Norfolk v. Pinnacle Coal Co.
| Decision Date | 02 April 1898 |
| Citation | 44 W.Va. 574 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Pinnacle Coal Co.(Brannon, President, dissenting'). |
In the absence of legislative enactment, a justice of the peace has no authority to determine the rate of freight charges of a railroad corporation.
Although a justice of the peace has jurisdiction of civil actions of debt, he exceeds his legitimate powers whenever he extends such jurisdiction to include matters of controversy or causes of action unknown to the common law, and unauthorized by legislative enactment.
Where an enactment of the legislature which authorized such causes of action has been repealed, the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace over the same is repealed therewith, and he cannot, under the pretense of deciding whether such enactment has been repealed or not, take jurisdiction of such causes of action, and, if he does so, he is guilty of exceeding his legitimate powers, subjecting him to restraint by prohibition.
Under pretense of determining its jurisdiction, an inferior tribunal cannot usurp a jurisdiction which is denied to it, nor, having jurisdiction of the subject-matter in controversy, abuse or exceed its legitimate powers.
The jurisdiction of inferior tribunals is fixed by law, and for such a tribunal, even though in good faith, to extend its jurisdiction beyond the limitations of law, is to make it guilty of usurpation and abuse of power.
In all cases of usurpation and abuse of power, when the inferior court has not jurisdiction of the subject-matter in controversy, or, having such jurisdiction, exceeds its legitimate powers, prohibition now lies as a matter of right, and not as a matter of sound judicial discretion.
Subsections 7, 8, s. 82c, c. 54, Code 1891,. as to classification of freight and rates of charges therefor, are repealed by chapter 17, Acts 1895.
Error to Circuit Court, Mercer County.
Action by the Pinnacle Coal Company against the Norfolk & Western Railway Company to recover for overcharge for carriage of coal. Plaintiff had judgment, and, a writ of prohibition to prohibit the carrying of the judgment into execution being denied, defendant brings error.
Reversed.
A. W. Reynolds and Johnston & Hale, for plaintiff in error.
The case of the Norfolk & Western Railway Company against the Pinnacle Coal Company and ethers presents but a single important question, and this is: When the legislature enacts a statute fixing a maximum rate of freight charges for railroad companies, and afterwards repeals such enactment, has a justice of the peace the jurisdiction, under the pretense of deciding whether such enactment has been repealed, to take cognizance of causes of action arising thereunder, hold such law still in force, and render judgment against alleged offending railroad companies for overcharge of freight? Our statute greatly simplifies the common-law remedy of prohibition. It is as follows (section 1, chapter 110, Code): "The writ of prohibition shall lie as a matter of right in all cases of usurpation and abuse of power when the inferior court has not jurisdiction of the subject matter in controversy, or having such jurisdiction, exceeds its legitimate powers." Two important changes are made in the common law: (1) The writ is no longer a matter of sound discretion but a matter of right; (2) it lies in all proper cases, whether there is other remedy or not. Prior to this enactment, which bears date in 1882, it was recognized as a concurrent remedy with appeal, writ of error, etc., only to be resorted to, however, when such other writs were inadequate. Swinburn v. Smith, 15 W. Va. 501; High. Extr. Rem. §§ 770, 771; People v. House, 4 Utah, 369, (10 P. 838); People v. Spiers, 4 Utah, 585, (10 P. 609, and 11 P. 509). These two Utah cases hold that when a justice is proceeding to try a case of which he has no jurisdiction, prohibition is the proper remedy, although an appeal would lie, as the latter is neither a speedy nor adequate remedy. The reason why it is given as a concurrent remedy at common law is found in High. Extr. Rem. § 765: "Nor is it a writ of right granted ex debitor justtice, but rather one of sound judicial discretion, to be granted or withheld aecording to the circumstances of each particular case." The statutes of some other states, notably California, preserve the common-law doctrine intact by the addition of the words where there "is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Code Civ. Proc. Cal. §§ 1102, 1103. Our statute contains no such words of limitation, for the better reason that the legislature recognized the fact that in cases of usurpation of denied or abuse of conceded power on the part of an inferior tribunal prohibition alone would furnish a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, as