Nichols v. Moore
| Decision Date | 13 July 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-74313.,03-74313. |
| Citation | 396 F.Supp.2d 783 |
| Parties | James D. NICHOLS, Plaintiff, v. Michael MOORE, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Gregory A. Bell, Stephani C. Godsey, Williamston, MI, Kenneth G. McIntyre, Sinas, Dramis, Lansing, MI, for Plaintiff.
Brian D. Wassom, Herschel P. Fink, Honigman, Miller, Detroit, MI, for Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BACKGROUND:
Presently before the Court is Michael Moore's ("Defendant") Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Plaintiff James Nichols' Complaint, filed on October 27, 2003, contains the following counts:
On September 3, 2004, this Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court dismissed Counts II, IV, VI, VIII and X. The following Counts remain pending:
Count I Libel Per Se (based upon the Film)
Count III Defamation by Implication (based upon the Film)
Count V False Light Invasion of Privacy (based upon the Film)
Count VII Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (based upon the Film)
As set forth in the Court's September 3, 2004 Opinion and Order, on October 28, 2002, the movie Bowling for Columbine premiered in Flint, Michigan, near Decker, the hometown of Plaintiff. (Complaint, ¶ 5). The Film is a documentary which explores guns and violence in America. James Nichols ("Plaintiff") bases his lawsuit on a film segment on the bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, for which Plaintiff's brother Terry Nichols and Timothy McVeigh were arrested and convicted.
Shortly after the Oklahoma City bombing, Plaintiff was arrested on a charge of possession of explosive devices on his farm in Decker, Michigan. He was first detained, and then released on bond. (Plaintiff's Response, Ex. 6). Plaintiff was also held as a material witness to the bombing. (Id. Ex.4). Subsequently, the government dismissed the criminal charges against Plaintiff James Nichols due to a lack of incriminating evidence. (Id. Ex.12).
As to that portion of the Film dealing with the Oklahoma City bombing, Defendant had interviewed Plaintiff at his home in Decker, Michigan. The interview lasted approximately three hours; Defendant incorporated approximately ten minutes of the interview into the Film. (Defendant's Motion, Ex. J).
Defendant conducted an ongoing narration throughout the Film. The text and sequence of Defendant's statements made in the film, pertinent instantly, are as follows:
(1) ... when on April 19, 1995 two guys living in Michigan who had attended Militia meetings, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, blew up the federal building in Oklahoma City killing 168 people.
(2) On this farm in Decker, Michigan, McVeigh and the Nichols brothers made practice bombs before Oklahoma City.
(3) Terry and James were both arrested in connection to the bombing.
(4) (female voice over) U.S. Attorneys formally linked the Nichols brothers of Michigan with Oklahoma bomb suspect, Timothy McVeigh.
(5) Officials charged James, who was at the hearing, and Terry, who was not, with conspiring to make and possess small bombs.
(6) Terry Nichols was convicted and received a life sentence. Timothy McVeigh was executed. But the feds didn't have the goods on James, so the charges were dropped.
(Plaintiff's Response, Ex. 14).
On February 25, 2005, Defendant filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff responded on May 9, 2005 and Defendant replied on May 11, 2005.1
Defendant argues that his statements are not actionable because they are substantially true accounts of public records and reliable news reports. (Defendant's Motion, at 4). Defendant further argues that the statements are not defamatory because Plaintiff is a public figure and there is no evidence of actual malice. (Id. at 11). Defendant also argues that Plaintiff's defamation by implication claims fails because Plaintiff cannot overcome the constitutional hurdles for such a claim, and that there were no material factual omissions in the film. (Id. at 17). Lastly, Defendant contends that Plaintiff's false light and emotional distress claims fail because they are subject to the same constitutional restraints as his defamation claim. (Id. at 19).
Plaintiff contends that the statements at issue were false. (Plaintiff's Response, at 13). Plaintiff further contends that Plaintiff is not a limited purpose public figure, but if the Court were to find otherwise, Plaintiff has met the actual malice standard. (Id. at 15-16). Lastly, Plaintiff contends that even if Defendant's statements were true, Defendant defamed Plaintiff by implication given the context and totality of the film. (Id. at 18).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted may "at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits, for a summary judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part thereof." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b). Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of an essential element of the nonmoving party's case on which the nonmoving party would bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
A fact is "material" for purposes of a motion for summary judgment where proof of that fact "would have [the] effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of a cause of action or defense asserted by the parties." Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir.1984) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 881 (6th ed.1979)) (citations omitted). A dispute over a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Conversely, where a reasonable jury could not find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id.; Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 988 F.2d 649, 654 (6th Cir.1993). In making this evaluation, the court must examine the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Bender v. Southland Corp., 749 F.2d 1205, 1210-1211 (6th Cir.1984).
If this burden is met by the moving party, the non-moving party's failure to make a showing that is "sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial" will mandate the entry of summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, must set forth specific facts which demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The rule requires that non-moving party to introduce "evidence of evidentiary quality" demonstrating the existence of a material fact. Bailey v. Floyd County Bd. of Educ., 106 F.3d 135, 145 (6th Cir.1997); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ().
Summary judgment is particularly appropriate at an early stage in cases where claims of libel or invasion of privacy are made against publications dealing with matters of public interest and concern. "In recognition of the constitutional privilege of free expression secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the courts in libel actions have recognized the need for affording summary relief to defendants in order to avoid the `chilling effect' on freedom of speech and press." Ireland v. Edwards, 230 Mich.App. 607, 613, n. 4, 584 N.W.2d 632 (1998)(quoting Lins v. Evening News Ass'n, 129 Mich.App. 419, 425, 342 N.W.2d 573 (1983)).
Defendant first argues that his statements were literally true, and substantial truth is an absolute defense in an action for defamation. Truth is an absolute defense to an action for defamation, regardless of the speaker's motivation. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 770, 106 S.Ct. 1558, 89 L.Ed.2d 783 (1986). The Court finds that " "truth" means substantial truth, as the Michigan Court of Appeals has set forth [i]f the gist, the sting, of the [statement] is substantially true, the defendant is not liable." Fisher v. Detroit Free Press, 158 Mich.App. 409, 414, 404 N.W.2d 765 (Mich.App.1987). Duran v. Detroit News, 200 Mich.App. 622, 633, 504 N.W.2d 715 (Mich.App.1993).
Michigan law also provides that damages will not be allowed in a libel action for a fair and true report of matter of public record. MCL § 600.2911(3) provides:
Damages shall...
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