Newsome ex rel. Bell v. Barnhart, Civil Action No. 1:04cv1231-SRW.

Decision Date12 July 2006
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 1:04cv1231-SRW.
Citation444 F.Supp.2d 1195
PartiesRosette NEWSOME o/b/o Rasheed BELL, Plaintiff, v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

Georgia H. Ludlum, Law Offices of Georgia H. Ludlum, Dothan, AL, for Plaintiff.

Ann K. Reeg, Frank V. Smith, III, Social Security Administration, Region VII, Kansas City, MO, R. Randolph Neeley, U.S. Attorney's Office, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

WALKER, United States Magistrate Judge.

Rosette Newsome o/b/o Rasheed Bell1 brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of a decision by the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her application for Supplemental Security Income under the Social Security Act. The parties have consented to entry of final judgment by the Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Upon review of the record and briefs submitted by the parties, the court concludes that the decision of the Commissioner is due to be affirmed.

BACKGROUND

On March 23, 2001, plaintiff filed an application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI). On April 29, 2002, after the claim was denied at the initial administrative levels, an ALJ conducted an administrative hearing. The ALJ rendered a decision on May 28, 2002, in which he found that plaintiff was not under a disability as defined in the Social Security Act at any time through the date of his decision. On November 18, 2004, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review and, accordingly, the decision of the ALJ became the final decision of the Commissioner.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court's review of the Commissioner's decision is narrowly circumscribed. The court does not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Rather, the court examines the administrative decision and scrutinizes the record as a whole to determine whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's factual findings. Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir.1993); Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir.1991). Substantial evidence consists of such "relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Cornelius, 936 F.2d at 1145. Factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence must be upheld by the court. The ALJ's legal conclusions, however, are reviewed de novo because no presumption of validity attaches to the ALJ's determination of the proper legal standards to be applied. Davis, 985 F.2d at 531. If the court finds an error in the ALJ's application of the law, or if the ALJ fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted, the ALJ's decision must be reversed. Cornelius, 936 F.2d at 1145-46.

DISCUSSION

The plaintiff, who was born on April 25, 1995 and was seven years old at the time of the ALJ's decision, challenges that decision on three grounds. He argues that: (1) the ALJ erred by ignoring portions of the treating psychologist's opinion which indicate that plaintiff has an extreme limitation, (2) the ALJ erred by failing to address plaintiff's oppositional defiant disorder, and (3) new evidence submitted to the Appeals Council warrants remand. Upon review of the record as a whole, the court concludes that the ALJ's decision should be affirmed for the reasons discussed below.

1. Treating psychologist's opinion

While acknowledging that the ALJ gave substantial weight to the opinions of Dr. Randy Jordan, plaintiffs treating psychologist, plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly ignored a portion of Dr. Jordan's medical records which indicate that plaintiff has "extreme limitation." Plaintiff's brief at 6. The extreme limitation to which plaintiff refers is plaintiffs Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score of 50 on Axis V of Dr. Jordan's April 4, 2000 report. Dr. Jordan gave no specific explanation for this score in his report, and he did not assign any GAF score to plaintiff on any examination after his initial visit. Like Dr. Jordan, the ALJ did not specifically discuss this Axis V diagnosis, although the ALJ did review Dr. Jordan's major findings at considerable length in his decision. R. 18-19.

The opinion of a treating physician ... "must be given substantial or considerable weight unless `good cause' is shown to the contrary." Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240-41 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir.1997)). The Eleventh Circuit "has concluded `good cause' exists when the: (1) treating physician's opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician's opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor's own medical records." Id. When electing to disregard the opinion of a treating physician, the ALJ must clearly articulate [his or her] reasons. Id. However, "there is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision, so long as the ALJ's decision ... is not a broad rejection which is `not enough to enable [the district court or this Court] to conclude that [the ALJ] considered [plaintiff's] medical condition as a whole.'" Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir.2005).2

