Nguyen v. IBP, Inc.
Decision Date | 22 September 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 94-4046.,94-4046. |
Citation | 905 F. Supp. 1471 |
Parties | Hong Van NGUYEN, Plaintiff, v. IBP, INC., Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
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Brent C. Moerer, Topeka, KS, Gary E. Patterson, Patterson, Nelson, Nolla & Witteman, L.C., Wichita, KS, for plaintiff.
J. Nick Badgerow, Michaela M. Warden, Spencer, Fane, Britt & Browne, Overland Park, KS, for defendant.
The case comes before the court on the defendant's motion for summary judgment (Dk.38). The plaintiff, Hong Van Nguyen ("Nguyen"), is a former employee of IBP, Inc. ("IBP") and brings this suit alleging he was discharged in retaliation for reporting a work-related injury, in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117, and in breach of an implied employment contract. By order filed September 1, 1995, the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and explained that a memorandum and order would follow setting forth the reasons for its decision. The court submits the following as its memorandum and order.
A court grants a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if a genuine issue of material fact does not exist and if the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court is to determine "whether there is the need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will ... preclude summary judgment." Id. There are no genuine issues for trial if the record taken as a whole would not persuade a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "There are cases where the evidence is so weak that the case does not raise a genuine issue of fact." Burnette v. Dow Chemical Co., 849 F.2d 1269, 1273 (10th Cir.1988).
The initial burden is with the movant to "point to those portions of the record that demonstrate an absence of a genuine issue of material fact given the relevant substantive law." Thomas v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 968 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1013, 113 S.Ct. 635, 121 L.Ed.2d 566 (1992). If this burden is met, the nonmovant must "come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial as to elements essential to" the nonmovant's claim or position. Martin v. Nannie and Newborns, Inc., 3 F.3d 1410, 1414 (10th Cir.1993) (citations omitted). The nonmovant's burden is more than a simple showing of "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1356; it requires "`presenting sufficient evidence in specific, factual form for a jury to return a verdict in that party's favor.'" Thomas v. International Business Machines, 48 F.3d 478, 484 (10th Cir.1995) (quoting Bacchus Industries, Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir.1991)). The court views the evidence of record and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id. A party relying on only conclusory allegations cannot defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. White v. York Intern. Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 363 (10th Cir.1995).
More than a "disfavored procedural shortcut," summary judgment is an important procedure Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). At the same time, a summary judgment motion does not empower a court to act as the jury and determine witness credibility, weigh the evidence, or choose between competing inferences. Windon Third Oil and Gas v. Federal Deposit Ins., 805 F.2d 342, 346 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947, 107 S.Ct. 1605, 94 L.Ed.2d 791 (1987).
For purposes only of this motion for summary judgment, the court considers the following facts, as so stated, to be uncontroverted:
1. On June 22, 1992, the plaintiff Nguyen began working for IBP at its plant in Emporia, Kansas. He worked in the production department as a meat processor or "deboner." Nguyen speaks little English and needs an interpreter in most matters involving the English language.
2. On October 30, 1992, Nguyen reported a work-related injury to his hand. He sought treatment from a physician who restricted his work to light duty. The treating physician also prescribed physical therapy which began on February 25, 1993.
3. IBP complied with the treating physician's restrictions and prescriptions. It temporarily placed Nguyen in a light-duty position known as a "picker." It also gave him time off for the scheduled physical therapy appointments.
4. According to the physical therapist, Nguyen missed five scheduled physical therapy appointments between February 25, 1993, and March 12, 1993.
5. Nguyen admits missing a physical therapy appointment on February 26, 1993, and explains that he fell asleep and forgot it.
6. Nguyen admits missing another physical therapy appointment scheduled for noon on March 8, 1993. When he reported to work that afternoon for his 3:30 p.m. to 11:45 p.m. shift, his supervisor, LaChelle Schamle, questioned him about missing the physical therapy appointment. Nguyen told her that his car would not start, that it had been towed, and that he had no transportation to his appointment. Nguyen later rode to work with a friend who also was employed at IBP.
7. On March 10, 1993, Rodger D. Brownrigg, IBP's Complex Personnel Manager, presented Nguyen with a letter regarding the missed physical therapy appointment. An interpreter read the letter to Nguyen. The letter states in relevant part:
(Dk. 39, Ex. F). Nguyen gave Brownrigg the same excuse of his car not starting and being towed to a garage for repairs. During his recount of car problems, Nguyen described his car as a Dodge "minivan." Because Nguyen had given dubious excuses for missing work and physical therapy appointments on earlier occasions, Brownrigg was suspicious and asked Nguyen to bring in the bill for the car repair work done on March 8, 1993.
8. Nguyen did not bring the car repair bill to Brownrigg on March 11, 1993. Brownrigg asked again for the repair bill on March 15, 1993. Nguyen told Brownrigg that his friend had the car towed for repairs and he did not know the name of the garage where the car had been taken. When Nguyen said that a woman who worked at IBP had recommended the garage, Brownrigg visited with this employee. The female employee told Brownrigg that she did not know what Nguyen was talking about. Brownrigg then told Nguyen that based on everything Nguyen had said and his past stories he "felt" Nguyen was not being truthful and that he could be terminated for falsification. Brownrigg instructed Nguyen that (Brownrigg Dep. at 52-53).
9. On March 16, 1993, Nguyen reported to Brownrigg that his friend had his copy of the car bill and that he could not find his friend. Brownrigg told Nguyen "that he could stay at home until he brought the bill in; and I would leave it on indefinite suspension until further notice." (Brownrigg Dep. at 53).
10. On March 18, 1993, Brownrigg telephoned all the wrecker services in the Emporia phone book and asked each if it had towed a Dodge Caravan or Voyager to a repair shop on March 8, 1993. Brownrigg learned that none of the wrecker services had done so. Having received no car repair bill from Nguyen and having investigated enough to believe that Nguyen's excuse was false, Brownrigg decided to terminate Nguyen on March 18, 1993. Nguyen completed his departure form at IBP that same day, and "falsification" is handwritten on the form as the apparent reason for Nguyen's termination. Brownrigg testified that he fired Nguyen for giving false reasons for the missed physical therapy appointment.
11. When he was hired at IBP, Nguyen had read to him a form that disclosed first offenses which could result in his immediate discharge. He...
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