Nichols v. Gaddis & McLaurin, Inc., 39318

• Decision Date: 16 March 1955
• Docket Number: No. 39318,39318
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: James NICHOLS et al. v. GADDIS & McLAURIN, Inc.

Page 471

78 So.2d 471

222 Miss. 207

James NICHOLS et al. v. GADDIS & McLAURIN, Inc.

No. 39318.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

March 16, 1955.

Appeal from Chancery Court, Hinds County; L. Arnold Pyle, Chancellor.

On suggestion of error. Suggestion of error overruled.

For former opinion see 75 So.2d 625.

Craig Castle, Carl E. Guernsey, Jackson, for appellant.

James H. Adams, Raymond, Vardaman S. Dunn, Jackson, for appellee.

On Suggestion of Error

Suggestion of error overruled.

LEE, Justice (dissenting).

On the original decision of this case, I thought that the decree of the trial court should have been affirmed. My views were stated in a dissent at the time.

I did not think Peeples v. Boykin, 132 Miss. 359, 96 So. 177, should have been overruled because in my opinion (1) it was correctly decided and announced a wholesome principle of law; and (2) from long recognition, it had become a rule of property, many titles rested on it, and these should not be disrupted with the probability of great injustice.

I did not see how it would be judicially possible to reverse this case, if Peeples v. Boykin, supra, remained a part of our jurisprudence. However, inasmuch as the other Members of the Court determined to overrule it, I realized the futility of a lengthy exposition of my contrary views; and I strove to save the case on other grounds.

I think the blow of overruling Peeples v. Boykin should be softened at least to the extent of making it prospective; and I therefore join in the dissent by Justice GILLESPIE against overruling the Suggestion of Error in this case.

GILLESPIE, Justice (dissenting).

Appellee filed a suggestion of error in which seven errors were suggested. The Court called for a reply to only one point: The doctrine of recordation as laid down in Peeples v. Boykin, 132 Miss. 359, 96 So. 177, affects titles to real estate, is a rule of property, and is the law of this case. The majority overruled the suggestion of error and thereby adhered to the decision of the original opinion to the effect that Peeples v. Boykin, supra, did not establish a rule of property.

With deference, I am unable to agree to the conclusions of the majority on the stated question. I think the rule laid down in Peeples v. Boykin, and as understood by the bench and bar, established a rule of property; and the change in the rule should be applied prospectively, but all transactions occurring prior to the change in the rule should be controlled by the rule of property existing at the time of their occurrence.

This Court has said that the stability and certainty of rules relating to muniments of titles to real estate is of first importance. The law favors the repose of society in general; it especially favors stability in the law as it affects or involves the descent, transfer, sale, title, or possession of property. Courts sometimes find that a rule of law that affects or involves these considerations is unsound and mischievous in operation and should be overruled; whereupon two competing considerations confront the Court, (1) The need for stability in the law affecting property, and the protection of rights and titles established under the unsound rule, and (2) the need for a change in a rule of law that has proven to be unsound and mischievous in operation. The Court then has a choice of either refusing to change the rule or of changing the rule only as to transactions occurring subsequent to the change. In either case, the vested rights and titles acquired while the error prevailed are upheld and protected.

Appellee contends that Peeples v. Boykin established a rule of property in that it was there held that recordation of the deed purporting to convey the full title plus possession by a cotenant for ten years vested complete title; that notice to the cotenants was conclusively presumed from these circumstances. That seems to me to be what the bench and bar has understood the case to hold. In 1948, after Peeples v. Boykin had been in the books for twenty-five years, this Court said of that decision, in the case of McDonald v. Roberson, 204 Miss. 737, 38 So.2d 189, 190, the following:

'In Peeples v. Boykin, 132 Miss. 359, 96 So. 177, this Court held that where a person who would otherwise be a tenant in common remained in exclusive and continuous possession, claiming to be the owner under a recorded deed purporting to convey the entire interest in the property, the title would mature in the occupant on the expiration of ten years from the date of the recordation of the deed, even though the deed in severalty was made by other tenants in common, and there was no visible change in the character of the occupancy after the recordation of the deed, and no actual notice was given by the occupant--the theory being that when the deed was recorded, that fact, coupled with the occupancy under it, gave rise immediately to a cause of action to the co-tenants whose interests had not been conveyed.'

The annotators of every code since Peeples v. Boykin was decided have placed the following annotation under what is now Section 711, Mississippi Code of 1942:

'Tenant in common cannot acquire title against co-tenant without notice; recorded deed held notice to co-tenant of adverse claim. Peeples v. Boykin, 132 Miss. 359, 96 So. 177.'

The definition of a rule of property is set out in 54 C.J. 1110, Section 8; 77 C.J.S. p. 544 as follows: 'Rule of Property. A settled legal principle governing the ownership and devolution of property; the decisions of the highest court of a state when they relate to and settle some principle of local law directly applicable to this. In the plural, those rules governing the descent, transfer, or sale of property, and the rules which affect the title and possession thereto.'

Rules of property are defined as 'those rules governing the descent, transfer, or sale of property, and the rules which affect the title and possession thereto.' Bucher v. Cheshire R. Co., 125 U.S. 555, 8 S.Ct. 974, 978, 31 L.Ed. 795.

In Fuller v. Mullins, 143 Ky. 639, 137 S.W. 243, the holding is summarized in the headnote as follows: 'The rule that certain things are sufficient for acquisition of title by adverse possession declared in a long series of opinions by the Supreme Court has become a rule of property, from which, under the rule of stare decisis, it cannot depart.'

In Stewart v. Hunt, 1942, 303 Mich. 161, 5 N.W.2d 737, 738, there was involved the question as to adverse possession of an easement and the issue was whether a user by successive owners could be tacked together to reach the prescribed time. The court had previously held in the negative, but recognized that the previous decision was against the overwhelming weight of authority. The court applied its former decision, saying: 'Any change, if desirable, should be accomplished by legislation, prospective in operation, rather than by judicial redecision, which would disturb vested rights.'

A rule of property as a legal principle has been applied by this Court in a number of cases. In Webb v. Mobile & Ohio R. Co., 105 Miss. 175, 62 So. 168, 169, the validity of a tax sale was involved. The Court held that the rule, under prior decisions, that parol evidence was admissible to correct a deed was a rule of property. The Court said: 'The stability and certainty of rules relating to muniments of title to real estate is of the first importance.'

In Forest Product & Manufacturing Co. v. Buckley, 107 Miss. 897, 66 So. 279, the Court declined to overrule a former decision as to the construction of a timber deed because the former decision was a rule of property.

In Robertson v. Puffer Manufacturing Co., 112 Miss. 890, 73 So. 804, there was involved the question of whether a document was a lease or a conditional sales contract. The Court held that a previous decision holding such document a lease was a rule of property and declined to overrule it.

The rule of property principle was applied in the case of K. C. Lumber Co. v. Moss, 119 Miss. 185, 80 So. 638. A tax sale was there involved.

In Magee v. Morehead, 154 Miss. 828, 123 So. 881, a rule of property was held to be involved and the Court declined to overrule the decision under which it was established.

In Boon v. Bowers, 30 Miss. 246, the Court declined to overrule a prior decision because of the 'important bearing upon titles to property.'

In Yazoo & M....