Newton v. LOCAL 801 (FRIGIDAIRE LOCAL, ETC.)
| Decision Date | 31 December 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. C-3-79-192.,C-3-79-192. |
| Parties | Julus NEWTON, Plaintiff, v. LOCAL 801 (FRIGIDAIRE LOCAL OF the INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS), Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
William L. Havemann, Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling, Dayton, Ohio, for plaintiff.
Richard F. Rice, Kettering, Ohio, for defendant.
DECISION AND ENTRY SUSTAINING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT AND AGAINST PLAINTIFF; ENTRY OF JUDGMENT; CANCELLATION OF TRIAL DATE; TERMINATION ENTRY
The captioned cause came to be submitted upon Defendant's motion seeking an Order of the Court entering summary judgment in its favor and against Plaintiff.
This is a labor matter. The Complaint indicates that Plaintiff, a former employee of the Frigidaire Division of General Motors, was a member in good standing of the Defendant Union Local at the time of his discharge from employment at Frigidaire. The Complaint further indicates that Plaintiff's discharge was grieved pursuant to procedures established by the collective bargaining agreement between the Defendant and Frigidaire, and that during the course of said grievance Frigidaire and the Defendant agreed that Plaintiff should be reinstated. Finally, it is alleged in the Complaint that, because of improper considerations on the part of Union officials, the Defendant withdrew Plaintiff's grievance and thereby effectively abrogated the reinstatement agreement prior to its implementation.
Based on these facts and associated matters concerning Plaintiff's discharge and grievance (i. e., the nature of the "improper considerations" by Defendant's officials), Plaintiff claims that Defendant: (1) breached its duty of fair representation; (2) violated Plaintiff's statutory right to "freedom from intimidation" in the exercise of other rights; and (3) violated Plaintiff's procedural rights.
The procedural claim is not altogether clear from the Complaint. In paragraph 2, thereof, Plaintiff claims entitlement to relief for "violation of his due process rights under the Constitution." However, in correlative paragraphs (numbers 17-19) under the Third Claim, it is alleged that Defendant refused to "fairly process his i. e., Plaintiff's grievance under the applicable collective bargaining agreement," and, therefore, "Plaintiff believes that his constitutional rights to due process under the collective bargaining agreement has been denied him sic." Despite the "constitutional" language, the Court fairly concludes that Plaintiff either did not or does not now intend to allege a deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment rights.
In this regard, the Court notes that there is no specification in the Complaint of any cognizable constitutional due process deprivation, no allegation of state action, and no attempt either to frame the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or assert jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343. Although these considerations are not necessarily dispositive, in context the Third Claim only appears to be capable of fair construction as a claim for deprivation of procedural rights under the collective bargaining agreement.
Plaintiff, in omitting all discussion of the Third Claim in memoranda opposing defendant's motion, has not explicitly shed any light on what in fact was, or is now intended by this part of the Complaint. However, if the Third Claim is construed as a violation of bargaining agreement provisions (as suggested above), then it is susceptible of implicit consideration in discussion of Plaintiff's fair representation claim (as explained further below). Therefore, since Plaintiff has omitted explicit consideration of the Third Claim from his memoranda, but has explicitly discussed the fair representation claim, the Court finds that Plaintiff either now considers that the Third Claim is "under the collective bargaining agreement," or has otherwise determined to abandon whatever else may have been formerly intended by said claim.
Further, as a means of ascribing some intelligibility to the Third Claim for purposes of addressing Defendant's motion, and thereby preserving whatever merit may exist in the allegation of procedural misconduct in that part of the Complaint, the Court concludes that said procedural misconduct must be considered as an allegation of breach of the collective bargaining agreement.
In its motion, Defendant says that Plaintiff is barred from seeking relief with respect to the stated claims by virtue of the applicable statutes of limitations. In general, Defendant says that where a cause of action recognized under federal law is not expressly made subject to a federal statutory limitation, then the most appropriate state statute of limitations is deemed applicable and is determinative of the timeliness of suit on such cause of action. International Union v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704-05, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 1112-13, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966). In particular, because a union's duty of fair representation is essentially statutory and no federal limitations statute is applicable to a claim of breach thereof, such claim of breach arising in Ohio should be governed by that part of O.R.C. § 2305.07 which provides:
An action ... upon a liability created by statute ... shall be brought within six years after the cause thereof accrued.
