Nichols v. Judge of Superior Court of Grand Rapids

• Decision Date: 26 March 1902
• Citation: 89 N.W. 691,130 Mich. 187
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: NICHOLS v. JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT OF GRAND RAPIDS.

89 N.W. 691

130 Mich. 187

NICHOLS v. JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT OF GRAND RAPIDS.

Supreme Court of Michigan

March 26, 1902

Petition by George E. Nichols against the judge of the superior court of Grand Rapids for writ of prohibition. Refused.

October 28, 1901, the prosecuting officers of Kent county filed in the superior court of Grand Rapids affidavits charging relator with contempt of court. The affidavits charged that the respondent committed the offense of subornation of perjury in a criminal case, viz., People against Lant K Salsbury, which was then on trial in the superior court; the relator being one of the attorneys for the prisoner. The relator made a motion in that court to quash the proceedings on the ground that the superior court had no jurisdiction in the case. This motion was denied, and an order entered that the contempt proceedings be stayed until the further order of the court, and that the prosecuting attorney 'take such action through the regular channels of the criminal law as the gravity of the case and the ends of justice demand.' The relator thereupon filed the petition in this court for the writ of prohibition, claiming that the superior court has no jurisdiction over contempt proceedings of this character. Three questions are presented for determination: (1) Is prohibition the proper remedy? (2) Has the superior court jurisdiction over contempt proceedings? (3) Was the superior court proceeding according to law?

A. A. Ellis, J. B. Judkins, and Charles W Nichols, for relator.

Ward &amp Brown, for respondent.

GRANT J. (after stating the facts).

1. The writ of prohibition is the appropriate remedy only where the court is acting entirely without jurisdiction or in clear excess of its jurisdiction. It is not applicable where the party has a complete and adequate remedy in some other and more ordinary form. It will not lie to determine whether the petition for contempt is defective, any more than mandamus or certiorari will lie to determine whether a declaration information, or indictment is defective. In such cases the circuit courts have full jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the pleadings, and the proper course is by writ of error, appeal, or certiorari, after the proceedings are concluded. The principle is thus stated: 'The broad governing principle is that a prohibition lies where a subordinate tribunal has no jurisdiction at all to deal with the cause or matter before it, or where, in the progress of a cause within its jurisdiction, some point arises for decision which the inferior court is incompetent to determine. But a prohibition will not lie where the inferior court has jurisdiction to deal with the cause and with all matters necessarily arising therein, however erroneous its decisions may be upon any point.' Heard, Shortt, Extr. Rem. 436. See, also, High, Extr. Rem. � 770, where it is stated that 'it is always a sufficient reason for withholding the writ that the party aggrieved has another and complete remedy at law.' This rule is approved in Hudson v. Judge of Superior Court, 42 Mich. 239, 248, 3 N.W. 850, 913, and authorities there cited. In People v. Wayne Co. Circuit Court, 11 Mich. 394, 404, 83 Am. Dec. 754, in a unanimous opinion, written by Justice Campbell, it was said: 'As the writ of prohibition, if possible, is only for excess of jurisdiction, it is not material, on this motion, whether the facts charged are true or not. There seems to be no power to issue this writ to restrain any action which can be disposed of by appeal or other ordinary method of review.' The clear weight of authority sustains the rule as above stated. The United States supreme court has held that: 'A writ of prohibition is never to be issued unless it clearly appears that the inferior court is about to exceed its jurisdiction. It cannot be made to serve the purpose of a writ of error or certiorari to correct mistakes of that court in deciding any question of law or fact within its jurisdiction.' Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 176, 6 S.Ct. 570, 574, 29 L.Ed. 601. See, also, Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38, 5 L.Ed. 391. Repeated attempts have been made in this court by application for the writ of mandamus and certiorari to determine the validity of declarations, indictments, and informations; but we have for several years consistently refused to entertain them. Only when the court below has held the pleadings bad, and quashed them, have we entertained such applications, and then for the reason that the parties had no other remedy. But where the court has retained jurisdiction the party has another adequate and appropriate remedy. The most recent decisions upon this point are People v. Thompson, 108 Mich. 583, 66 N.W. 478, where the respondent was charged with manslaughter, and the circuit court refused to quash the indictment; and Maynard v. Ingham Circuit Judge, 124 Mich. 465, 83 N.W. 102, where the relator was under indictment, which the court refused to quash on the ground that the indictment was fatally defective. Certainly, the writ of prohibition should not be used to determine the same questions which we have refused to determine upon applications for mandamus and certiorari. In the case now before us relator denies that the respondent has any jurisdiction over proceedings of this character. No attack is made upon the form of the proceedings or upon the sufficiency of the papers. It is a clear case of denial of jurisdiction. We are therefore of the opinion that the writ of prohibition furnishes the proper remedy to determine the jurisdiction of the court.

