Newman v. Kerr Cnty.
| Decision Date | 07 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | SA-20-CV-0022-JKP |
| Parties | MARK NEWMAN, JENNIFER NEWMAN, Plaintiffs, v. KERR COUNTY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Kerr County (the County). ECF No. 25. Plaintiffs responded to the motion, ECF No. 26, and Defendant replied, ECF No. 27. After due consideration, the Court grants the motion in part.
This dispute arises out of Plaintiffs Mark Newman and Jennifer Newman's employment with and resignation from the Kerr County Sheriff's Office (KCSO). Mark began working for KCSO in June 2011. ECF Nos. 26-1; 25-2. He resigned July 5 2018. ECF No. 25-4. Jennifer began working for KCSO in October 2012. ECF Nos. 26-1; 25-5. She resigned April 13 2018. ECF No. 25-3.
The operative complaint, ECF No. 1, alleges the County discriminated against Mark when KCSO would not allow him to take his accrued sick leave to care for his children and violated his rights when it did not engage in the interactive process when he requested an accommodation for his disability. The operative complaint alleges the County discriminated against Jennifer when Sheriff William R. Hierholzer (the Sheriff) decided that only she would be allowed to take sick leave to care for Mark's and her children and by failing to protect her from a hostile work environment. Mark and Jennifer bring claims under Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). Mark brings claims for discrimination and failure to accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), sex discrimination under Title VII, and the same under the TCHRA, Tex. Lab. Code § 21.051. Jennifer brings claims for sex discrimination and hostile work environment under Title VII, discrimination under the ADA, and the same under the TCHRA.
Plaintiffs filed this action on January 9, 2020. ECF No. 1. The matter is now before the Court on the County's Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 25.
A court must “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”[1] Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material, ” and a fact is “material” only if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Because there must be a genuine dispute of material fact, “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 247-48. There is no genuine dispute for trial when “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)).
The “party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant carries its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present competent summary judgment evidence showing the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The nonmovant must identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports its claim. Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). Rule 56 does not impose a duty on the court to “sift through the record in search of evidence.” Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994); accord Wright v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. (Ohio), 842 Fed.Appx. 869, 872 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). If the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [its] case and on which [it] will bear the burden of proof at trial, ” summary judgment must be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
In determining the merits of a motion for summary judgment, a court views all facts and reasonable inferences drawn from the record “in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, ” Heinsohn v. Carabin & Shaw, P.C., 832 F.3d 224, 234 (5th Cir. 2016), but “may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254-55.
The County asserts it is entitled to summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs' claims for the following reasons: (1) Plaintiffs cannot establish the prima facie elements of any discrimination claim because they resigned and cannot prove constructive discharge; (2) Plaintiffs cannot establish sex discrimination claims because KCSO has a gender neutral sick leave policy; and (3) Mark cannot establish a violation of the ADA because he did not request an accommodation. The County avers generally that Plaintiffs cannot establish the retaliation claim that is brought in the alternative to Plaintiffs' discrimination claims.
Title VII prohibits employers from intentionally discriminating against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment based on the individual's sex or other protected class. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Roberson v. Alltel Info. Servs., 373 F.3d 647, 651 (5th Cir. 2004). The TCHRA was “enacted to address the specific evil of discrimination and retaliation in the workplace, ” and to “provide for the execution of the policies embodied in Title VII.” City of Waco v. Lopez, 259 S.W.3d 147, 153-55 (Tex. 2008); accord Prairie View A & M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex. 2012). “The Supreme Court of Texas has instructed Texas courts to consult judicial interpretations of Title VII and follow the approach of the United States Supreme Court in interpreting Title VII when reviewing TCHRA claims.” Ross v. Judson Indep. Sch. Dist., 993 F.3d 315, 321 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 633-34 (Tex. 2012)).
Intentional discrimination claims are generally analyzed according to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 969 F.3d 571, 577 (5th Cir. 2020); Harville v. City of Houston, 945 F.3d 870, 874-75 (5th Cir. 2019). Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff first establishes a prima facie case; the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate “some legitimate reason” for the adverse employment action; if the employer provides such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the reason is a pretext. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-805 (1973).
Title VII's ban on intentionally discriminatory employment practices extends to conduct that creates a hostile work environment. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986); accord Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116 (2002) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)); EEOC v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 452 (5th Cir. 2013). An employer violates Title VII when the employer allows the workplace to be “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult . . . that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment[.]” Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. at 21 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “If the harassing employee is the victim's co-worker, the employer is liable only if it was negligent in controlling working conditions.” Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 424 (2013).
A plaintiff establishes a hostile work environment prima facie case by demonstrating: (1) she is a member of a protected group; (2) she was the victim of unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on her membership in the protected group; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of her employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action. Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 2002); accord Wright, 842 Fed.Appx. at 874.
The County's basis for summary judgment is that Jennifer cannot establish that any harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of her employment because she resigned and cannot prove constructive discharge. ECF No. 25 at 6, 8. Constructive discharge is an involuntary termination of employment; it occurs when “working conditions become so intolerable” an employee feels “compelled to resign.” Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141 (2004); Brown v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 237 F.3d 556, 566 (5th Cir. 2001); Young v. Southwestern Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1975).
The general rule is that if the employer deliberately makes an employee's working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation, then the employer has encompassed a constructive discharge and is as liable for any illegal conduct involved therein as if it had formally discharged the aggrieved employee.
Young, 509 F.2d at 144; accord Haley v. All. Compressor LLC, 391 F.3d 644, 649 (5th Cir. 2004).
Courts analyze constructive discharge claims under an objective standard, looking at the facts of each case to answer “Did working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to resign?” Suders, 542 U.S. at 141. In determining...
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