Newhouse v. Volusia County School Bd.

• Decision Date: 20 August 1985
• Docket Number: No. BD-19,BD-19
• Citation: 474 So.2d 1222,10 Fla. L. Weekly 1979
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals
• Parties: 10 Fla. L. Weekly 1979 Rita Penn NEWHOUSE, Appellant, v. VOLUSIA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD & Peninsular Fire Ins. Co., Appellees.

Page 1222

474 So.2d 1222

10 Fla. L. Weekly 1979

Rita Penn NEWHOUSE, Appellant, v. VOLUSIA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD & Peninsular Fire Ins. Co., Appellees.

No. BD-19.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

First District.

Aug. 20, 1985.

Bill McCabe, of Shepherd, McCabe & Cooley, Orlando, for appellant.

James B. Cantrell, of Sparks, Cooper & Leklem, Orlando, for appellees.

WENTWORTH, Judge.

Claimant appeals a workers' compensation order entered September 10, 1984, denying increased compensation and specified costs of medical treatment between July 1, 1982, and the date of hearing. We affirm the decretal portions of the order but strike the finding "that any further care of a palliative nature would not be a direct and natural result of the compensable primary injuries due to the breaking of the chain of causation by the automobile accident" of July 1, 1982.

Following two 1977 industrial injuries and ensuing surgery, the deputy found claimant reached maximum medical improvement in March and July 1981 and compensation was paid for back and cervical impairments of 7% and 15%. Based upon voluminous testimony and medical records on the current claim, filed after an unrelated noncompensable accident in 1982, the deputy denied increased compensation and noted evidence "that as late as January 9, 1984 [claimant] was not at a point of maximum medical improvement from the automobile accident." She denied costs of medical care because:

I find that the remedial treatment after July 1, 1982 is related to the automobile accident, as such remedial treatment would not have been required but for the automobile accident which aggravated the residuals of the industrial injury.... I find ... that the condition of the claimant prior to the automobile accident had reached a point wherein only PRN care would have been required but that the automobile accident caused continued pain, extensive treatment, and extensive care including the hospitalization. I reject testimony to the contrary.

We decline to revisit the deputy's factual conclusions that, for the period in question, none of the disputed costs resulted independently from the compensable injuries. Appellees, however, inappropriately rely upon the rationale of D'Angelo Plastering Co. v. Isaac, 393 So.2d 1066 (Fla.1980), where the court denied compensation for a subsequent accident. The noncompensability of the automobile accident was plainly not disputed in the present case. The occurrence of that accident does not, however, "break the causal chain" for all claims, but only those which would not have resulted if the later noncompensable accident had not occurred. In the circumstances of this case the deputy was required (and may in the future be required) to apportion and award any benefits still due independently ¹ from the industrial accidents. We must, however, assume, from the face of the order and the condition of the record, that...