Newald v. Valley Farming Co.
Decision Date | 25 March 1918 |
Docket Number | 246,338 |
Citation | 202 S.W. 838,133 Ark. 456 |
Parties | NEWALD v. VALLEY FARMING COMPANY |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Appeal from Clay Chancery Court, Western District; Chas. D Frierson, Chancellor; affirmed.
Decree affirmed. Motion for rehearing denied.
J. F Gautney and F. G. Taylor, for appellants.
1. Appellants have the right to pay their pro rata per acre of the mortgage and have their lands released. 127 Ark. 577; 141 U.S. 247; 41 Minn. 14; 27 Cyc. 1415-16; 20 A. & E. Enc. L 1070 and notes; 57 N.J.Eq. 539. This right to release may be exercised at any time before final decree. 41 A. 405; 41 Minn. 14; 63 N.W. 1012; 103 Iowa 301; 72 N.W. 531; 57 N.J.Eq. 539; 162 Ill. 426. It was not necessary to make a tender. 70 Ore.; 142 Pa. 321.
The stipulation entered into was only an extension of time of payment. 103 Ark. 484.
2. The court erred in rescinding the contracts of sale to appellants. There was no offer to put parties in statu quo. 25 Ark. 196; 59 Id. 251. The parties seeking rescission had full notice of the sales. 119 Mich. 343; 42 Neb. 87; 60 N.W. 391. The lands that Dorough-Newald Co. conveyed were conveyed after the contracts of sale were made and previous to the time of performance and there were no grounds of rescission. 29 A. & E. Enc. L. 667.
There was no evidence to sustain the decree in favor of John and Mary Gancell. The land sold the Blanars was not sold to Taylor or Morgan. As to the right to deduct the value of land lost by reason of the conveyance to Terry, see 47 Ark. 293.
3. The parties seeking rescission have no rights under the release provision of the mortgage even if they had a right to rescind.
4. The amount of the judgment is excessive.
D. Hopson, T. J. Crowder and G. B. Oliver, for appellee, Valley Farming Co.
1. The decree should be affirmed for non-compliance with Rule 9.
2. Appellee was not bound by the clause as to the release on payment of pro rata amount per acre. This was inserted without the knowledge or consent of appellee. Newald failed to pay the taxes and permitted the land to be sold, but received large rents. He made no improvements. He continued to sell lands after the suit to foreclose was commenced. His claim for damages is unfounded and without merit. He was not damaged.
As to the consideration for the deeds made see 13 Cyc. 613 (II).
The claims of the interveners are without merit. The conveyances were not in good faith. No tender was made.
3. Under the provision for release appellants have no rights. Par. 6 of the stipulation entirely supersedes this insertion made without authority. Appellants have never complied with their undertakings. Terry, Taylor and Morgan were not innocent purchasers. Their claims to release are without merit.
4. After suit to foreclose is begun the right to release ceases except on payment of the full debt. 92 N. Rep. 474; 84 Am. Dec. 726; 43 F. 552; 152 N.Y.S. 87; 36 N.J.Eq. 69. See also Jones on Mortg. (5th ed.) § 981, p. 987.
5. No payment nor tender was made under the stipulation.
G. B. Oliver, for the other appellees.
1. The action of Dorough-Newald Co. in selling and conveying the land to interveners without any reference to previous conveyances to appellees and the delivery of possession by said company to them amounts to a rescission, or rather the acceptance of the offer to rescind made in the complaint. Black on Rescission and Cancellation, etc., §§ 526, 528; Ib. 534; 39 Cyc. 1356, c. 1357.
2. Appellees tendered back a deed and offered to reconvey before suit. Black on Rescission and Cancellation, etc., § 630.
3. Appellees are entitled to rescission and a lien. The decree is right.
T. J. Crowder, D. Hopson and G. B. Oliver, for appellee, supplemental brief.
1. The decree of January 20, 1916, was final and the transcript was not lodged within six months.
2. The decree is not excessive. If any error was made, it was a misprision of the clerk and can be corrected.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
This was a suit in equity to foreclose a mortgage on real estate. Certain persons who had purchased tracts of land after the execution of the mortgage were allowed to become parties and asked that their contracts for the purchase of the lands be set aside on account of fraud practiced upon them by the mortgagors. Still other persons who had purchased some of the lands from the mortgagors since the execution of the mortgage were allowed to intervene for the purpose of asserting their rights to have the lands purchased by them released from the mortgage by the payment of certain sums.
On the 31st day of March, 1914, the plaintiff, Valley Farming Company, conveyed to the defendant, L. J. Newald, a large tract of land in the western district of Clay County, Arkansas, consisting of something over 8,000 acres; about five hundred acres of which were cleared and in cultivation. The consideration was $ 85,000, evidenced by the promissory notes of L. J. Newald and S.E. Newald, his wife. Of these notes one was for $ 5,000, due six months after date; four were for $ 15,000, each due respectively twelve, eighteen, twenty-four and thirty months after date and the remaining note was for $ 20,000, due thirty-six months after date. The notes bore the date of March 31, 1914, and on that date L. J. Newald and S. E. Newald executed a mortgage to the Valley Farming Company on the lands to secure the payment of these notes. Said mortgage contains the following provision:
"It being expressly agreed by and between the Valley Farming Company and L. J. and S. E. Newald, or assigns, that upon paying the pro rata amount per acre of this mortgage any part or parcel of the land covered by said mortgage shall be released."
According to the contention of the plaintiff the draft of the mortgage submitted to its officers did not contain this provision and evidence was introduced tending to show that the provision was inserted in the mortgage without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff and was not discovered until after the mortgage was filed and recorded. The plaintiff at once caused the following notice to be entered on the margin of the record where said mortgage was recorded:
The original bill of foreclosure in this case was filed on the 23d day of November, 1914. The question of whether or not the release above referred to was contained in the mortgage and was placed there without the consent of the mortgagee was made an issue by the answer tendered by the mortgagors. Evidence was introduced by the mortgagee to show that the release was placed there without its knowledge and consent and by the mortgagors to show that it was placed in the mortgage by the agreement of the parties. On the 8th day of October, 1915, at the October term of the chancery court the following order was entered of record:
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