Richardson v. United Steelworkers of America
Decision Date | 06 February 1989 |
Docket Number | No. 87-1875,87-1875 |
Citation | 864 F.2d 1162 |
Parties | 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2571, 57 USLW 2474, 110 Lab.Cas. P 10,939, 13 Fed.R.Serv.3d 138 Altheus RICHARDSON, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, Gilberto Miranda, et al., Appellants, v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Mike T. Milligan, El Paso, Tex., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Richard J. Brean, Asst. General Counsel, United Steelworkers of America, Pittsburgh, Pa., Bruce Alan Fickman, Houston, Tex., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.
Before REAVLEY, GARWOOD, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
The plaintiffs-appellants in this case are former employees of Phelps Dodge Copper Refinery in El Paso, Texas (Phelps Dodge) who were replaced while on strike. Defendant-appellee United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC (the Union) was their collective bargaining representative. Plaintiffs sued the Union in state court for alleged breach of its duty as their bargaining agent by failing to warn them of Phelps Dodge's statutory right to replace them. The Union removed the case to federal court and several other former employees sought leave to intervene. The district court determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the case, denied the motions for leave to intervene, and dismissed plaintiffs' action as time-barred by the six-month federal statute of limitations for federal duty of fair representation claims, section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 160(b). We affirm.
Plaintiffs filed this action against the Union in Texas state court on Monday, April 6, 1987, alleging in their original petition that:
Plaintiffs' original petition does not allege that plaintiffs are or ever were members of the Union. And, this pleading does not expressly mention or refer to any federal or state statute, regulation, or court decision, nor does it expressly refer to federal or state law or expressly identify the jurisdiction the law of which it seeks to invoke.
The Union was served with plaintiffs' state court original petition on May 6, 1987 and on May 20, it removed the case to the United States Court for the Southern District of Texas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1441 on the basis of jurisdiction under section 301 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185(a) ( ). The Union then moved to dismiss plaintiffs' action as time-barred under the six-month limitations period of section 10(b) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 160(b), asserting that the plaintiffs' action was actually for breach of its duty of fair representation under the NLRA, though plaintiffs had not pleaded the NLRA as the basis for their state action. On May 26, plaintiffs moved to remand and filed a response to the Union's motion to dismiss, contending that their claim was for negligent breach of a Texas common-law tort duty owed by a union to its members and that either the Texas four-year, or two-year, statute of limitations applied. On May 29, the Union moved to amend its petition for removal, and tendered an amended removal petition alleging federal jurisdiction based on 29 U.S.C. Sec. 159(a) ( ), 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 ( ), and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1337 ( ). The district court granted leave to file the amended removal petition, noting that since it was tendered within the original thirty-day period provided by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1446(b) the amendment should be allowed. See Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction Sec. 3733 at 537 (2d ed. 1985).
While the respective motions to dismiss and to remand were under submission, fourteen additional ex-employees of Phelps Dodge moved to intervene, asserting they had identical claims.
The district court ultimately agreed with the Union's analysis of plaintiffs' claim, finding that plaintiffs had "stated a claim for breach of the duty of fair representation," which "arose in the context of a collective bargaining agreement." Based on this conclusion, the district court denied plaintiffs' motion to remand; applied the six-month limitations period of section 10(b) of the NLRA prescribed by DelCostello v. International Broth. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983), for duty of fair representation claims, and dismissed plaintiffs' claims as time-barred. It also denied the motion for intervention. 1 This appeal followed.
Plaintiffs alleged that the Union had a duty to advise them of Phelps Dodge's right to replace them if they went on strike. They alleged that this duty arose from the Union's status as their collective bargaining agent (and their original petition asserts no other source of this duty). The Union's right to act as plaintiffs' bargaining agent is conferred by the NLRA, and we hold that the duties corresponding to this right conferred by federal labor law are likewise defined solely by federal labor law. As a result of this complete preemption of state law, we further hold that the district court had removal jurisdiction over these actions. Finally, we find that the district court did not err in denying the motion to intervene.
Plaintiffs simply alleged that the Union was "the bargaining agent for Plaintiffs" and that it "acted as bargaining agent for Plaintiffs in connection with their employment by" Phelps Dodge. Taken in the context of plaintiffs' original petition as a whole, these statements clearly imply that the Union was the exclusive bargaining agent under the NLRA for the collective bargaining unit of which plaintiffs (and the putative intervenors) were members, and the subsequent briefs and motions of all parties, here and below, in fact treat the Union as such. The duty which the Union allegedly breached is described in the original petition as "a duty" which the Union had "[a ]s the bargaining agent for Plaintiffs" (emphasis added). No other source of duty is alleged in the original petition. The nature of the relationship between a collective bargaining agent and the employees in the bargaining unit is well established:
Bass v. International Broth. of Boilermakers, 630 F.2d 1058, 1062 (5th Cir.1980).
See also In re Carter, 618 F.2d 1093, 1104 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied sub nom. Sheet Metal Workers' Intern. Ass'n v. Carter, 450 U.S. 949, 101 S.Ct. 1410, 67 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981).
This duty of fair representation generally governs a union's conduct vis-a-vis the bargaining unit members when the union is representing them. 2 See Swatts v. United Steelworkers of America, 808 F.2d 1221, 1224 (7th Cir.1986) ( ); Acri v. Intern. Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 781 F.2d 1393, 1397 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816, 107 S.Ct. 73, 93 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986) (...
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Forum Selection: Venue and Removal
...tax disputes. [28 USC §1340.] • National Labor Relations Act and related labor union claims. [ Richardson v. United Steelworkers of Am. , 864 F2d 1162 (5th Cir 1989).] But an employee’s retaliatory discharge claim that does not require interpretation of a labor union contract does not raise......
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Forum Selection: Venue, Forum Non Conveniens, and Removal
...F3d 922, 929 (5th Cir 1997).] • National Labor Relations Act and related labor union claims. [ Richardson v. United Steelworkers of Am. , 864 F2d 1162 (5th Cir 1989).] But an employee’s retaliatory discharge claim that does not require interpretation of a labor union contract does not raise......
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Forum Selection: Venue and Removal
...tax disputes. [28 USC §1340.] • National Labor Relations Act and related labor union claims. [ Richardson v. United Steelworkers of Am. , 864 F2d 1162 (5th Cir 1989).] But an employee’s retaliatory discharge claim that does not require interpretation of a labor union contract does not raise......
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Forum Selection: Venue and Removal
...tax disputes. [28 USC §1340.] National Labor Relations Act and related labor union claims. [ Richardson v. United Steelworkers of Am. , 864 F2d 1162 (5th Cir 1989).] But an employee’s retaliatory discharge claim that does not require interpretation of a labor union contract does not raise......