Newell v. Estate of Newell
| Decision Date | 17 October 1924 |
| Docket Number | 36065 |
| Citation | 200 N.W. 238,198 Iowa 710 |
| Parties | LILLIAN C. NEWELL, Appellee, v. ESTATE OF SAMUEL NEWELL et al., Appellants |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Wapello District Court.--F. M. HUNTER, Judge.
APPELLEE the surviving spouse of Samuel Newell, deceased, filed a claim against the estate of her husband for $ 2,000 and interest, alleged to have been advanced by her to her husband in his lifetime under an agreement that the same would be repaid to her. By an amendment to her claim, she claimed the further sum of $ 1,100 and interest, for money alleged to have been advanced to him under a like understanding. The first claim was filed September 26, 1921, upon which plaintiff claimed interest from March 1, 1919. The amendment setting up the second claim, was filed October 22, 1921. At the close of all the testimony, on plaintiff's motion the court directed the jury to return a verdict for her in the sum of $ 3,738.10. Such a verdict was returned, and the amount was by the court allowed as a claim against the estate. The defendant appeals.
Reversed.
Roberts & Webber and Thomas J. Bray, for appellants.
Jaques, Tisdale & Jaques, for appellee.
The original claim recites that it was for cash advanced on or about March 1, 1919, under an agreement and understanding that the same should be repaid to her, with interest thereon at 6 per cent from said date, $ 2,000, and that the circumstances connected with this transaction are, briefly, as follows: That, when decedent bought the O'Neil 40 acres, he did not have money enough to pay for same; that this claimant had $ 2,000 of her own individual money which she had inherited prior to her marriage, and she let her husband have same on the understanding that he would repay her therefor, and her said husband used the money as part of the purchase money of said land; that said money has never been repaid. The amendment recites that it is for cash advanced on or about March 1, 1920, under an agreement and understanding that the same should be repaid to her, with interest, $ 1,100, and that the circumstances are that, when deceased bought the Ross 190 acres of land, he did not have enough money to pay for same; that this claimant had $ 1,100 of her own individual money, which she had inherited prior to her marriage, and she let her husband have same on the understanding that he would repay her therefor, and her husband used the money as a part of the purchase money of the Ross land; that it has not been repaid.
The claimant and deceased were married October 7, 1908. Decedent died August 12, 1921. In September, 1921, claimant petitioned the court for appointment as administratrix, and she was appointed and qualified. Later, A. W. Enoch was appointed to investigate in regard to the claim of plaintiff.
The answer, in addition to a denial of the claim, pleads the statute of limitations.
1. The principal question, as appellant states it, is that plaintiff was not entitled to a directed verdict because the facts necessary to be established by her were not admitted in the pleadings or conceded on the trial or proved by undisputed evidence; and second, that the burden was on claimant to prove not only that she had advanced money to her husband, but that there was an agreement to repay it; that, if the wife advances money or property to the husband, to be employed in his business, without a contract to repay the same, the reasonable presumption is that the advancement is made in view of the mutual benefits which are likely to accrue from the use of the advancement; that a gift from a wife to her husband of property belonging to her separate estate, in the absence of all evidence that it had been given to him to be held in trust for her use, or of a promise on his part to repay it, is presumed to be intended as an absolute gift, and she has, therefore, no claim against his estate; and that, under the circumstances, the law will not create the relation of debtor and creditor between the parties, or imply an agreement when the parties have not entered into one; and that, consequently, she cannot recover in an action against him or his estate. The argument on the second proposition is as to the form of the statement or allegation in the claim and amendment. The thought is that the real claim is that there was a specific contract or agreement by the deceased to repay, and that the allegations state only an implied agreement. Appellee urges that this is sufficient. We have held that it is not necessary that a claim in probate be stated with the same fullness and particularity as a petition in an ordinary case, and that the same conformity of proof to the allegations of the claim is not required as in an ordinary action; that the same formality is not required; that liberality is indulged in stating a claim in probate. Craig v. Estate of Craig, 167 Iowa 340, 149 N.W. 454; Harrison v. Harrison, 124 Iowa 525, 528, 100 N.W. 344; Thompson v. Romack, 174 Iowa 155, 156 N.W. 310; In re Estate of Howell, 179 Iowa 969, 974, 162 N.W. 231. Considering the allegations of the claims and the law, we think appellant has no just cause for complaint at this point.
2. At the August, 1922, term of the Wapello district court, the claimant was a witness in an action entitled Ellis v. Samuel Newell. She testifies in this case that she then testified that:
Of the foregoing testimony, appellee says, in argument:
As to the last statement, it may be remarked that the claims as filed do not refer to the certificates of deposit, so that there is some discrepancy between the claim as filed and the claim now made. We recognize the difficulty in proving claims against estates, because of the dead man's statute, and that this difficulty applies to claims which are just. Some claims are so, and others are not. As administratrix, claimant had possession of the papers of her deceased husband, and she had knowledge of the certificates before the claims were filed,--at least the amended claim. She testifies:
Claimant attempts to explain this discrepancy by showing that, on October 6, 1921, some two weeks before the second claim was filed, she had a letter from cashier Jenkins, of the Chillicothe Savings Bank, to her, saying:
It seems to be conceded that the $ 2,000 certificate of deposit, dated February 26, 1919, was a renewal of the one dated August 26, 1918. A deposit slip was introduced in evidence, dated February 25, 1920, "Samuel Newell in the Chillicothe Savings Bank, certificate and interest, $ 1,122."
In regard to claimant's testimony in the Ellis case, we think it does matter, and that it is of some importance. It is in the nature of impeachment, and contradicts her present claim. It affects, to some extent, her credibility as a witness and the good faith of her present claim, and bears upon the question as to when, if at all, she let deceased have the money. Ordinarily, the credibility of witnesses and inferences to be drawn from their testimony and questions as to good faith, and so on, are not for the court. Wildeboer v. Petersen, 187 Iowa 1169, 1170, 175 N.W. 349; State v. Carpenter, 124 Iowa 5, 11, 98 N.W. 775; Hess v. Dicks, 192 Iowa 378, 382, 184 N.W. 742.
Again it is argued by appellee that witness Abegg "testified that deceased had a guardian's account in his bank, the...
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