Noddin v. Noddin
| Decision Date | 26 January 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 82-088,82-088 |
| Citation | 455 A.2d 1051,123 N.H. 73 |
| Parties | Elizabeth S. NODDIN v. Charles W. NODDIN, Jr. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Law Offices of Stanton E. Tefft, Bedford (Daniel J. Harkinson, Bedford, on the brief and Mr. Tefft orally), for plaintiff.
Eaton, Solms, Mills & McIninch, Manchester (Douglas A. McIninch, Manchester, on the brief and orally), for defendant.
The issue in this case is whether it was error to grant a modification of a support and alimony decree where the defendant brought about his reduced financial condition by his own criminal conduct and where the defendant still had an asset which could be applied to meet his support and alimony obligations. We hold that it was not unfair and improper to continue the original support order, and accordingly, we reverse and remand.
Charles and Elizabeth Noddin were divorced in December 1979 by a decree of the Rockingham County Superior Court which incorporated the parties' stipulation as to support and alimony. The stipulation provided that the defendant, Charles, would pay the plaintiff, Elizabeth, $150 per week, fifty dollars to be allocated as alimony and $100 to be allocated as child support. Additionally, the jointly owned home was awarded to the plaintiff, with the provision that upon the sale of the house on or before January 1, 1986, the defendant would receive 25.1% of the proceeds.
In October 1981, the defendant filed a motion requesting that the support and alimony obligations set forth in the divorce decree be reduced because of a change in his financial condition. At the time of the divorce, he had been earning $23,000 per year, but because he had been arrested for stealing trade secrets from his employer, he was later fired from that position and was receiving considerably less income.
The plaintiff objected to the defendant's motion and moved to have the court permit her to attach the defendant's interest in the jointly owned home in the amount of the defendant's then existing arrearage in child support and alimony. She also petitioned the court for permission to attach the defendant's equity in the home when there were future arrearages because of the defendant's failure to keep up with the $150-per-week support and alimony payments called for in the final divorce decree.
After a hearing, the Master (Earl J. Dearborn, Esq.) found that the defendant was unable to obtain employment similar to the position he had lost and was now employed as a surveyor's helper at five dollars per hour, resulting in a net income of $165.35 per week. He also found that the plaintiff was, at the time of the hearing, gainfully employed with a net weekly income of $133. The master concluded that the defendant's earnings had been substantially reduced so that he was no longer able to meet his obligations set forth in the divorce decree. The master recommended that the child support payments be reduced to fifty dollars per week and the alimony payments be suspended.
In effect, the master denied the plaintiff's motion to provide that the support and alimony obligations be assessed against the defendant's interest in the house. He did, however, recommend that the defendant's arrearage of $2,671.31 in alimony and support payments should be held in abeyance until the time the jointly owned home was sold and that the outstanding arrearage should then be deducted from the defendant's share of the net proceeds of the sale of the house. The master's recommendations were approved by the Trial Court (Nadeau, J.). The plaintiff appeals.
The plaintiff contends that because the defendant's diminished income is due to his own criminal conduct, it was error to reduce his child support and alimony obligations, particularly where he had an asset against which these obligations could be applied. We agree.
A modification of a support order "will be set aside only if it clearly appears on the evidence that there has been an abuse of judicial discretion." Douglas v. Douglas, 109 N.H. 41, 42, 242 A.2d 78, 79 (1968) (citations omitted). Modification orders are measured in terms of the needs of the parties and their respective abilities to meet those needs, and trial courts, of necessity, are accorded wide discretion in regard to these...
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ARTHUR YOUNG & CO. v. SUTHERLAND
...precept that equitable relief will be denied if the party seeking it "comes to the court with unclean hands." Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73, 76, 455 A.2d 1051, 1053 (1983) (citation omitted). This means that a court of equity will not "lend its aid in any manner to one . . . who has been gu......
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Ballinger v. Wingate, No. FA97-0541718 (CT 4/7/2004), FA97-0541718
...v. Longnecker, 11 Neb.App. 773, 660 N.W.2d 544 (2003); Ohler v. Ohler, 220 Neb. 272, 369 N.W.2d 615 (1985); New Hampshire, Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73, 455 A.2d 1051 (1983); New York, Matter Of Winn v. Baker, 2 App.Div.3d 1169, 768 N.Y.S.2d 708 (2003); Furman v. Barnes, 293 App.Div.2d 781......
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Yerkes v. Yerkes
...(La.Ct.App.1991); Montana, see Mooney v. Brennan, 257 Mont. 197, 848 P.2d 1020, 1023-24 (1993); New Hampshire, see Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73, 455 A.2d 1051, 1053-54 (1983); New York, see Matter of Knights, 71 N.Y.2d 865, 527 N.Y.S.2d 748, 522 N.E.2d 1045, 1046 (1988); North Dakota, see ......
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Marriage of Phillips, In re
...(court denied modification because a trust existed upon which obligor could draw to satisfy his support obligation); Noddin v. Noddin, 123 N.H. 73, 455 A.2d 1051 (1983) (court denied modification because obligor possessed at least one valuable asset and voluntarily engaged in criminal activ......