst, had made no question of his liability, the complainant could not do so, but was bound by the judgment against him; (3) no fraud, accident, mistake, or other ground for equitable relief was alleged; (4) complainant had a full, adequate, and complete remedy at law; and (5) complainant was estopped to deny the legality of the bond or the attachment proceedings under which complainant obtained the automobile.

Sustaining the demurrer, the chancellor decreed Lawson a recovery upon appellant's injunction bond for the amount of the judgment, interest, and costs.

Thus the question arising below upon the pleadings and presented here by the assignments of error is whether the judgment is such that a court of chancery ought to intervene to prevent its enforcement. A court of chancery is not a court of review to correct errors committed by other courts, and it will not enjoin a judgment or decree merely because such judgment or decree is erroneous. But it will enjoin a judgment or decree which is void or one which is voidable for certain reasons recognized as grounds of equitable relief. Gibson's Suits in Chancery, § 814; Ridgeway v. Bank, 30 Tenn. (11 Humph.) 523; Bell v. Williams, 38 Tenn. (1 Head) 229.

The bill does not impeach the judgment as voidable upon any such ground of equitable relief. It attacks it as void. A void judgment is one which shows upon the face of the record a want of jurisdiction in the court assuming to render the judgment, which want of jurisdiction may be either of the person, or of the subject-matter generally, or of the particular question attempted to be decided or the relief assumed to be given. Chickamauga Trust Co. v. Lonas, 139 Tenn. 228, 235, 201 S.W. 777, L. R. A. 1918D, 451; Vanvabry v. Staton, 88 Tenn. 353, 12 S.W. 786; Finley v. Gaut, 67 Tenn. (8 Baxt.) 149; Holmes v. Eason, 76 Tenn. (8 Lea) 755.

It may be said that, in the absence of such an affirmative showing of a jurisdictional defect, there is a presumption that none existed. While this is the rule which is applied to a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction rendered in the exercise of such jurisdiction, it is not the rule for a judgment of a court of special and limited jurisdiction or for a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction where such judgment rests, not upon such general jurisdiction, but upon special and limited powers derived from statute. The rule for a judgment of either of these kinds is that every jurisdictional fact must affirmatively appear upon the record, or the judgment is void. This is true of judgments in attachment proceedings. Harris v. Hadden, 75 Tenn. (7 Lea) 215; Ingle v. McCurry, 48 Tenn. (1 Heisk.) 29; Walker v. Cottrell, 65 .Tenn. (6 Baxt.) 257; Pope v. Harrison, 84 Tenn. (16 Lea) 82, 95.

In this state, jurisdiction of the subject-matter of attachments is derived from two sources; (1) As an incident to its powers with respect to extraordinary process, a chancery court may issue attachments of property. These are sometimes called equitable attachments, and they cannot issue except upon the fiat of a chancellor or judge. (2) Under our statutes chancery courts, circuit courts, and justices of the peace are empowered to issue attachments of property in certain specific cases. These may be called statutory attachments, and in the cases provided for they may be issued by the clerk and master without a fiat (Gibson's Suits in Chancery, §§ 175, 872), or by the clerk of the circuit court, a circuit judge, a chancellor, or a justice of the peace (Shannon's...