Newton v. Com.

• Decision Date: 03 February 1956
• Citation: 333 Mass. 523,131 N.E.2d 749
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: Charles E. NEWTON v. COMMONWEALTH.

Page 749

131 N.E.2d 749

333 Mass. 523

Charles E. NEWTON v. COMMONWEALTH.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Dec. 8, 1955.

Decided Feb. 3, 1956.

George H. Lewald, Boston, for plaintiff in error.

Daniel J. Finn, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.

Before QUA, C. J., and WILKINS, WILLIAMS and WHITTEMORE, JJ.

QUA, Chief Justice.

This case is here on a bill of exceptions directed to the action of a single justice of this court in ordering affirmed on writ of error a judgment of the Superior Court entered February 10, 1947, sentencing the petitioner to imprisonment for life ¹ on his plea of guilty in the second degree to an indictment charging him with the murder of his wife.

The original substitute petition, the return to the writ, the answer of the Commonwealth, the findings, rulings, and order for judgment of the single justice, and the petitioner's claim of exceptions, all being papers on file in this court for the county of Suffolk, are all referred to in the bill of exceptions as incorporated therein and have been certified to us by the single justice. We treat them as included in the record before us. See G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 231, § 135, as amended by St.1941, c. 187, § 1. The return to the writ contains a full record of the proceedings in the trial court, including a transcript of what took place when the petitioner's plea of guilty in the second degree was accepted.

The petitioner took only a single exception to the findings, rulings, and order for judgment--a document of nearly seven typewritten pages. No attempt was made to point out any particular error or errors of the single justice upon which the petitioner intended to rely. It is well settled as a matter of State practice that an exception of that sort is not valid and must be overruled. Matter of Loeb, 315 Mass. 191, 194-195, 52 N.E.2d 37, citing many cases. Other recent cases are Robinson v. Trustees of New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 318 Mass. 121, 134, 60 N.E.2d 593; Barton v. City of Cambridge, 318 Mass. 420, 424, 61 N.E.2d 830; Commonwealth v. Shea, 323 Mass. 406, 416, 82 N.E.2d 511; Matter of Ruby, 328 Mass. 542, 543, 105 N.E.2d 234, and DiCicco v. Graphic Machine Corp., 329 Mass. 695, 696, 110 N.E.2d 387. This rule of practice alone requires that the exceptions be overruled, and we so hold. It is our understanding that reasonable State rules of practice apply to the raising of Federal questions in State courts. Parker v. People of State of Illinois, 333 U.S. 571, 574-575, 68 S.Ct. 708, 92 L.Ed. 886; Michel v. State of Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 76 S.Ct. 158.

But in a case as serious as this it seems proper to add that in any event a careful examination of the record has disclosed no error.

The petitioner complains that his constitutional rights were violated in that he was not properly represented by court-appointed counsel. The petitioner, having abandoned one of his original claims that the counsel appointed was incompetent, now contends that that counsel was negligent in advising the petitioner to plead guilty and that 'by threat and intimidation [he] caused the petitioner to plead guilty because he felt it was the best course to follow.' These questions are open on writ of error, because, if the petitioner's contentions should be sustained, they would bear upon his right adequately to protect himself by the usual process of exception and appeal in the trial court. Aronson v. Commonwealth, 331 Mass. 599, 601-602, 121 N.E.2d 669.

The facts and the law are so fully covered by the findings and rulings of the single justice of this court, who saw and heard the witnesses face to face, that we feel that even at the risk of unduly lengthening this opinion we should set them forth here exactly as filed in the county court:

'I find the following facts: Shortly after the petitioner was indicted the District Attorney talked with him and told him that he ought to have the assistance of counsel. Upon learning that the petitioner was without funds, the District Attorney informed him that the court would appoint counsel and would also 'pay the expenses.' The District Attorney then asked the petitioner if he had anyone in mind and the petitioner stated that Mr. Eben G. Townes, a Brockton lawyer, had been acting for him in a civil matter but that he did not know whether he handled criminal cases. The District Attorney suggested to the petitioner that he have Mr. Townes represent him in the murder case. Thereafter, presumably at the petitioner's request, Mr. Townes came to see him at the Plymouth jail and at that time he authorized Mr. Townes to represent him and signed a motion requesting the court to appoint Mr. Townes pursuant to the provisions of G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 277, §§ 47, 55, and 56. Mr. Townes at the time of his appointment had been at the bar approximately thirty years and had had wide experience in the trial of causes, criminal and civil. I am fully convinced that he possessed the requisite experience and ability to deal with a case of the sort here involved.

'In accordance with G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 123, § 100A, the so called Briggs law, the petitioner was examined by two psychiatrists of the Department of Mental Health, Dr. Earl Holt and Dr. C. Stanley Raymond. They examined the petitioner at the Plymouth jail on three occasions, October 25, 1946, November 2, 1946, and January 18, 1947. Thereafter they drew up a report which was filed in court on January 28, 1947. This report, which is incorporated in the return, is detailed and comprehensive, and need not be summarized. At the end of the report the examining doctors were asked to answer the following: 'State definitely, whether, in the opinion of the examiner, the prisoner is suffering from any mental disease or defect which would affect his criminal responsibility:' and their reply was, 'As a result of our examination, it is our opinion that this prisoner is suffering from a mental disease which would affect his criminal responsibility.' Earlier in their report the examining doctors had stated that the petitioner showed 'definite evidence of paranoid psychosis.'

'Perhaps at this point a word or two concerning the circumstances of the homicide would be pertinent, as they are not in dispute, and shed some light both on the appropriateness of the advice given to the petitioner by Mr. Townes and on the matter of disposition.

'It appears that on September 6, 1946, the petitioner went to a restaurant in Brockton with his wife and while there he drew a revolver and shot her several times. To a policeman who came to the scene shortly thereafter he stated 'I murdered my wife to which I plead guilty.' It further appeared that the petitioner for some time prior had not been on good terms with his wife and that he had suspected her of having illicit relations with an attorney in Brockton.

'Following his appointment as counsel, Mr. Townes conferred with the petitioner many times. As a result of the Briggs law report filed on January 28, 1947, the problems confronting Mr. Townes were exceedingly difficult and grave. He now had an opinion from two psychiatrists to the effect that his client was suffering from a mental disease which would affect his criminal responsibility. But this opinion, although contained in a report filed pursuant to § 100A, was not binding on a jury and in no way precluded them from reaching a contrary conclusion. Moreover there were subsidiary findings in the report from which Mr. Townes might reasonably conclude that although the petitioner might have been insane in the medical sense he could, nevertheless, from the legal viewpoint be held accountable for his conduct. It is also to be noted that the report of the doctors does not undertake to say what the petitioner's condition as to sanity was at the time of the homicide. As a practical matter if the case went to trial one of three results might be expected: a verdict of...