Nexus v. Swift
| Decision Date | 20 July 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. A09-2060.,A09-2060. |
| Citation | 38 Media L. Rep. 2539,785 N.W.2d 771 |
| Parties | NEXUS, Respondent, v. Janette J. SWIFT, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
Minnesota's statute prohibiting strategic lawsuits against public participation (anti-SLAPP statute), Minn.Stat. §§ 554.01-.05 (2008), does not violate a party's constitutional right to due process of law, U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7, or right to a jury trial, U.S. Const. amend. VII; Minn. Const. art. I, § 4.
Victor Lund, Mark J. Manderfeld, Mahoney, Dougherty and Mahoney, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.
Marshall H. Tanick, Brian N. Niemczyk, Mansfield, Tanick & Cohen, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.
Considered and decided by HUDSON, Presiding Judge; CONNOLLY, Judge; and MUEHLBERG, Judge.*
Appellant challenges the district court's denial of her motion to dismiss respondent's defamation suit pursuant to Minnesota's anti-SLAPP statute. The statute immunizes from liability "[l]awful conduct or speech that is genuinely aimed in whole or in part at procuring favorable government action ... unless the conduct or speech constitutes a tort or a violation of a person's constitutional rights." Minn.Stat. § 554.03. The district court held that to the extent the anti-SLAPP statute required the district court to determine by clear and convincing evidence whether appellant defamed respondent before full discovery could be had and without submitting the case to the jury, the statute violated respondent's constitutional rights todue process and a jury trial. The district court concluded that dismissal was not warranted because respondent pleaded the appropriate elements of a defamation claim. We hold that the anti-SLAPP statute does not violate respondent's constitutional rights to due process of law and to a jury trial. Because the district court applied the incorrect legal standard in evaluating appellant's motion to dismiss, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
In its complaint, respondent Nexus alleged the following facts, which appellant Janette J. Swift admitted in her answer. Nexus is a Minnesota nonprofit corporation that operates a residential treatment facility for juvenile sex offenders in Onamia. Nexus planned to build a new residential treatment facility for juvenile sex offenders approximately two miles from the current location. Swift resides in Bradbury, approximately one-half mile from the location where Nexus planned to build the new facility. Swift opposed the proposed location of the new facility. Swift expressed her opposition at public hearings and on her two websites; some of the statements she made in opposing the location of the new facility form the basis of this lawsuit.
At a March 2008 public hearing before the Onamia City Council, Swift stated that a young boy under Nexus's care "died at the hands of one of [its] employees." She then posted a video on YouTube showing portions of the hearing interspersed with text segments. These text segments identified the youth and stated that he was "asphyxiated" and "killed" by a Nexus employee in 2001 and that the death was "ruled a homicide." Shortly before the end of the YouTube video, the text stated: "Nexus Treatment Centers getting away with MURDER." The video then ended with a picture of the deceased youth.
On one of her websites, Swift posted a link to the video. Swift also posted an "obituary" on her website, which stated that the youth "was killed by a NEXUS staff member, while in a prone restraint hold." She stated that the "autopsy determined that [he] was suffocated to death" and that his "death was ruled a homicide."
After counsel for Nexus wrote to Swift demanding that she retract and remove the above statements, Swift posted a blog entry stating that "these are BAD PEOPLE," referring to Nexus. She stated that in her, "the people who run Nexus are deficient." She stated that Nexus representatives harassed her by "employ [ing] bullying tactics" and that "[t]hey have shown a propensity for punishment and a sadistic approach to dealing with adversaries." According to this blog entry, Swift reiterated the claim that Nexus was "getting away with murder":
Nexus filed a complaint including the above allegations in district court in June 2008. Although not admitted by Swift, Nexus also alleged that Swift published false and defamatory material on her websites about Nexus's former CEO and sent false and defamatory e-mails to the supervisor and coworkers of a member of Nexus's volunteer board of directors. Nexus alleged that its employee did not kill the boy in question. No one was ever charged with murder in the case. Nexus alleged that the staff member involved restrainedthe boy in accordance with procedures approved by the State of Iowa, which is where the incident occurred. According to Nexus, "No one except [Swift] has ever called the tragic accident 'murder.' " Nexus noted that child-endangerment charges were initially brought against the employee, but "were dropped before trial upon motion of the prosecution when the validity of the opinion of the medical examiner, the only person who called the event an 'asphyxiation homicide,' was questioned by the state's own consulting expert." Nexus alleged that Swift's blog and YouTube postings embarrassed Nexus, injured its reputation, and lowered its position in the esteem of the public. Nexus also alleged that the statements were made with actual malice and reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statements.
Swift's answer asserted that her statements were protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 3 of the Minnesota Constitution, and that she was immune from suit under the anti-SLAPP statute. In May 2009, Swift moved for dismissal pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute and for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. In her memorandum of law in support of her motion, Swift argued that the anti-SLAPP statute applied and that her statements were not defamatory.
In its memorandum in opposition to Swift's motion, Nexus argued that the anti-SLAPP statute was inapplicable because Swift was not petitioning the government via her Internet posts and that her actions were not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action. Nexus also argued that if the statute mandated dismissal of its defamation action, the statute violated Nexus's constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, a certain remedy in law, and a jury trial.1 Nexus also argued that it had presented clear and convincing evidence of defamatory statements accusing it falsely of murder. Nexus argued in the alternative that it should be allowed to conduct discovery before the court determined any issues of malice because Swift brought the motion to dismiss instead of answering interrogatories and document requests aimed at discovering what information was available to her before she made the various statements. This claim was essentially that it would be unfair to require Nexus to prove malice, which depended on the information Swift had before making the statements, before Nexus was allowed to conduct discovery on that issue.
Swift filed a reply memorandum in which she reiterated her earlier arguments-that the statute applied, that "getting away with murder" was a constitutionally protected opinion, and that it was substantially true that Nexus or its employee got away with murder because of the medical examiner's initial determination that the youth's death was a homicide. Swift also argued that the statute did not violate any constitutional provisions.
In October 2009, the district court issued an order denying Swift's motion to dismiss. The district court treated Swift's motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12.02(e) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court refused to consider evidence outside of the pleadings or to convert the motion into a motion for summary judgment. The district court found that discovery was warranted, and that because the case involved only the claim of defamation, the only discovery that could be appropriately ordered was "full" discovery. The district court held that if the anti-SLAPP statute were construed to require it to grant Swift's motion, the statute would violate Nexus's due-process rights. It also held that the statute, if construed in such a manner, would violate Nexus's right to a jury trial to the extent that a jury trial would be warranted on the issue of whether Swift defamed Nexus. The district court declined to address the constitutional argument under the Remedies Clause of the Minnesota Constitution. The district court then held that Nexus had alleged the appropriate elements of defamation and "[found] that facts could be introduced consistent with the pleading that would support granting the relief demanded." The district court declined to address Nexus's argument about discovery on the issue of malice because it intended to order full discovery. This interlocutory appeal follows.
I. Does application of Minnesota's anti-SLAPP statute to Nexus's defamation action against Swift violate Nexus's constitutional right to due process of law or to a jury trial?
II. Did the district court err in denying Swift's motion to dismiss on the ground that she was immune from liability under the anti-SLAPP statute?
Nexus challenges the constitutionality of the...
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