Nielsen v. 2003 Honda Accord, A12–0217.

• Decision Date: 26 December 2013
• Docket Number: No. A12–0217.,A12–0217.
• Citation: 845 N.W.2d 754
• Parties: Matthew Roy NIELSEN, Appellant, v. 2003 HONDA ACCORD, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

845 N.W.2d 754

Matthew Roy NIELSEN, Appellant,

v.2003 HONDA ACCORD, Respondent.

No. A12–0217.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Dec. 26, 2013.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The motor vehicle exemption in Minn.Stat. § 550.37, subd. 12a (2012), does not, as a matter of statutory interpretation, apply when a motor vehicle is subject to forfeiture under Minn.Stat. § 169A.63 (2012).

2. The forfeiture of a motor vehicle under Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, without the application of the motor vehicle exemption in Minn.Stat. § 550.37, subd. 12a, does not violate Minn. Const. art. I, § 12.

Kirk M. Anderson, Anderson Law Firm, PLLC, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Daniel P. Rogan, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.

John E. Mack, Mack & Daby, P.A., New London, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Office of the Public Defender for the Eighth Judicial District.

OPINION

WRIGHT, Justice.

The question presented by this case is whether the motor vehicle exemption, Minn.Stat. § 550.37, subd. 12a (2012), applies to the forfeiture of a motor vehicle used in the commission of a designated driving-while-impaired (DWI) offense, pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 169A.63 (2012). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Hennepin County on behalf of respondent vehicle and held that the motor vehicle exemption does not apply when a motor vehicle is forfeited under section 169A.63. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant Matthew Nielsen asserts that both the motor vehicle exemption and Article I, Section 12, of the Minnesota Constitution apply to forfeiture under section 169A.63. Because we conclude that neither section 550.37, subdivision 12a, nor Article I, Section 12, applies to DWI forfeiture pursuant to section 169A.63, we affirm.

On April 11, 2011, a law enforcement officer stopped Nielsen after observing him drive in the wrong direction on a one-way street. Nielsen showed signs of intoxication and “registered [a] .282 blood alcohol concentration on a preliminary breath test.” Nielsen was arrested and charged with first-degree driving while impaired. Minn.Stat. §§ 169A.20, 169A.24 (2012). Nielsen subsequently pleaded guilty to the charged offense.

At the time of his arrest, Nielsen received a notice advising him of the County's intent to administratively forfeit his vehicle pursuant to section 169A.63. He sought a judicial determination of the forfeiture of his vehicle in conciliation court. Nielsen argued that he was entitled to receive a portion of the value of the forfeited vehicle under the motor vehicle exemption, section 550.37, subdivision 12a. The conciliation court agreed and entered judgment in favor of Nielsen in the amount of the motor vehicle exemption. The County removed the case to the district court after which the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Concluding that the motor vehicle exemption in section 550.37, subdivision 12a, does not apply when a motor vehicle is forfeited under section 169A.63, the district court awarded judgment in favor of the County.

Nielsen appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the district court. Nielsen v. 2003 Honda Accord, 823 N.W.2d 347, 348 (Minn.App.2012). The court of appeals first held that Article I, Section 12, of the Minnesota Constitution does not require application of the motor vehicle exemption when a vehicle used in the commission of a designated DWI offense is forfeited. Nielsen, 823 N.W.2d at 350. Without deciding whether the two statutes are actually in conflict, the court of appeals then concluded that the DWI forfeiture provision, section 169A.63, is the more recently enacted statute and therefore prevails over the motor vehicle exemption statute, section 550.37, subdivision 12a. Nielsen, 823 N.W.2d at 350–51.

I.

Nielsen advances two legal theories in opposition to the DWI forfeiture of his motor vehicle. First, Nielsen argues that, because the motor vehicle exemption in section 550.37, subdivision 12a, was enacted pursuant to Article I, Section 12, of the Minnesota Constitution, the owner of a motor vehicle is entitled to receive the exemption amount when the motor vehicle is forfeited under section 169A.63. Alternatively, Nielsen contends that the motor vehicle exemption applies in a DWI forfeiture proceeding as a matter of statutory interpretation because section 550.37, subdivision 12a, creates an exemption from forfeiture that does not conflict with the DWI forfeiture statute. According to Nielsen, if the value of the vehicle or the owner's equity interest in the vehicle is greater than the value of the exemption established in section 550.37, subdivision 12a, the County is entitled to forfeit the value of the property over the exemption amount. Because we will address a constitutional question only if another legal basis to decide a case does not exist, State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 926 (Minn.2006), we first address Nielsen's argument founded on statutory interpretation.

Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Caldas v. Affordable Granite & Stone, Inc., 820 N.W.2d 826, 836 (Minn.2012). Our goal in interpreting a statute is to determine and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Rohmiller v. Hart, 811 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Minn.2012). When the language of a statute is free from ambiguity, we give effect to the statute's plain language. Id. If a general provision in a statute conflicts with a special provision in the same or another statute, we interpret the two provisions, if possible, in a manner that gives effect to both provisions. Enright v. Lehmann, 735 N.W.2d 326, 335 (Minn.2007) (citing Minn.Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1 (2012)). But if the conflict between two statutes is irreconcilable, the special provision prevails and will be interpreted as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision was enacted at a later session and it is the manifest intent of the Legislature that the general provision prevail. Hyatt v. Anoka Police Dep't, 691 N.W.2d 824, 830 (Minn.2005)

The statutes at issue here are the motor vehicle exemption, section 550.37, subdivision 12a, and the DWI forfeiture statute, section 169A.63. Section 550.37, subdivision 1, limits the enforcement of judgments by designating certain property as “not liable to attachment, garnishment, or sale on any final process, issued from any court.” Minn.Stat. § 550.37, subd. 1 (2012). Section 550.37, subdivision 12a, exempts “[o]ne motor vehicle to the extent of a value not exceeding $2,000.” ¹

Section 169A.63, subdivision 6(a), subjects a motor vehicle “to forfeiture ... if it was used in the commission of a designated offense or was used in conduct resulting in a designated license revocation.” Such forfeiture may be achieved through an administrative or judicial forfeiture procedure. Id., subds. 8–9; see also Patino v. One 2007 Chevrolet, 821 N.W.2d 810, 813 (Minn.2012). “If the vehicle is administratively forfeited ..., or if the court finds ... that the vehicle is subject to forfeiture,” the law enforcement agency that initiated the forfeiture may sell the vehicle. Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 10(a). If the vehicle is sold, 70 percent of the proceeds must be distributed to the law enforcement agency's “operating fund or similar fund” and 30 percent of the proceeds must be distributed to the prosecuting authority that handled the forfeiture. Id., subd. 10(b). Alternatively, the agency may “keep the vehicle for official use.” Id., subd. 10(a)(2).

We first consider whether, based on the plain language of the statute, the exemptions in section 550.37 apply to a civil forfeiture. Section 550.37 exempts property from “sale on any final process, issued from any court.” “Final process” is defined as “process issued at the conclusion of a judicial proceeding; esp., a writ of execution.” Black's Law Dictionary 1325 (9th ed.2009). Applying this definition, the “sale on any final process” addressed in section 550.37 contemplates a forced sale. In a judicial forfeiture proceeding, the forfeiture is complete after process is issued at the end of the proceeding. More fundamentally, as with a forced sale, forfeiture proceedings result in the involuntary transfer of property. See, e.g., Butterworth v. Caggiano, 605 So.2d 56, 59–60 (Fla.1992) (concluding that exemption from forced sale includes exemption from forfeiture). We, therefore, conclude that because a civil forfeiture proceeding is in the nature of a forced sale, the exemption from sale on any final process established in section 550.37 applies to a civil forfeiture.

Having concluded that the motor vehicle exemption in section 550.37, subdivision 12a, applies to a civil forfeiture, we next consider whether this statutory provision conflicts with section 169A.63. Even though section 550.37 generally provides an exemption from civil forfeiture, we examine whether the exemption applies in the context of the specific forfeiture statute at issue here. See Enright, 735 N.W.2d at 335 (discussing the interpretation of two statutes that potentially conflict).

Although permitting the owner of a motor vehicle subject to DWI forfeiture to invoke the motor vehicle exemption would avoid a conflict between section 550.37, subdivision 12a, and section 169A.63, there are several provisions in section 169A.63 that preclude reconciling the statutes in this manner. First, the DWI forfeiture statute contemplates the forfeiture of vehicles worth less than $500. Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 8(e) (“If the value of the seized property is less than $500, the claimant does not have to pay the conciliation court filing fee.”). If the motor vehicle exemption applied to forfeiture under section 169A.63, a vehicle worth less than $500 would be immune from forfeiture becausethe exemption amount exceeds $500 dollars. SeeMinn.Stat. § 550.37, subd. 12a. As a result, there would be no need for section 169A.63, subdivision 8(e)—the provision waiving the...