Nixon v. State
Decision Date | 10 July 2003 |
Docket Number | No. SC01-2486., No. SC93192, No. SC92006 |
Parties | Joe Elton NIXON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. Joe Elton Nixon, Petitioner, v. James V. Crosby, Jr., etc., Respondent. Joe Elton Nixon, Appellant, v. State of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Jonathan Lang, Eric M. Freedman, New York, NY, and John J. Lavia, III of Landers & Parsons, Tallahassee, FL, for Appellant/Petitioner.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Curtis M. French, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Appellee/Respondent.
Joe Elton Nixon, a prisoner under a sentence of death, appeals an order of the trial court denying his motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Additionally, he files a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with this Court. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1),(9), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we remand this case to the trial court for a new trial.
Joe Elton Nixon was charged, convicted, and sentenced to death for the 1984 murder of a Tallahassee woman. This Court affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal. See Nixon v. State, 572 So.2d 1336 (Fla.1990)
.1 The United States Supreme Court denied Nixon's petition for a writ of certiorari. See Nixon v. Florida, 502 U.S. 854, 112 S.Ct. 164, 116 L.Ed.2d 128 (1991). Subsequently, in 1993, Nixon filed a rule 3.850 motion, which the trial court denied without an evidentiary hearing. Nixon appealed the trial court's summary denial of his 3.850 motion to this Court. Additionally, Nixon filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with this Court. Nixon raised seven issues relating to the denial of his rule 3.850 motion2 and three issues in his habeas petition.3
See Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So.2d 618 (Fla.2000).4
In Nixon II, this Court found Nixon's claim that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his lawyer conceded guilt without his consent to be the primary issue in the case. Nixon's counsel made the following statement during opening argument of the guilt phase:
In this case, there will be no question that Jeannie [sic] Bickner died a horrible, horrible death. Surely she did and that will be shown to you. In fact, that horrible tragedy will be proved to your satisfaction beyond any reasonable doubt. In this case, there won't be any question, none whatsoever, that my client, Joe Elton Nixon, caused Jeannie [sic] Bickner's death. Likewise, that fact will be proved to your satisfaction beyond any reasonable doubt. This case is about the death of Joe Elton Nixon and whether it should occur within the next few years by electrocution or maybe its natural expiration after a lifetime of confinement.
During closing argument, Nixon's counsel made the following statement:
On appeal, the parties were in disagreement regarding the appropriate standard of review to be applied in the case. The State argued that the standard explained in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), should be applied, whereas Nixon argued that because counsel's concessions amounted to per se ineffective assistance of counsel, the United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), standard was the proper test. Ultimately, this Court held that if Nixon could establish that he did not consent to counsel's strategy, then the Court would find counsel to be per se ineffective under the Cronic standard. This Court reasoned that the Cronic standard should apply because:
Although statements made by attorneys in closing arguments are not evidence, nevertheless, for all practical purposes, counsel's admission of guilt on behalf of his client denied to petitioner his constitutional right to have his guilt or innocence decided by the jury. Petitioner, in pleading not guilty, was entitled to have the issue of his guilt or innocence presented to the jury as an adversarial issue. Counsel's complete concession of petitioner's guilt nullified the adversarial quality of this fundamental issue.
Nixon, 758 So.2d at 623 (quoting Wiley v. Sowders, 647 F.2d 642, 650 (6th Cir.1981)). Since counsel's comments operated as the "functional equivalent of a guilty plea," this Court concluded that Id. at 624. To avoid similar problems in the future, this Court said:
[W]e hold that if a trial judge ever suspects that a similar strategy is being attempted by counsel for the defense, the judge should stop the proceedings and question the defendant on the record as to whether or not he or she consents to counsel's strategy. This will ensure that the defendant has in fact intelligently and voluntarily consented to counsel's strategy of conceding guilt.
Id. at 625 (citations omitted). Accordingly, we remanded the case to the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether Nixon consented to trial counsel's strategy.5
On remand, an evidentiary hearing was held before Judge Janet Ferris on May 11, 2001. Although Nixon was present at the evidentiary hearing, he did not testify; the only witness presented was Michael Corin, Nixon's trial counsel. After the hearing, the trial court denied relief and found that Nixon consented to counsel's strategy. This appeal followed.6
The dispositive issue is whether Nixon is entitled to a new trial under this Court's decision in Nixon II. In reaching the merits of this issue, this Court must decide whether there is competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that Nixon consented to trial counsel's strategy of conceding guilt.7 In Nixon II, this Court directed the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether evidence existed which indicated an 758 So.2d at 624. Nixon never testified at the evidentiary hearing on this issue. On direct examination, trial counsel repeatedly testified that Nixon did nothing when asked his opinion regarding this trial strategy.
Corin further testified that Nixon provided neither verbal nor nonverbal indication that he did or did not wish to pursue counsel's strategy of conceding guilt.8 Thus, at most, this testimony demonstrates silent acquiescence by Nixon to counsel's strategy.
The trial court indicated that it would consider the totality of the circumstances in making a determination of whether Nixon affirmatively and explicitly agreed to counsel's strategy of conceding guilt to the charged crime. The court in its written order noted that one of the factors that needed to be examined was the general pattern of Corin's interactions and communications with Nixon. After reviewing the trial record, Nixon I and Nixon II, the transcript of the evidentiary hearing conducted on December 19, 1988, and Corin's testimony at the May 11, 2001, evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Nixon's pattern of interactions with counsel involved information being provided by Corin, followed by silence from Nixon. In essence, the trial court found that Nixon's failure to approve or disapprove verbally was approval of counsel's strategy.
In Nixon II, we found that counsel's comments at trial were the functional equivalent of a guilty plea. Since counsel's comments operated as a guilty plea, in order to affirm the trial court's ruling, the record must contain substantial evidence which would enable this Court to determine that Nixon did more than silently submit to counsel's strategy. There is no evidence that shows that Nixon affirmatively, explicitly agreed with counsel's strategy. The only evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing was Corin's testimony, which indicated that Nixon neither agreed nor disagreed with counsel's trial strategy. Thus, there is no competent, substantial evidence which establishes that Nixon affirmatively and explicitly agreed to counsel's strategy. Without a client's affirmative and explicit consent to a strategy of admitting guilt to the crime charged or a lesser included offense, counsel's duty is to "hold the State to its burden of proof...
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