Nixon v. State

• Decision Date: 10 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. 97-357.,97-357.
• Citation: 4 P.3d 864
• Parties: Todd Luther NIXON, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

4 P.3d 864

Todd Luther NIXON, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. 97-357.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

April 10, 2000.

Representing Appellant: Sylvia L. Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Karl Linde, Assistant Public Defender.

Representing Appellee: William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; and D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,¹ JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

The major complaint presented by Todd Luther Nixon (Nixon) is that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty to charges of first degree murder and aggravated assault and battery, which was made prior to sentencing. At the change of pleas hearing, in response to a question by Nixon about whether something less than a life sentence could be imposed for murder in the first degree, the trial judge stated: "Under the existing case law a judge could still put you on probation[.]" Nixon claims that he relied upon this comment by the trial judge in changing his pleas from "not guilty" to "guilty." A second issue is raised with respect to the propriety of ordering restitution by a person sentenced to life imprisonment. Our examination of the record persuades this Court that Nixon's change of pleas was motivated by the advantage provided by his plea bargain with the State, and it cannot be perceived as reasonably based upon the erroneous statement by the trial judge. The order of restitution was properly imposed in the absence of any objection by Nixon. The Judgment Upon Pleas of Guilty is affirmed.

In the Brief of Appellant, the issues that are raised are:

ISSUE I

Appellant should have been permitted to withdraw his guilty pleas after the trial court advised him that he could receive probation for first degree murder.

ISSUE II

The trial court's order for restitution was improper because it was based on the mistaken belief that appellant would be working again in fifteen to twenty years after he had been sentenced to life in prison.

This Statement of the Issues is found in the Brief of Appellee:

I. Did the district court properly deny appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea?

II. Was the district court's restitution order proper?

In the Reply Brief of the Appellant, this additional Statement of the Issue is found:

Whether the record supports a finding that appellant knew probation was not a possibility if he pled guilty?

In early June of 1997, Nixon was charged with first degree murder in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101(a) (Lexis 1999) and with aggravated assault and battery in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i) (Lexis 1999). Nixon was charged with causing the death of his three-year-old step-daughter, and he was bound over for trial in the district court. He was arraigned on these charges on July 3, 1997, and he entered pleas of not guilty.

In the course of the following month, Nixon entered into a Statement of Agreement pursuant to which the State agreed not to seek the death penalty in exchange for pleas of guilty by Nixon to both counts. In pertinent part, the Statement of Agreement provided:

B. The offense of First Degree Murder is punishable by death or life imprisonment according to law;

C. In consideration of the mutual terms, covenants and conditions of this Statement of Agreement, the respective parties agree with one another, and hereby represent, submit and recommend to the Court as follows:

* * *

3. Conditioned upon, and only after, the Court has accepted the Defendant's said pleas of guilty to Count I and Count II of the Felony Information and has entered said pleas of record, the state will then represent to the Court that it will not endorse the death penalty and will not seek punishment of death upon Count I;

4. Because the entitled case is based upon this Agreement, the Defendant will not file any post guilty plea/conviction motions, requests for sentence reduction, appeals, or post conviction relief petitions, and should the Defendant subsequently file any of the same, the State will be permitted to seek death penalty punishment upon sentencing hearing/resentencing hearing.

* * *

7. This agreement will be disclosed to the Court pursuant to Rule 11 of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure.

At a change of pleas hearing, held on August 22, 1997, Nixon changed his pleas to guilty. Nixon and the trial judge discussed, at some length, Nixon's understanding of his pleas of guilty and their significance. The trial judge explained that it was possible for the State to elect to seek the death penalty, but it would not necessarily do so. The trial judge also clarified the procedure and safeguards in place if the State should elect to seek the death penalty. The trial judge continued the dialogue with this colloquy:

I want to make sure you understand a couple things. First of all, we'll take as much time as it takes to go through this today. So whenever you want to talk to your attorneys, you just let me know and we'll take a break and you can do that, number one.

Number two, I want to make sure that you understand that I don't intend by any of the things that I may say to you or any things that I may do influence your decision one way or the other.

The decision about what you do here is your decision to make, and my role is not to try to influence you to do something or not do something. That's entirely up to you based upon visiting with your attorneys.

After that, the trial court again sought clarification of Nixon's understanding of the proceedings and their significance. Nixon advised the trial court that he planned to plead guilty to both counts in exchange for the State's relinquishment of its option to seek the death penalty. After all the ramifications of the pleas of guilty had been thoroughly explained, Nixon changed his pleas on both counts to guilty. The trial judge then offered further explanation of the legal consequences of the pleas of guilty and the rights that Nixon would forgo by entering such pleas.

Nixon asked only one question during the exchange that pertained to sentencing, which led to the major issue in this appeal. The exchange, as it was reported in the record, was:

THE COURT: That once your plea is accepted, then the only thing left to be decided is what sentence will be imposed, and that sentence worst case could be life imprisonment, plus ten years, plus the fines and other things that I've told you about. Do you have any questions about that?

THE DEFENDANT: Does that sentence have to be life, or can it be something lesser than that?

THE COURT: The sentence is life, however—

THE DEFENDANT: Regardless of—

THE COURT: Excuse me. Let me finish. Under the existing case law a judge could still put you on probation, but let me tell you that would be extremely unlikely.

THE DEFENDANT: Okay.

THE COURT: So realistically you need to understand—and it would be my obligation to consider whether or not a life sentence should be suspended and you should be placed on probation, but I'm telling you that it is highly unlikely that would happen in a first degree murder case. Not just because it's you; simply because first degree murder is so serious that someone is probably not realistically looking at probation for it. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.

THE COURT: So you're probably looking at at least a life sentence. So you understand?

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.

(Emphasis added.)

At that point in the proceedings, Nixon announced that he was not going to plead guilty, and the trial court ordered a short recess. When the trial court reconvened the proceedings, Nixon vacillated and said he was "not going to rule the plea agreement out." The trial judge, Nixon, and Nixon's attorney discussed the guilty pleas some more, and Nixon admitted that he understood he would likely lose if the case were to go to trial. His attorney explained to the trial court, in Nixon's presence, that Nixon did not have a strong case because he had no alibi or explanation for the injuries sustained by the dead child. When he was asked again to say why he was pleading guilty, Nixon responded: "Because the threat of [the] death penalty and * * * trying to spare my family the pain it would cause them if I was put to death." The trial judge reiterated the importance of listening to advice from his attorneys in making his decision, but Nixon continued to vacillate, and the trial judge ordered a second recess so that Nixon could speak with his family and his attorneys once again. Following that recess, Nixon maintained his pleas of guilty to both counts.

For purposes of establishing a factual basis for the pleas, an investigator for the Campbell County sheriff's department testified on behalf of the State. No other witnesses were called by the State, but a number of exhibits were entered before the State rested its presentation. After hearing this testimony and receiving the exhibits, the trial judge inquired of Nixon if he had changed his mind or wanted to plead guilty. Nixon again affirmed his desire to enter pleas of guilty. After the change of plea and the presentation of the Statement of Agreement, a Judgment Upon Pleas of Guilty was entered by the trial court.

Later, on October 2, 1997, Nixon's counsel filed a motion to continue the sentencing hearing because counsel did not receive the Presentence Investigation Report ten days prior to the scheduled date for sentencing as required by W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(A). In addition, Nixon had advised his attorneys that he was planning to file a motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty prior to sentencing. Nixon did move to withdraw his pleas of guilty, asserting in his motion that the trial court had furnished improper and misleading advice with respect to the mandatory minimum sentence contrary to the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 11(b)(1).

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