Schwartz v. Schwartz
| Decision Date | 11 March 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. S01A1425.,S01A1425. |
| Parties | SCHWARTZ v. SCHWARTZ. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Howard & Whatley, Molly M. Howard, Savannah, for appellant.
James C. Metts, III, Savannah, for appellee.
Appellant Leticia Schwartz, the ex-wife of appellee Stephen Schwartz, appeals the trial court's determination that under the terms of the parties' divorce settlement agreement, Stephen was entitled to retain funds he received for the overpayment of state and federal income taxes. Applying the standard rules of contract construction, we conclude that the settlement agreement at issue contemplated that Stephen would shoulder the entire burden of paying income taxes and also would receive any amount refunded for the overpayment of such taxes. Therefore, we affirm.
The parties were divorced by a final decree entered in 1998. The decree contained a settlement agreement that purported to resolve all issues relative to the divorce, including the division of property and the responsibility for indebtedness. The agreement made the following provisions with regard to the payment of income taxes owed for 1997:
The [parties] shall file joint tax returns for 1997. [Stephen] shall be responsible for all state and federal taxes for the year 1997....The parties agree that none of the income of [Stephen] payable from [his anesthesiology practice] ... shall be income to [Leticia].
It is undisputed that in 1997 Stephen earned monthly income of $40,000, while Leticia had no separate income.
After paying state and federal income taxes for 1997, Stephen received a refund for the overpayment of taxes in the amount of $27,046, which he refused to divide with Leticia. He sought declaratory relief that he alone was entitled to the overpayment refund, which the trial court granted.
1. Settlement agreements in divorce cases must be construed in the same manner and under the same rules as all other contractual agreements.1 It is axiomatic that contracts must be construed in their entirety and in a manner that permits all of the terms contained therein to be consistent with one another.2 Of course, the terms and phrases contained in a contract must be given their ordinary meaning.3 As always, the paramount rule in construing a contract is to ascertain the intention of the parties.4
Applying these hornbook principles of contract construction to the settlement agreement in this case, we conclude that the trial court did not err in holding that Stephen was entitled to retain the funds he received for the overpayment of state and federal income taxes for 1997. The agreement plainly states that Stephen would be responsible for all state and federal income taxes for 1997 and that none of Stephen's income earned in 1997 would be considered income to Leticia for tax purposes. Thus, the parties intended that Stephen assume all liability for taxes owed in 1997, and that none of his earned income for that year would be treated as income to Leticia. It is clear from the agreement that the parties also intended for Leticia to avoid any responsibility for income tax liability in 1997.
In accordance with the terms of the agreement, the parties filed a joint tax return and Stephen paid all state and federal income taxes for 1997. As do many taxpayers, Stephen paid his income taxes through periodic income withholding, and actually overpaid the amount of income tax owed for 1997. The amount of this overpayment was returned to him by the state and federal tax authorities.
Leticia claims that the settlement agreement is silent as to how the parties would divide income tax overpayment refunds,5 and that she is entitled to half of the tax overpayment returned to Stephen. As explained above, however, the parties intended for Stephen to assume all responsibility for 1997's income taxes. Leticia must concede that the parties intended for Stephen to be responsible for paying any taxes that might still have been owed after periodic withholding in 1997. It follows that if, after withholding, taxes were overpaid, then Stephen was also entitled to receive the amount of any tax refund. In other words, because Stephen carried the entire burden of income taxes for 1997, and because Leticia avoided all responsibility for those taxes, Stephen was entitled to receive any refunds due for tax overpayment.
In essence, Leticia argues that if taxes were still owed after withholding, then Stephen would have to pay them, but if a refund was in order, he should have to divide it with her. Nothing in the settlement agreement indicates the parties intended such divergent results to turn upon whether there was a tax deficiency or an overpayment refund. To construe the agreement as Leticia urges would clearly result in a windfall to her that was not contemplated by the parties. As explained above, the parties intended that Leticia have nothing to do with the payment of income taxes for 1997, and that intention must be fulfilled regardless of whether there was an income tax refund or an income tax deficiency.6 Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that Stephen was entitled to retain the income tax refund paid to him for 1997.
