Noe v. State, 1 Div. 120
Decision Date | 07 October 1980 |
Docket Number | 1 Div. 120 |
Citation | 391 So.2d 151 |
Parties | Clifford Dixon NOE v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Al Pennington, Mobile, for appellant.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Helen P. Nelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
This appeal, by an indigent, is from a judgment of conviction by the Mobile Circuit Court for forgery in the first degree. The appellant, who has a Ph.D. in economics, pleaded guilty to the charge. Prior to accepting the plea, the court made the necessary inquiries as required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274. In addition, the record shows that State's Exhibit A, which is a motion to enter a guilty plea, reflects the Boykin requisites.
After the guilty plea was entered, the court ordered a pre-sentencing investigation, and sentencing was postponed. The appellant had federal charges pending against him, and he surrendered himself to the federal authorities in Miami, Florida, before sentence could be imposed on him in Alabama.
The appellant was returned to Mobile in January, 1980, for a matter in federal court and, while there was brought to the Mobile Circuit Court for sentencing. In the Mobile Circuit Court, the appellant moved to withdraw his guilty plea and, also, filed a motion alleging his denial of a speedy trial. The motions were denied, and the appellant was sentenced to twelve years imprisonment to begin at the expiration of his federal sentence.
The appellant's primary contention is that he was denied his right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The facts are uncontroverted that the appellant had entered a plea of guilty and that the court had accepted the plea but had not sentenced him.
It is well settled that the passage of time alone will not bar imposition of a sentence or require an accused's discharge. In order to assert that speedy trial was denied, the delay must be purposeful or oppressive. United States v. Grabina, 2nd Cir., 309 F.2d 783. Whether the delay amounts to a deprivation of an accused's right to a speedy trial depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 77 S.Ct. 481, 1 L.Ed.2d 393.
As was pointed out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, four factors must be considered in determining whether there has been a deprivation of the appellant's right to a speedy trial. Those factors are, (1) lengthy delay, (2) reason for delay, (3) assertion of the right, and, (4) prejudice.
The thirteen-month interval between judgment and sentencing was not a deliberate or an unjustifiable delay on the part of the State. The record indicates that the guilty plea was taken on August 2, 1978, and that sentencing had been delayed until August 8, 1978, for the purpose of obtaining a pre-sentencing investigation. However, at the insistence of the appellant, sentence was delayed until August 21, 1978.
From the record:
Under these circumstances, we do not believe the delay in the present case, was "purposeful or oppressive." United States v. Grabina, supra. The delay was originally occasioned by the appellant surrendering himself to the federal authorities in Miami, even though he was under court order to return for sentencing on August 21, 1978.
The appellant has not shown that he incurred any prejudice as a result of the delay, nor do the circumstances of this case lend themselves to a showing of "affirmative prejudice." See Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 94 S.Ct. 188, 38 L.Ed.2d 183.
The State did not achieve or receive any advantage by this delay. The prisoner was incarcerated in a federal institution on federal charges and...
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