New York State Thruway Authority v. Ashley Motor Court, Inc.

• Decision Date: 07 July 1961
• Citation: 10 N.Y.2d 151,218 N.Y.S.2d 640,176 N.E.2d 566
• Parties: , 176 N.E.2d 566 NEW YORK STATE THRUWAY AUTHORITY, Respondent, v. ASHLEY MOTOR COURT, INC., et al., Appellants.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 640

218 N.Y.S.2d 640

10 N.Y.2d 151, 176 N.E.2d 566

NEW YORK STATE THRUWAY AUTHORITY, Respondent, v. ASHLEY MOTOR COURT, INC., et al., Appellants.

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 7, 1961.

Joseph Worona and Milton M. Haven, Poughkeepsie, for appellants.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (Julius L. Sackman and Paxton Blair, Albany, of counsel), for respondent.

FULD, Judge.

This appeal involves the constitutionality of the statute restricting the erection of billboards and other advertising devices along the Thruway.

The advertising sign in question carried the legend

'On Exit 14 Thruway

Ashley MOTEL (AAA)',

the motel being located some miles from where the sign was located. The Thruway Authority instituted this suit to enjoin the defendants Ashley Motor Court, the owner of the motel, Highway Displays, the party who maintained the sign, and Ramapo Land Company, who owned the land where the sign was situated from continuing to use the sign and to have them remove it. The courts below decided in favor of the Thruway, upholding the validity of the statute, and the defendants appeal to us as of right.

Attending the enactment of the statute, section 361-a of the Public Authorities Law, Consol.Laws, c. 43-A (L.1952, ch. 593), were explicit legislative findings that the 'unrestricted and unregulated erection and maintenance of advertising devices adjacent to the thruway system would create conditions which are inimical to the public interest, interfere with the safety, comfort, security and welfare of the people of this state and mar the natural beauty of areas adjacent to the thruway system. In order to prevent such conditions the legislature hereby determines that the following enactment (§ 361-a) is necessary' (§ 1).

In its first subdivision, section 361-a prohibits the erection of any billboard or other advertising device located within a specified distance of the nearest edge of the Thruway pavement unless a written permit is granted by the Thruway Authority. ¹ Subdivision 2 defines an 'advertising device' as any device 'intended to attract or which does attract the attention' of those driving motor vehicles on the Thruway. Subdivision 3 gives the Authority the power to adopt regulations for the issuance of permits for advertising devices; such regulations, it is specified, 'shall be designed to effectuate the general purposes' of the statute and 'the specific objectives and standards' are set out as follows:

(a) 'To provide for maximum visibility';

(b) 'To prevent unreasonable distraction' of motor vehicle operators;

(c) 'To prevent confusion with regard to traffic lights, signs or signals' or other interference with the effectiveness of traffic regulations;

(d) 'To preserve and enhance the natural scenic beauty or the aesthetic features of the thruway system' and

(e) 'To promote maximum safety, comfort and well-being of the users of the thruway.'

And, by subdivision 7, the Authority is expressly empowered to permit advertising devices such as signs giving the names and addresses of the owners of the property on which they are placed or indicating the sale or leasing of such property if it finds that they do not interfere with safety or contravene any other specified standards.

The sign in question, for which no permit has ever been sought by any one, is located within 500 feet of the edge of the Thruway pavement and was originally placed on defendant Ramapo's property, adjacent to Route 17 in 1937. When, in 1958, that property was condemned for use in connection with the widening of Route 17, it was moved to its present location on adjacent land.

The defendants argue that section 361-a is invalid because it is not reasonably related to the public health, morals or safety and because it constitutes a taking of property rights without compensation.

There can be no doubt that the statute is reasonably related to a legitimate legislative purpose. As both the Legislature's finding and the statute's listed objectives make clear, the legislation was aimed at rendering the Thruway safe for the traveling public by providing for maximum visibility and by preventing unreasonable distractions. There are some, perhaps, who may dispute whether billboards or other advertising devices interfere with safe driving and constitute a traffic hazard (see Price, Billboard Regulations Along the Interstate Highway System, 8 Kansas L.Rev. 81, but mere disagreement may not cast doubt on the statute's validity. Matters such as these are reserved for legislative judgment, and the legislative determination, here expressly announced, will not be disturbed unless manifestly unreasonable. See, e. g., Wiggins v. Town of Somers, 4 N.Y.2d 215, 218-219, 173 N.Y.S.2d 579, 581, 582; Lincoln Bldg. Associates v. Barr, 1 N.Y.2d 413, 415-416, 153 N.Y.S.2d 633, 634, 635.

It has been said that billboards can be as destructive of the beauties of the countryside as a plague of locusts and that, consequently, aesthetic considerations alone are enough to sustain enactments restricting and regulating the erection of advertising devices. We need not, however, concern ourselves with the question whether the preservation of 'the natural scenic beauty' (§ 361-a, subd. 3, par. (d)) would in and of itself be a sufficient basis for the legislation under consideration. The fact is that the statute before us refers to the aesthetic element as but one of the 'objectives and standards' which the Authority should have in mind in adopting regulations for the issuance of permits. The other factors to be considered by the agency such as the promotion of 'maximum safety' and the prevention of 'unreasonable distraction' and 'confusion' (§ 361-a, subd. 3, pars. (b), (c), (d)) undoubtedly justify the exercise of the police power. See, e. g., Presnell v. Leslie, 3 N.Y.2d 384, 389, 165 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492; Perlmutter v. Greene, 259 N.Y. 327 332, 182 N.E. 5, 6, 81 A.L.R. 1543. A...