The Court agrees. Gray v. International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators, 416 F.2d 313 (6th Cir. 1969) ().
Further, Defendant says that because a violation of the statutory right to "freedom from intimidation" in the exercise of other rights is in the nature of a tort, a claim based on such violation arising in Ohio should be governed by that part of O.R.C. § 2305.09 which provides:
The Court again agrees. Howard v. Aluminum Workers International Union, 589 F.2d 771 (4th Cir. 1978) (); Sewell v. Grand Lodge of International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 445 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1971) ().
Finally, because Plaintiff's answers to interrogatories indicate that all events relevant to his claims occurred more than six years before the instant action was commenced (i. e., the last event—Defendant's withdrawal of the grievance—having occurred on April 24, 1973, and the Complaint herein having been filed on May 8, 1979), Defendant says such claims are barred by the applicable periods of limitations.
In its motions, Defendant omitted explicit discussion of the timeliness of Plaintiff's Third Claim for relief. However, the Court finds that for present purposes, as construed above, said claim is no different in kind from the claimed breach of Defendant's duty of fair representation. Both claims arise from Defendant's statutory status as Plaintiff's exclusive bargaining agent in negotiating and maintaining the collective bargaining agreement, and from Defendant's alleged failure to meticulously enforce the provisions thereof for Plaintiff's benefit without arbitrary or discriminatory deviation. Thus, the considerations applicable to determination of the timeliness of Plaintiff's fair representation claim are equally applicable to the claim of violation of procedural rights under the collective bargaining agreement (i. e., primarily, that each claim is in essence founded on statutory liability).
Plaintiff does not dispute as fact that his claims arose more than six years before the instant action was commenced. Indeed, insofar as Plaintiff has not submitted an affidavit or any additional documentory evidence in opposition to the motion, it may be said that no factual issues have been preserved relevant to a determination whether Plaintiff's cause is time-barred. F.R.C.P. 56(e), (f).
What Plaintiff does say in opposition to Defendant's motion is that Plaintiff's cause is atypical, being neither of statutory creation nor in tort, but is founded on a contract reduced to writing—specifically, the reinstatement agreement—and thereby governed by that part of O.R.C. § 2305.06 which provides:
An action upon ... an agreement, contract or promise in writing shall be brought within fifteen years after the cause thereof accrued.
In other words, contrary to the plain meaning of the stated claims in the Complaint, Plaintiff now contends that his action is not directly predicated on Defendant's breach of statutory duties concerning the collective bargaining agreement, or on Defendant's tortious interference with Plaintiff's statutory rights. Rather, Plaintiff says that he was a third-party beneficiary of the reinstatement agreement entered into between the Defendant and Frigidaire, and that Defendant's subsequent withdrawal of Plaintiff's grievance...
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...§ 2305.07, rather than the 15-year statute of limitations for actions based on written contracts, Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2305.06. 507 F.Supp. 439 (S.D.Ohio 1980). This Court applied the former statute since the union's duty of fair representation, which it allegedly breached, was derived from......
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...union for breach of its duty of fair representation. See, id. at 403. See also, Newton v. Local 801 Frigidaire Local of the International Union of Electrical Workers, 507 F.Supp. 439, 441-443 (S.D. Ohio 1981), aff'd 684 F.2d 401 (6th Cir.1982) (holding, prior to both Mitchell and Badon, tha......
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Rose v. General Motors Corp., Frigidaire Div.
...Labor Relations Act), and was properly governed by the six-year statute of limitations found in § 2305.07. Newton v. Electrical Workers Local 801, 507 F.Supp. 439 (S.D.Ohio 1980). This decision was recently affirmed by the Sixth Circuit. 684 F.2d 401 (6th Cir.1982). While these decisions di......
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