The Global Assessment of Functioning Scale is used to report an individual's overall level of functioning. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 30 (4th Edition 1994) ("DSM-IV"). "A GAF code of 41-50 indicates serious symptoms (e.g ., suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting), [or] serious impairment in social or occupational functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to keep a job)." Hurley v. Barnhart, 385 F.Supp.2d 1245, 1262 n. 5 (M.D.Fla.2005)(citing DSM-IV at 32). However, the Commissioner "has declined to endorse the GAF scale for `use in the Social Security and SSI disability programs,' and has indicated that GAF scores have no `direct correlation to the severity requirements of the mental disorders listings.'" Wind v. Barnhart, 133 Fed.Appx. 684, 692 n. 5 (11th Cir.2005) (citing 65 Fed.Reg. 50746, 50764-65 (Aug. 21, 2000)). Further, "[t]he GAF score is not an assessment of a claimant's ability to work, but a global reference scale to aid in the treatment of an ongoing condition." Sparks v. Barnhart, 2006 WL 1633828, *4 n. 1 (N.D.Ala.2006). "[N]owhere do the Social Security regulations or case law require an ALJ to determine the extent of an individual's disability based entirely on his GAF score." Wilkins v. Barnhart, 69 Fed.Appx. 775, 780 (7th Cir. 2003).

In this case, Dr. Jordan assigned a GAF to plaintiff only once, on April 4, 2000, Dr. Jordan's first visit with plaintiff. The latter was referred to Dr. Jordan "secondary to possible ADHD and behavioral problems." R. 132. Dr. Jordan found after extensive testing that plaintiff needed psycho-stimulant medication for his ADHD and, in addition, he recommended that plaintiff's mother use better methods to discipline the plaintiff as she "more or less allows this child to rule her world and to boss her as opposed to being the guiding figure in his life." R. 133. On May 2, 2000, plaintiff returned after being placed on Adderall. Plaintiff's mother reported that his teacher could see a "vast improvement" in plaintiff's behavior, but that she herself "does not get the benefit from the Adderall." R. 130. Dr. Jordan indicated in his notes that, in his view, plaintiff's mother "continues to be a parent who wishes actually to not discipline and is very slow to engage in discussion concerning how she needs to discipline Rasheed." Id. Dr. Jordan found that plaintiff remained "quite strong-willed," but that the Adderall was working efficiently and plaintiff had improved substantially on a number of tests. Id. He recommended that plaintiff's doctor give a 5 mg booster at lunch "until mother has been able to incorporate some adaptive parenting skills." Id.

On May 31, 2000, Dr. Jordan found that plaintiff was doing well on Adderall and noted that, although plaintiff's mother still had concerns about plaintiff's behavior, "so much of what he is doing is actually childlike and she has such poor parenting skills, I really do not think this is a medication issue, as much as it is a parenting and behavior-shaping issue." R. 129. On June 30, 2000, plaintiff's mother reported that plaintiff's behavior was somewhat better, although he was having some trouble going to sleep at night. Dr. Jordan commented, "I still feel as if mother wishes to have a child that she is not going to have, but do believe that Adderall might be increased to 10 mg and perhaps Clonidine added at night." R. 128. On August 2, 2000, Dr. Jordan noted that the combination of Adderall and Clonidine was "working quite nicely. Some very, very mild hyperkinetic behavior is still noted, but overall things are much improved." R. 127. Further, on October 4, 2000, Dr. Jordan reported that "Rasheed's mother says that the Adderall 10 mg a.m. and 5 mg. at lunch is working very nicely along with a half tablet of Clonidine at night for sleep. He essentially is asymptomatic with medication." R. 126. Although plaintiff was receiving some notes from his school about afternoon behavior at this time, this problem appears to have been caused by plaintiff's mother's decision not to give him his lunchtime dose "on purpose so that the teacher would see that he truly needs the medication, as she feels as if the teacher does not believe her that he needs it." Id.

There are no further records from Dr. Jordan until February 2, 2001. At that time, plaintiff's mother reported that plaintiff was not doing well—he had only gotten "10 smiley faces out of 100 days." R. 125. Dr. Jordan noted that this was "in direct contrast to what she last reported when she said that he was doing nicely," and said that "[i...

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