Ngamby v. Ember Hamburg, Greyhound Lines, Inc.
| Decision Date | 29 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. TDC-15-0931 |
| Parties | AMELIE NGAMBY, Plaintiff, v. EMBER HAMBURG, GREYHOUND LINES, INC., JAMES KENNEDY, and AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION LOCAL 1700, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Plaintiff Amelie Ngamby, who is self-represented, has filed suit against Defendants Ember Hamburg, Greyhound Lines, Inc. ("Greyhound"), James Kennedy, and Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1700 ("Local 1700"). She alleges discrimination on the basis of national origin and breach of contract related to an involuntary furlough and subsequent termination from her job with Greyhound. Pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss filed by Kennedy and Local 1700 (collectively, "the Union Defendants"). The Motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition. No hearing is necessary to resolve the issues. See D. Md. Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
The following facts are presented in the light most favorable to Ngamby, the nonmoving party:
I. Ngamby's Involuntary Furlough and Termination
On September 26, 2012, Ngamby was involuntarily furloughed from her job as a ticket agent with Greyhound. Ngamby, who hails from Cameroon, claims that non-African ticket agents with less seniority were not furloughed. Ngamby requested and received transfers to other Greyhound locations, but her managers prevented them from occurring. Although she belonged to Local 1700, the union did not assist her. Instead it chose to "look the other way" and allowed Greyhound "to break their contract." Compl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 2.
Ngamby returned to full-time employment with Greyhound as a service worker on November 13, 2012. Greyhound mechanic Jose Ruiz, who had an oversight role over service workers, including Ngamby, subjected her to disparate treatment and harassment because of her national origin. For example, on September 10, 2013, Ruiz instructed a Greyhound service worker to clean a particular bus. The employee refused and was not disciplined. Ruiz then gave the same instruction to Ngamby, who was occupied cleaning a different bus. When Ngamby also refused, Ruiz complained to David Ortega, the manager on duty. Ngamby tried to explain that Ruiz's demand conflicted with prior instructions from Rebecca Wright, Ngamby's usual supervisor, who was on vacation that day. In response, Ortega raised his voice and told Ngamby to go home. When Ngamby returned to work on September 11, she attended a meeting with a union representative and a Greyhound official, during which she was fired. Ngamby contacted Wright to ask for assistance in getting her job back, but her termination was not rescinded. Local 1700 did not pursue a grievance on her behalf or otherwise try to help her regain her job.
II. Procedural History
On September 8, 2014, after Ngamby had filed a complaint with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), the EEOC mailed her a "right-to-sue letter,"dismissing her charge of employment discrimination and informing her of her right to file a lawsuit within 90 days. Ngamby's EEOC charge document is not part of the record in this case, and Ngamby has not alleged its contents. On December 14, 2014, 97 days after the notice was mailed, Ngamby filed her Complaint in this action in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland.1 The Complaint names Ember Hamburg, Greyhound's Director of Human Resources, and James Kennedy, the Vice President of Local 1700, as defendants, and seeks compensatory and punitive damages from Greyhound and Local 1700. On April 1, 2015, the Union Defendants, who had been previously served with the Complaint, removed the case to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction. On April 7, 2015, the Union Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, to which Ngamby filed a Response on April 27, 2015. The Union Defendants filed a Reply Memorandum on May 11, 2015. To date, neither Hamburg nor Greyhound has been served with the Complaint.
In their Motion, the Union Defendants construe Ngamby's Complaint, which does not explicitly reference any statutory or common law causes of action, as alleging two claims: (1) a "hybrid § 301 claim"—an allegation that Greyhound breached the collective bargaining agreement and that Local 1700 breached its duty of fair representation—arising under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2012) and the NationalLabor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169;2 and (2) an employment discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. In the Motion, the Union Defendants seek dismissal on the grounds that the LMRA prevents Kennedy from being held personally liable for the wrongs alleged by Ngamby, that Ngamby's hybrid § 301 claim against all defendants is time-barred, and that her Title VII claim fails because she did not exhaust administrative remedies before the EEOC. When Ngamby submitted her EEOC right-to-sue letter with her Response, the Union Defendants shifted their argument against the Title VII claim to an assertion, in their Reply Memorandum, that Ngamby failed to file her Complaint within 90 days of her right-to-sue letter, such that it is time-barred.
The claims against Kennedy are properly considered as the subject of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). To defeat a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must allege enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is plausible when the facts pleaded allow "the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Although courts should construe pleadings of self-represented litigants liberally, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), legal conclusions or conclusory statements do notsuffice, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court must examine the complaint as a whole, consider the factual allegations in the complaint as true, and construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Davidson Cnty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005).
Because Ngamby has submitted evidence for the Court's review and because portions of the Motion rely upon this evidence, the Motion will be converted, with respect to the remaining claims, to a motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), the Court grants summary judgment if the moving party demonstrates there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In assessing the Motion, the Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, with all justifiable inferences drawn in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The Court may rely only on facts supported in the record, not simply assertions in the pleadings. Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003). The nonmoving party has the burden to show a genuine dispute on a material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," and a dispute of material fact is only "genuine" if sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party exists for the trier of fact to return a verdict for that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49.
Although no party challenges the Court's subject matter jurisdiction, "questions of subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any point during the proceedings and may (or, moreprecisely, must) be raised sua sponte by the court." Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. Datanet Eng'g, Inc., 369 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 2004). Ngamby's Complaint does not name her causes of action. It begins with the heading "Wrongful Discharge," includes an allegation that Local 1700 allowed Greyhound to "break their contract," and concludes with a demand for damages resulting from national origin discrimination. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 11. The Union Defendants interpret the Complaint as alleging a "hybrid-301" claim under the LMRA and a discrimination claim under Title VII. A hybrid § 301 claim alleges both that the plaintiff's employer violated the collective bargaining agreement and that the union violated its duty of fair representation. DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164-65 (1983); Thompson v. Aluminum Co. of America, 276 F.3d 651, 656-57 (4th Cir. 2002). The plaintiff "must prevail upon his unfair representation claim before he may even litigate the merits of his § 301 claim against the employer." Thompson, 276 F.3d at 656-57 (quoting United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 67 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring)). The Union Defendants' Notice of Removal asserted that "[t]he Complaint is completely preempted by Section 301" of the LMRA and that removal was proper on the grounds of federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Notice of Removal ¶¶ 5-6, ECF No. 1. The Court is not convinced that Ngamby necessarily intended to assert these federal claims, as opposed to a state law claim under Maryland's anti-discrimination statute and a common law breach of contract claim. The Court agrees, however, that federal question jurisdiction exists because any breach of contract claim would be completely preempted by the LMRA.
Although the existence of a federal preemption defense to a state law claim brought in state court does not ordinarily provide grounds for removal to federal court, see Richardson v. United...
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