New York Institute for Ed. of Blind v. United Federation of Teachers' Committee for New York Institute for Ed. of Blind

• Decision Date: 08 December 1981
• Docket Number: AFL-CIO
• Parties: The NEW YORK INSTITUTE FOR the EDUCATION OF the BLIND, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. The UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS' COMMITTEE FOR the NEW YORK INSTITUTE FOR the EDUCATION OF the BLIND, The United Federation of Teachers, Local 2,, and New York State Labor Relations Board, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 637

444 N.Y.S.2d 637

83 A.D.2d 390

The NEW YORK INSTITUTE FOR the EDUCATION OF the BLIND Plaintiff-Respondent, v. The UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS' COMMITTEE FOR the NEW YORK INSTITUTE FOR the EDUCATION OF the BLIND, The United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, AFL-CIO, and New York State Labor Relations Board, Defendants-Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

First Department.

Dec. 8, 1981.

James R. Sandner, New York City, for defendants-appellants other than New York State Labor Relations Bd., for Elizabeth A. Truly, New York City, of counsel.

Norbert M. Phillipps, New York City, for New York State Labor relations bd.

Herman E. Cooper, New York City, for plaintiff-respondent; Jonathan L. Sulds, New York City, of counsel.

Before MURPHY, P. J., and KUPFERMAN, SULLIVAN, CARRO and LUPIANO, JJ.

SULLIVAN, Justice.

This action arises out of the efforts of the United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, AFL-CIO (UFT) and its affiliate, the United Federation of Teachers' Committee for the New York Institute for the Education of the Blind, to obtain, pursuant to Labor Law § 705, New York State Labor Relations Board certification of the UFT as collective bargaining representative of certain employees of the New York Institute for the Education of the Blind.

In the course of the State Board's investigation of the UFT's representation petitions, the Institute raised a question as to whether the Board had jurisdiction over it and its employees upon the ground, inter alia, that it was a "public employer" and its employees "public employees" within the meaning of the Civil Service Law, Article 14 (Taylor Law), sections 201(6) and 201(7), respectively, and, therefore, that jurisdiction was properly vested in the New York State Public Employment Relations Board, pursuant to Civil Service Law §§ 200-214. Copies of a letter from the Institute's counsel to a UFT representative warning of the possible application of the Taylor Law, with its prohibition against strikes and the specter of fines and penalties for its violation, were distributed by the Institute to its employees. The UFT, alleging interference with the employees' exercise of their collective bargaining rights in violation of Labor Law § 704(10), filed an unfair labor practice charge with the State Board. Eight days later, as the charge was being investigated, and three months after the filing of the original representation petition, the Institute commenced this action against the UFT, the Committee and the State Board for a declaratory judgment, pursuant to CPLR §§ 3001 and 3017(b), that it is a "public employer" and its employees "public employees" and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the Public Employment Relations Board or, alternatively, if it is not a public employer, that it is subject to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board (National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169), rather than the State Board. The statutorily mandated formal hearing (Labor Law § 705 which had been scheduled to ascertain the facts upon which this jurisdictional question would have been resolved, was aborted due to the commencement of this action.

After the State Board answered, the UFT and the Committee moved to dismiss, asserting that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that, in any event, in the exercise of judicial discretion, it should decline to entertain jurisdiction. The State Board joined in this application and submitted a supporting affirmation. In opposing the motion the Institute requested a declaration that it is a public employer. Special Term denied the motion and declared the Institute to be a public employer and its employees public employees under the Taylor Law. ¹ Special Term stated, erroneously we believe, that "the material facts are not in dispute." As a matter of fact, the Board, without any knowledge of the Institute's operations and its relationship to its employees, and having been deprived of the opportunity to conduct a hearing on the underlying jurisdictional question, by its answer put in issue all the material allegations of the complaint. Because we believe that the sound exercise of discretion and orderly administration of the labor laws and policies of this state require that the State Board be permitted, in the first instance, to conduct an evidentiary hearing and rule with respect to its own jurisdiction, we would reverse and dismiss the complaint.

