Noble v. Republic Servs. of Sc
| Decision Date | 02 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 2:19-01159-DCN-MGB |
| Parties | Yero Noble, Plaintiff, v. Republic Services of SC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Yero Noble (“Plaintiff”), through counsel, filed this lawsuit alleging: race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”); retaliation in violation of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”) and Section 1981; hostile work environment in violation of Title VII and Section 1981; and age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). (Dkt. No. 1.) This matter is before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 38.) Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in employment discrimination cases are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration. For the reasons stated below, the undersigned recommends that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 38) be granted as to all of Plaintiff's claims.
This civil action arises from Defendant's alleged discrimination and retaliation against Plaintiff, an African American male over forty years old. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) Defendant is a waste collection and disposal company that hired Plaintiff in September of 2005 as a residential driver. (Id.; Dkt. No. 38-1 at 1). During the course of his employment, Plaintiff was promoted to operations supervisor for the commercial division. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that his intent was to continue moving up through Defendant's management. (Id.) To further this goal, Plaintiff applied for the “Leadership Training Program” in August of 2017, for the “Landfill 101 Training” in October of 2017, and for the “Operations Manager Training Program” in November of 2017. (Id. at 4-5; Dkt. No. 38-1 at 10.) Plaintiff alleges that his requests to participate in these trainings were denied. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5.)
Plaintiff further alleges that he requested a transfer to a different facility, but that Defendant denied this request. (Id.) More specifically, Plaintiff applied to: a landfill supervisor position in California and a heavy equipment operator position in Bishopville, South Carolina in July of 2017, and an operations manager position in Maryland in September of 2017. (Dkt. No. 38-1 at 6-9; Dkt. No. 38-11 at 2-15.) Plaintiff was not placed in any of these positions. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5; Dkt. No. 38-1 at 6-7.) In November of 2017 Plaintiff resigned from his position to take a job with another company. (Dkt. No. 38-23 at 2.)
Plaintiff contends that he was treated differently than younger, white employees because such employees were allowed to participate in the aforementioned trainings and received the aforementioned transfer positions. (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) Plaintiff further contends that he was subjected to a hostile work environment during his tenure with Defendant. (Id.) He claims that other employees made “racist commentary regarding [his] appearance.” (Id.) For example, Plaintiff alleges that one specific general manager constantly commented on Plaintiff's hairstyle. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that he “made several complaints to Human Resources and management” regarding the alleged hostile work environment and discrimination. (Id. at 7.) He argues that Defendant's reasons for its actions were pretextual, and meant to harass, harm, and retaliate against him. (Id.)
Accordingly on April 22, 2019, Plaintiff filed the instant civil action alleging race discrimination (First Cause of Action) retaliation (Second Cause of Action); hostile work environment (Third Cause of Action); and age discrimination (Fourth Cause of Action). (See generally id.) Now before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 38.) Defendant filed this Motion on October 16, 2020. (Id.) After requesting and receiving an extension of time to respond, Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion on November 13, 2020. (Dkt. No. 41.) On December 2, 2020, Defendant filed a timely reply. (Dkt. No. 42.) As such, the motion before the Court has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment “shall” be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Facts are ‘material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a ‘genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” The News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
“As the moving party, Defendant[] [is] required to identify those portions of the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which [it] believe[s] demonstrate the absence of genuine issues of material fact.” Perez v. Arnold Transportation, No 3:15-cv-3162-TLW, 2018 WL 2301850, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 12, 2018) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “As the nonmoving party, Plaintiff[] must then produce specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 317). “Plaintiff[] may not rest on mere allegations or denials; [he] must produce ‘significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.'” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). In other words, “the nonmoving party must go beyond the facts alleged in the pleadings and instead rely upon affidavits, depositions, or other evidence to show a genuine issue for trial.” Crawford v. Newport News Indus. Corp., No. 4:14-cv-130, 2018 WL 4561671, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 2, 2018) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 317), adopted in part, 2018 WL 2943445 (E.D. Va. June 11, 2018), appeal dismissed sub nom. Kershaw v. Newport News Indus. Corp., 2018 WL 8058614 (4th Cir. Oct. 25, 2018).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “‘the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor.'” Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255); see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990). Although the Court must “draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party must rely on more than conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Sandlands C & D LLC v. County of Horry, 737 F.3d 45, 54 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013)). Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
Here Defendant claims that it is entitled to summary judgment on each of Plaintiff's causes of action because Plaintiff “has not, and cannot, proffer sufficient credible evidence of his claims for age and race-based failure to promote, retaliation, and hostile work environment harassment.” (Dkt. No. 42 at 1.)[1] For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned agrees that Defendant is entitled to summary judgement on all of Plaintiff's claims. The undersigned therefore recommends that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 38) be granted and that this case be dismissed in full.
Section 1981 states that “[a]ll persons . . . shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Plaintiff brings a race discrimination claim under Section 1981 and an age discrimination claim under the ADEA. (Dkt. No. 1 at 10-11, 14-15.)
When, as here, the plaintiff lacks direct evidence of discrimination, he must satisfy the three-step burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), to prevail on a claim under the ADEA or Section 1981.[2] Jeffers v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc., 622 F.Supp.2d 303, 315 (D.S.C. 2008) (ADEA context); Bryant v. Bell Atl. Maryland, Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 133 (4th Cir. 2002) (Section 1981 context). Under the McDonnell Douglas paradigm, the plaintiff must first establish the elements of a prima facie discrimination claim.
With respect to Plaintiff's race discrimination claim Plaintiff can make a prima facie case by demonstrating: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory work performance; (3) adverse employment action; and (4) different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected class, or some other evidence giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Ferguson v. Waffle House, Inc., 18 F.Supp.3d 705, 719 (D.S.C. 2014); Perkins v. Int'l Paper Co., 936 F.3d 196, 207 (4th Cir. 2019) (referencing Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010)); Gairola v. Va....
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