Nissen v. Sabin
Decision Date | 08 February 1927 |
Docket Number | 37507 |
Citation | 212 N.W. 125,202 Iowa 1362 |
Parties | FRANK C. NISSEN, Appellant, v. E. M. SABIN et al., Appellees |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Linn District Court.--ATHERTON B. CLARK, Judge.
In an action to foreclose a real estate mortgage, plaintiff asked judgment against the mortgagor's grantee on an assumption clause in the deed to him. The decree denied such relief, and the plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Barnes Chamberlain, Hanzlik & Thompson, for appellant.
Johnson Donnelly & Lynch, for appellee.
The defendants E. M. and Jennie E. Sabin executed the mortgage in question to the appellant, to secure their notes in the sum of $ 13,000. Thereafter, E. M. Sabin entered into a written contract with E. W. Dennstedt for the sale of the mortgaged premises to the latter, who, in the contract, assumed payment of the mortgage. The conveyance of the land in pursuance of this contract was made by the Sabins to the appellee A. L. Dennstedt by warranty deed, in which the grantee assumed and agreed to pay the mortgage. The appellee subsequently conveyed the land to the defendant Curley by a deed in which the grantee also assumed payment of the mortgage. Judgment for the amount due under the mortgage was asked against the mortgagors and against the appellee and Curley on the assumption clauses in the respective conveyances to them. The relief prayed was denied as against the appellee, and it is from this judgment that the plaintiff appeals.
The appellee claimed, and, subject to objection, introduced parol evidence to show, that the Dennstedt Land Company, a corporation, was the real purchaser of the land from Sabin; that the contract therefor was made in the name of E. W. Dennstedt, and the deed taken in the name of appellee as a mere matter of convenience; that the latter had no interest in the land and received no consideration for the agreement in the deed to assume and pay the mortgage; that the corporation contracted to sell the land to Curley, and he executed a conveyance thereof in pursuance of such contract; and that he received no part of the consideration therefor. There is no contradiction of this testimony. The only question upon which the testimony is in conflict is as to whether Sabin had knowledge that the corporation was the real purchaser of the land. The controversy is over the competency of the evidence and its sufficiency to relieve appellee from liability on the assumption clause in the deed to him. It should be observed that the Sabins, the grantors in the conveyance to appellee, make no claim under the assumption clause therein. The only party seeking to enforce any liability as against the appellee is the mortgagee, who was not a party to the agreement.
It is a well settled doctrine, frequently applied to such contracts as the one in question, that the rule that the terms of a written contract cannot be altered or contradicted by parol evidence cannot be invoked either by or against a stranger to the contract; that it has Aultman E. & T. Co. v. Greenlee, 134 Iowa 368, 111 N.W. 1007. See, also, DeGoey v. Van Wyk, 97 Iowa 491; Logan v. Miller, 106 Iowa 511, 76 N.W. 1005; Clark v. Shannon & Mott Co., 117 Iowa 645, 91 N.W. 923; Livingston v. Stevens, 122 Iowa 62, 94 N.W. 925; Peters v. Goodrich, 192 Iowa 790, 185 N.W. 903; Shult v. Doyle, 200 Iowa 1, 201 N.W. 787. In In re Assessment of Shields Bros., 134 Iowa 559, 111 N.W. 963, we said:
"As against a stranger to the contract, a party thereto may assert that the agreement was other or different--in any respect and to any extent--than that which the writing imports."
In Shult v. Doyle, supra, we said, speaking of the relation of the mortgagee to a contract whereby the purchaser of the land from the mortgagor assumed and agreed to pay the mortgage:
Appellant relies upon Beeson v. Green, 103 Iowa 406, 72 N.W 555. Language is to be found in that case that seems to support appellant's contention that, in such a situation, the rule excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a written contract is applicable. No consideration appears to have been given in that case to the fact that the question arose between the assignee of the mortgagee, a...
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