2. The legislature is, by the constitution, authorized to establish municipal courts of criminal and civil jurisdiction. Const art. 6, � 1. The superior court of Grand Rapids is a creation of the legislature, with such powers and jurisdiction as the legislature has seen fit to confer upon it. We must, therefore, look to the act of the legislature establishing this court to determine what power is given it over the subject of contempts. The statute is silent upon the subject, except as it is covered by the general and broad jurisdiction conferred upon the court. The act gives such court original and exclusive jurisdiction over all criminal proceedings committed within the corporate limits of the city, with certain exceptions, and 'power to issue all lawful writs and process, and to do all lawful acts which may be necessary and proper to carry into complete effect the powers and jurisdiction given by this act, and especially to issue all writs and process, and to do all acts which the circuit courts of this state, within their respective jurisdictions, may in like cases issue and do by the laws of this state.' Laws 1875, Act No. 49, �� 13, 14 (Comp. Laws, �� 630, 631). Under this law the superior court is subject only to the control of the supreme court. It is governed by the same rules of practice as the circuit courts. Appeals are taken from it to the supreme court. In short, it is subject to the mandate of this court in precisely the same manner and to the same degree that the circuit courts are. This act is similar in its provisions to the act establishing the superior court of Detroit. This court held that: 'As respects civil jurisdiction, the superior court of Detroit is a tribunal of the same class as the circuit courts. There are no limitations upon its powers. * * * The nature of the subjects of its jurisdiction, so far as the jurisdiction extends, is the same. It is a court of original jurisdiction, proceeding according to the course of the common law.' Mills Co. v. Robinson, 34 Mich. 428. See the further reasoning of the court on page 432. See, also, People v. Treasurer of Kent. Co., 36 Mich. 332. The power to punish for contempt is essential to the due administration of the law and to carry out the orders, decrees, and judgments of the court. If it was the intention of the legislature to limit the jurisdiction of the court over contempts to the causes specified in section 1098, Comp. Laws,--a law which was enacted long prior to the adoption of the present constitution, and when there was only one constitutional court, viz., the supreme court,--it would certainly have used language appropriate to express such intention. On the contrary, it expressly confers upon the court the same powers in this respect that circuit courts possess under the constitution. It follows that, if the circuit courts are clothed with the power to punish for contempts, and are not limited to the cases provided for in the statute, which was enacted under the constitution of 1835, then the respondent possesses the same power. The question, therefore, is again presented to this court, have the circuit courts of this state the inherent power to punish for contempts, or are they subject to the control of the legislature? The question is an important one in the administration of the law. If the legislature can determine what acts shall constitute contempts in the circuit courts, it can abolish the power of such courts to punish for contempts. There is no middle ground; either the courts have the absolute control, under the constitution, over contempt proceedings, or they have only such as the legislature may see fit to confer. The language of this court in Langdon v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 76 Mich. 367, 43 N.W. 310, is a broad statement that this power is inherent in the circuit courts of this state to the full extent that it existed in the courts of England at the common law. This was an authoritative statement of the law, but seems not to have been so considered by the entire profession. The subject was again before the court in Re Chadwick, 109 Mich. 588, 67 N.W. 1071. We there cited many authorities from other courts holding the same view that was...