The Institute, established in 1831 by special act of the New York State Legislature "for the purpose of instructing children who have been born blind, or who may have become blind by disease or accident" (L. of 1831, ch. 214) ², is a residential educational facility for blind and blind multiple-handicapped children located in the Bronx. Examination of the statute creating it reveals that the Institute was incorporated solely as a private corporation, ³ not as a "public corporation." It is a "body corporate and politic, in fact and in name ...." ⁴ The Institute may purchase, hold and convey real and personal property in its own name and in furtherance of its purposes. ⁵

Under the New York State Constitution, the state is required to maintain and support "a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated." (Article XI, Section 1.) The State of New York has historically provided educational services to the blind, the deaf, and the handicapped through a combination of state-owned and private state-supported institutions (Education Law §§ 4201 et seq., 4301 et seq., 4351 et seq., 4401 et seq.), whose purposes are identical. The Commissioner of Education exercises general regulatory authority over both types of schools. (See Education Law §§ 4201 et seq.) Article 85 of the Education Law calls for the appointment of "blind persons of suitable age and capacity ... who shall have been residents in this state for one year" as "state pupils" to either the Institute, the New York State School for the Blind in the City of Batavia or the Lavelle School for the Blind in the City of New York. (Education Law § 4206 Appointments of blind children to each of these institutions are made on the basis of residence. Traditionally, the Institute and the Lavelle School receive children who reside in the lower tier of the state, south of Albany, while the State School in Batavia takes those from the northern tier. The Batavia school currently has approximately 100 students and the Lavelle School approximately 70. The State School in Batavia, established by the Legislature in 1867 (L. of 1867, ch. 744), is a state-operated facility (Education Law § 4301) while the Institute and the Lavelle School are state-supported private schools ⁶ "subject to the visitation of the Commissioner of Education" (Education Law § 4201[1]).

Section 4201of the Education Law, which fixes the specific duties and responsibilities of the Commissioner of Education, inter alia, authorizes the Commissioner to inquire into the organization and methods of instruction employed by the schools; to prescribe courses of study and methods of instruction that meet state requirements; to appoint, transfer and cancel appointments of students; to suggest to the school and the Legislature such improvements as he deems expedient and to report annually to the Legislature regarding his observations. Private state-supported schools may, with the exception of those recommendations related to accreditation and appointment of pupils, accept or reject the Commissioner's recommendations.

At present, there are two state-owned and ten private state-supported institutions for the education of the blind and the deaf subject to the visitation of the Commissioner. ⁷ The Institute is one of the ten private state-supported institutions. In 1979, it employed approximately 280 persons and serviced approximately 159 blind and blind multiple-handicapped students in day and residential treatment programs. The Institute is funded through federal, state and private sources. Most of its students are state-appointed (see Education Law § 4206), for each of whom the director of the Institute receives an appropriation from the Commissioner of Taxation and Finance for tuition and maintenance (see Education Law § 4207). A small number of out-of-state students, whose tuition is paid directly to the Institute, usually by the state of which they are residents, are accepted into the Institute's program. In addition, the Institute receives federal grants and solicits private donations.

The state reimburses the Institute for a substantial part of its operating expenses. (See section 200.6of the Commissioner's Regulations.) To qualify for such reimbursement, the Institute is required to justify its proposed and actual expenses to the Commissioner. The expenditures at state-owned and operated schools furnish the guidelines for the budget review of private state-supported schools, like the Institute. (See section 200.0(b)of the Commissioner's Regulations.) Neither the state nor the Commissioner imposes any limitation on the use by state-supported schools of private funds which are available to supplement employee wages and benefits. By regulation, the Commissioner has even suggested that private state-supported schools for the blind and deaf designate part of their private funds to provide "merit supplements" to the salaries of members of the staff. (See section 200.6(b)of the Commissioner's Regulations.)

A self-perpetuating and self-governing board of managers, none of whom is either a state officer ⁸ or school district officer ⁹, manages the Institute and is responsible for the conduct of its affairs. ¹⁰ These managers neither hold office at the pleasure of, nor derive their authority from, any public official or body. ¹¹ The Institute's officers are elected by the board of managers from among its own number.

Employment at the Institute is not governed by civil service appointment procedures, and...