2. Furthermore, it is axiomatic that whenever possible, a contract should not be construed in a manner that renders any portion of it meaningless.7 As explained above, the settlement agreement in this case stated that none of Stephen's 1997 income from his anesthesiology practice would be income to Leticia. The tax overpayment refund at issue in this case resulted from excessive withholdings taken directly from Stephen's income generated by his anesthesiology practice. In other words, the overpayment refund is nothing more than a portion of Stephen's income from his practice that was improperly paid to the government to satisfy tax obligations. Under the plain terms of the settlement agreement, those funds cannot be Leticia's income, and to rule otherwise would render a portion of the settlement agreement meaningless in derogation of the authorities cited above.8
3. Contrary to Leticia's argument, the trial court did not err by ruling on Stephen's motion for declaratory judgment without holding a trial, as both parties asked the court to rule on Stephen's motion based upon the evidence then before the court.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except BENHAM, HUNSTEIN and HINES, JJ., who dissent.
The majority holds that because Stephen was responsible for paying any additional tax liability of the parties, he is automatically entitled to the parties' joint tax refunds, reading this entitlement into a settlement agreement despite the express admission by the parties that this issue was never contemplated by them. I dissent because there is a complete absence of evidence to support the majority's holding that under the terms of the agreement Stephen is solely entitled to the joint tax refunds and because the majority imposes upon the agreement an intent and disposition of marital property never intended by the parties.
1. It is undisputed that at the time the parties entered into the agreement, some state and federal taxes had been paid through periodic withholding of income to Stephen during the marriage. During settlement negotiations Stephen announced that the couple had underpaid their 1997 taxes and he anticipated a substantial tax liability when the joint return was filed. The parties admitted and the trial court specifically found that the agreement is silent as to the distribution of tax refunds because no such refund was anticipated. There was no need to provide for the distribution of a refund under these circumstances and thus, no such provision was included in the settlement agreement.
Friedman v. Friedman, 259 Ga. 530, 532-533, 384 S.E.2d 641 (1989). Despite the uncontested fact that no provision was made in the agreement to provide for the distribution of tax refunds, the majority strains both logic and the rules of construction to provide for a contractual contingency not anticipated by the parties. In so doing, the majority concedes, as it must, that nothing in the settlement agreement indicates that the parties intended that Stephen would be responsible for the tax liabilities and then share any overpayment with Leticia and that to construe the agreement as Leticia urges would result in a windfall "not contemplated by the parties." Majority Op. at 109, 561 S.E.2d at 98. It is precisely because of the absence of intent as to the division of overpayments and the fact that the parties failed to contemplate the division of an unanticipated refund that the majority errs.9
Nothing in the settlement agreement supports the majority's finding that Leticia relinquished her interest in Stephen's 1997 income, which was the subject of the tax refunds in issue. The language on which the majority relies provides:
[Leticia] and [Stephen] shall file joint tax returns for 1997. [Stephen] shall be responsible for all state and federal income taxes for the year of 1997. The Parties shall file separate returns for 1998. The parties agree that none of the income of [Stephen] payable from Anesthesiology Consultants, P.C., for the 1997 and 1998 shall be income to [Leticia]. Post divorce payments made by [Stephen] for the marital residence including principle interest tax, insurance, and home owner association dues shall be considered alimony and shall be deductible by [Stephen] and income to [Leticia]...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- Moss v. State
-
Floyd v. Floyd
...same rules as all other contractual agreements.” See Jones v. Jones, 280 Ga. 712, 714(1), 632 S.E.2d 121 (2006); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 275 Ga. 107, 108(1), 561 S.E.2d 96 (2002). That is true enough, but the construction of an agreement and whether its provisions can be waived after it is in......
-
Freeman v. Smith
...entirety and in a manner that permits all of the terms contained therein to be consistent with one another." Schwartz v. Schwartz, 275 Ga. 107, 108(1), 561 S.E.2d 96 (2002) (citation omitted). See also OCGA § 13–2–2(4) ("The construction which will uphold a contract in whole and in every pa......
-
DJ Mortg., LLC v. Synovus Bank
..."whenever possible, a contract should not be construed in a manner that renders any portion of it meaningless." Schwartz v. Schwartz, 275 Ga. 107, 109(2), 561 S.E.2d 96 (2002) (citations omitted). The construction urged by the bank, however, would require us to do just that—to follow one of......
-
Domestic Relations - Barry B. Mcgough and Gregory R. Miller
...at 128. 95. Id. 96. Id. 97. Id. 98. Id. at 526, 556 S.E.2d at 128. 99. Id. 100. Id. 101. Id. 102. Id., 556 S.E.2d at 129. 103. Id. 104. 275 Ga. 107, 561 S.E.2d 96 (2002). 105. Id. at 107, 561 S.E.2d at 97. 106. Id. at 107-08, 561 S.E.2d at 97. 107. Id. at 109, 561 S.E.2d at 97. The majority......