it acts directly on the tribunal as well as the litigant. Appeals, writs of error, and certiorari, do not directly reach and cure the evil, for the reason that it may become chronic, epidemic, and highly damaging before these ordinary writs may be made effective. In cases of mere error, irregularity, or mistake, however gross, prohibition does not lie; not because, as is oftentimes erroneously stated, there exist other adequate remedies, or such remedies are inhibited, but for the reason that there has been no usurpation or abuse of power. In all cases within tie purview7 of the statute, prohibition lies as a matter of right without regard to other remedies. In applications for prohibition under the statute, the only important question for inquiry is as to whether the inferior tribunal is guilt) of "usurpation and abuse of power" beyond its jurisdiction, or, having jurisdiction of the subject-matter, has it exceeded its "legitimate powers?" An affirmative answer grants the writ as a matter of right, while a negative answer refuses it, though the applicant be bereft thereby of all remedy. In the present case, if the justice had jurisdiction of the matter in controversy, and did not exceed his legitimate powers, the writ must be denied; otherwise it issues as a matter of right, without regard to other remedies.
According to law, constitutional and statutory, a justice of the peace is given jurisdiction of all civil actions except where the amount claimed, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds three hundred dollars, or the title to real estate is involved, or the action is for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, slander, verbal or written, breach of marriage contract, or seduction. This includes all actions for the recovery of money when such recovery is authorized by common law or statutory enactment. And it impliedly follows that he has no jurisdiction of any cause of action unknown at common law, and not authorized by statute. The legislature has the right to create new causes of action for the recovery of money, but a justice of the peace has not, and when he attempts to create a new cause of action he usurps legislative functions, and, if he illegally extends a certain class of actions within his ju- risdiction to include a new cause of action of his own creation, he is guilty of exceeding-his legitimate powers. Nor can he excuse himself by claiming that he acted in good faith in accordance with the law, as he understood it, and had the right to decide it; for it is not a question of good faith or honest purpose, but of excess of legitimate powers, and usurpation of jurisdiction over a subjectmatter of which the law gives him no control, and ignorance of law is no justification therefor. In every case of usurpation or abuse of power the inferior tribunal always determines jurisdiction in its own favor, and so with excess of legitimate power, and, if its holding affords the criterion to go by, there could never be any justification for the writ of prohibition; but it is because such court erroneously determines its own jurisdiction that the writ issues. High, Extr. Rem. § 780. It always goes against a judicial tribunal and judicial action, and not that which is merely ministerial. A court that usurps jurisdiction only errs, but its error is of such a grievous nature as to call for prompt redress from a supervising tribunal. The statute uses the language "subject-matter in controversy," What is the subject-matter in controversy but the cause of action in this case, "over-charges of freight"? The mere money demand is neither the cause of action nor the subject-matter of controversy. It is simply the measure of damages. While the controverted fact is the right of the railroad company to fix its freight charges. This is a right that can only be taken away from it by reasonable legislative enactment. And if the maximum fixed by the legislature is unreasonably low, the enactment has been lately held, in a case not yet reported, by the Supreme Court of the United States, to be void, as depriving the company of its property without due process of law. Smyth v. Ames, 18 Sup Ct. 418. The question of the constitutionality of the act under consideration could not now be raised, since it has been repealed. And yet a right which is denied to a state legislature is claimed to be within the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace. In short, that he is clothed with the power to say when the charges of a railroad company are reasonable, simply because he has jurisdiction of money demands, and, if the. amount for which he gives judgment is less than that for which an appeal lies, the company is without remedy. This would be nothing less than legal robbery. The action of the justice...
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