Newton v. Highland Park Independent School Dist., 11028

• Citation: 361 S.W.2d 916
• Decision Date: 24 October 1962
• Docket Number: No. 11028,11028
• Parties: N. L. NEWTON, Appellant, v. HIGHLAND PARK INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Civil Appeals of Texas

Page 916

361 S.W.2d 916

N. L. NEWTON, Appellant, v. HIGHLAND PARK INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee.

No. 11028.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Austin.

Oct. 24, 1962.

E. D. Forbes, Dallas, for appellant.

C. L. Chance, Austin, for appellee.

RICHARDS, Justice.

Highland Park Independent School District, appellee, brought suit in County Court at Law No. 1 of Dallas County, Texas, against N. L. Newton, appellant, for the recovery of delinquent taxes, penalties and interest on personal property owned by appellant located within the limits of the School District. The trial was had before the Court without a jury and judgment was rendered for appellee as prayed for. On motion of appellant the Trial Court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

From the adverse judgment appellant has perfected this appeal based upon six points of error as follows: The error of the Trial Court in finding as a fact (1) that appellee is a legally qualified and municipal taxing authority situated in Dallas County, Texas, which made a proper prima facie case by introducing certified copies of the appropriate tax rolls and delinquent tax records; (2) that taxes were assessed against appellant by appellee's Tax Assessor-Collector on personal property owned by him which was situated within the School District; (3) that the taxes so assessed were delinquent; (4) that appellant did not render any of the property for taxation as required by law for any of the years 1942 through 1958, inclusive; (5) that such taxes, penalties and interest are due and owing by appellant and that no part thereof has been paid; and (6) that the Trial Court erred in not complying with appellant's request for additional findings of fact.

Appellant's defenses to the suit are based upon (1) non-ownership of a 1950 Pontiac automobile, the taxes upon which were assessed against him for the years 1951 and 1952; (2) failure of appellee to allow credit for the $250.00 exemption on personal property under Art. 7150, Sec. 11, Vernon's Civil Statutes, and (3) the alleged payment of the taxes sued for except the taxes on the 1950 Pontiac automobile and the taxes on a 1949 Oldsmobile for the years 1950 through 1952, non-payment of which was admitted by appellant.

The Trial Court found as a fact that the appellee is a legally qualified and municipal taxing authority situated in Dallas County, Texas and has made a proper prima facie case by introducing certified copies of its appropriate delinquent tax records which revealed that taxes were assessed by appellee's Tex Assessor-Collector against personal property owned by appellant which was situated within the School District for the years 1942 to 1958, inclusive, which taxes, together with penalties and interest aggregated $208.79, and that the assessment made by appellee's Tax Assessor-Collector was duly approved by appellee's Board of Equalization after hearing and considering evidence bearing on the value of each item so assessed.

The Trial Court further found as a fact that appellant did not render any of the property for taxation as required by law for any of the years 1942 through 1958 and that the amount of taxes due upon such property as shown by the delinquent tax records were computed after allowance of the statutory exemption provided in Art. 7150, Sec. 11, V.C.S., and that such taxes were due and owing by appellant but no part of the same have been paid.

Appellant contends under his first point of error that there is no evidence or at least insufficient evidence to support the finding that appellee is a legally qualified and existing municipal taxing authority and made a prima facie case by introducing certified copies of its tax rolls and delinquent tax records.

By the introduction of certified copies of appellee's appropriate delinquent tax records, a presumption was raised that there was a valid levy and assessment of the taxes in question made by a legally constituted taxing authority and that all conditions precedent to such assessment and levy had been performed. Art. 7326, V.C.S.; Art. 7328.1, Sec. 6, V.C.S.; State v. Whittenburg, 153 Tex. 205, 265 S.W.2d 569, 572; Stone v. City of Dallas, Tex.Civ.App., 244 S.W.2d 937, 943, error dism. Appellant's first point of error is overruled.

For his second point of error appellant asserts that the Trial Court erred in finding that he was the owner of the 1950 Pontiac automobile on which taxes were assessed by appellee for the years 1951 and 1952. Appellant properly pleaded his...