Newborn v. Clay

Decision Date02 December 1993
Docket NumberNo. S93A1515,S93A1515
Citation263 Ga. 622,436 S.E.2d 654
PartiesJames L. NEWBORN, Sr. v. Carolyn J. CLAY, f/k/a Newborn, et al.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Jennifer McLeod, Edwards and McLeod, Douglasville, for Newborn.

Joel D. Dodson, Nicholas Winn, Douglasville, for Clay et al.

FLETCHER, Justice.

In 1977, while married to each other, James Newborn and Carolyn Clay purchased a four acre tract of land on which they built their marital home. The property was conveyed to them as tenants in common. They subsequently separated and were divorced in 1983 by a final decree which incorporated their written settlement agreement. Although the agreement made no specific disposition of the four acre tract, paragraph 15 of the agreement provided:

[T]he parties hereby acknowledge that all marital property was divided at the time of separation; therefore, each party hereby waives any and all rights or claims to any property in the possession of the opposite party.

In June 1990, Clay conveyed her interest in the property by warranty deed to Barry Price. Price thereafter claimed an interest in the property and demanded rent from Newborn. Newborn filed this action in which he alleges that he acquired Clay's interest in the property under paragraph 15 of the agreement and seeks to have the deed to Price set aside and an order requiring Clay to quitclaim the property to him. 1 After completion of discovery, the court granted Clay's and Price's motions for summary judgment and Newborn appeals. We find the court correctly determined that the divorce decree had no effect on the title to the property at issue and affirm its order granting summary judgment in favor of Clay and Price.

The issue on this appeal is whether the agreement incorporated into the divorce decree was sufficient to transfer title to the property. Newborn argues that the parties intended to dispose of the property in paragraph 15 of the agreement but the property is only imperfectly or ambiguously described therein. He contends that a disposition was made, albeit an ambiguous one, and the court should have considered the parties' intent when determining the effect of the divorce decree on the title to the property. We reject Newborn's contentions.

The agreement is not ambiguous; rather, it completely fails to describe and dispose of the property. See Lee v. White, 249 Ga. 99, 286 S.E.2d 723 (1982) (an agreement is not ambiguous simply because it fails to dispose of or make reference to the disposition of property in which both parties have an interest). It has long...

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12 cases
  • Floyd v. Floyd
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • October 1, 2012
    ...of their interest in the property. This is true although title to the personal property of each is adjudicated....” Newborn v. Clay, 263 Ga. 622, 623, 436 S.E.2d 654 (1993) (citation and punctuation omitted). 12. The result is that the decree does not affect the title to the gold and silver......
  • Schwartz v. Schwartz
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • March 11, 2002
    ...rectify that omission as the majority does, I would find that the refunds are unaffected by the divorce decree. See Newborn v. Clay, 263 Ga. 622, 623, 436 S.E.2d 654 (1993) ("parties to a divorce decree must specifically describe and dispose of property in which both parties have an interes......
  • Russ v. Russ
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • May 30, 2000
    ...Since the judgment did not mention the property at issue, it is unaffected and remains titled in Ms. Russ' name. Newborn v. Clay, 263 Ga. 622, 623, 436 S.E.2d 654 (1993); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 263 Ga. 182, 183(1), 430 S.E.2d 350 (1993). Accordingly, the omission from the judgment of an expl......
  • Hollis v. Hollis, S04A0698.
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • September 13, 2004
    ...living," demonstrates that the parties intended to have the agreement control title to the residences. Although Ms. Hollis relies on Newborn v. Clay5 and Andrews v. Boykin6 to contend that the residence in question was not sufficiently described in the decree and thus that the title to the ......
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3 books & journal articles
  • Real Property - T. Daniel Brannan, Stephen M. Lamastra, and William J. Sheppard
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 46-1, September 1994
    • Invalid date
    ...and the absence of a timely objection by Marsh made such substantial compliance sufficient. 210 Ga. App. at 218, 439 S.E.2d at 77. 239. 263 Ga. 622, 436 S.E.2d 654 (1993). 240. Id. at 623-24, 436 S.E.2d at 655. 241. Id. at 622, 436 S.E.2d at 654. 242. Id. at 622-23, 436 S.E.2d at 654. 243. ......
  • Domestic Relations - Barry B. Mcgough and Gregory R. Miller
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 55-1, September 2003
    • Invalid date
    ...App. 513, 580 S.E.2d 297 (2003). 17. Id. at 513, 580 S.E.2d at 297. 18. Id. 19. Id. at 513-14, 580 S.E.2d at 297-98. See Newborn v. Clay, 263 Ga. 622, 436 S.E.2d 654 (1993). 20. 260 Ga. App. at 514, 580 S.E.2d at 299. 21. Patel v. Patel, 276 Ga. 266, 268, 577 S.E.2d 587, 589 (2003) (citing ......
  • Domestic Relations - Barry B. Mcgough and Gregory R. Miller
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 54-1, September 2002
    • Invalid date
    ...and Justices Carley, Thompson, and Sears. 108. Id. 109. Id. at 112, 561 S.E.2d at 100 (Hunstein, J., dissenting). See Newborn v. Clay, 263 Ga. 622, 623, 436 S.E.2d 654, 654-55 (1993) (holding that title to assets remains unaffected if not addressed in the divorce decree). 110. 275 Ga. at 11......

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