Norris v. Mo. Dep't of Corr.

• Decision Date: 19 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. 4:13-CV-392-JAR,4:13-CV-392-JAR
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
• Parties: JAMES NORRIS, Plaintiff, v. MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants.

JAMES NORRIS, Plaintiff, v. MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants.

No. 4:13-CV-392-JAR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

Dated: March 19, 2014

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. (Doc. No. 7) The motion is fully briefed and ready for disposition. For the following reasons, the motion will be granted.

Background

Plaintiff is a corrections officer employed by Defendant Missouri Department of Corrections ("MDOC") at South Central Correctional Center. (Compl., Doc. No. 1, ¶ 5) As a member of the Missouri Corrections Officers Association ("MOCOA"), Plaintiff is covered by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between MOCOA and MDOC. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, MDOC must comply with the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., with regard to the accrual of overtime.¹ (Compl., ¶¶ 6-8) Plaintiff allege that beginning some time in 2009, Defendants implemented a program requiring its correctional officers to take "flextime" in lieu of overtime pay or compensatory time off. (Compl., ¶¶ 9-11)Plaintiff filed a complaint with Defendants regarding the "flextime program" and alleges that as a result, he has been retaliated against by being denied promotions with the MDOC, monetary and/or employee benefits, and by being subjected to threats and ridicule. (Compl., ¶¶ 12, 14) Plaintiff seeks certification of a collective action under the FLSA, injunctive relief, damages for unpaid wages in violation of the FLSA and the CBA, and damages for retaliation under the FLSA.

Legal Standard

The standards governing motions to dismiss are well-settled. A complaint will not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of a claim entitling him or her to relief. Syndicated Office Systems, Inc. v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 2006 WL 1520635, at *2 (E.D.Mo May 31, 2006)(citing Breedlove v. Earthgrains Banking, 140 F.3d 797, 799 (8th Cir.1998) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court assumes all material facts alleged in the complaint are true. Davis v. Monroe City Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). A court must view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and "may dismiss the complaint only if it is clear that no relief can be granted under any set of facts that could be proven consistent with the complaint." McMorrow v. Little, 109 F.3d 432, 434 (8th Cir.1997); see also Stone Motor Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 293 F.3d 456, 464 (8th Cir.2002). Thus, a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) should be granted "only in the unusual case in which a plaintiff includes allegations that show, on the face of the complaint, that there is some insuperable bar to relief." Strand v. Diversified Collection Serv., Inc., 380 F.3d 316, 317 (8th Cir.2004). The issue on a motion to dismiss is not whether theplaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to present evidence in support of his or her claim. Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir.1995).

Discussion

Eleventh Amendment immunity

In support of their motion, Defendants argue that as a state agency, MDOC is immune from Plaintiff's FLSA claims under the Eleventh Amendment, citing Raper v. State of Iowa, 115 F.3d 623, 623-24 (8th Cir. 1997) and Moad v. Arkansas State Police Department, 111 F.3d 585, 586-87 (8th Cir. 1997). (Mem. in Supp., Doc. No. 8, p. 4) The Eleventh Amendment provides that the jurisdiction of the federal courts does not extend to suits brought in federal court for money damages against a state. In addition, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Lombardi, Director of MDOC, should be dismissed because suits against state officials in their official capacity are considered suits against the state. (Id., p. 4-5) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985); Frazier v. Courter, 958 F. Supp. 252, 253-54 (D. W.Va. 1997) (dismissing FLSA claim against state official)).

Plaintiff responds that by entering into a collective bargaining agreement incorporating the provisions of the FLSA, MDOC has constructively waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity and consented to suit. Plaintiff relies on Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) and Briggs v. Sagers, 424 F.2d 130 (10^th Cir. 1970).² (Mem. in Opp., Doc. No. 10, pp. 2-3)

States have constitutional sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment against claims by individuals seeking to assert claims under the FLSA. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); see also, Raper, 115 F.3d 623 (Congress lacked power to abrogate state's Eleventh Amendment immunity when it enacted FLSA); Moad, 111 F.3d 585 (in enacting FLSA, Congress had no power under Interstate Commerce Clause to abrogate state's Eleventh Amendment immunity). This immunity extends to state agencies and state officers acting in their official capacities. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985). Eleventh Amendment immunity is not, however, absolute. See College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999). A party may sue the state only if Congress has validly abrogated the state's immunity or if the state has waived its immunity. See id.; Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1301 (11th Cir.2007).

Congress has not validly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity in FLSA cases.³ See Powell v. State of Florida, 132 F.3d 677, 678 (11th Cir. 1998) (affirming dismissal of FLSA claim for unpaid wages against state based on Eleventh Amendment immunity); see also Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37, 48-49 (1st Cir.1997) (rejecting argument that Congress properly abrogated state immunity under FLSA); Abril v. Virginia, 145 F.3d 182, 184 (4th Cir.1998) (affirming dismissalof FLSA wage and overtime action by state prison employees); Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 206-11 (6th Cir.1996) (barring action by state employees under FLSA); Raper, 115 F.3d at 624 (affirming dismissal of FLSA action by state employees for unpaid overtime); Quillin v. Oregon, 127 F.3d 1136, 1138-39 (9th Cir.1997) (holding federal courts lack jurisdiction over FLSA overtime claims against states absent waiver of immunity). Although these cases involved wage and/or overtime FLSA claims, the same rationale and result is reached with regard to FLSA retaliation claims. See Mun v. Univ. of Alaska, 291 Fed.Appx. 115, 116-17 (9th Cir.2008) (unpublished); Tittl v. Ohio Dep't of Mental Health, 2008 WL 731035, at *4-5 (N.D.Ohio, Mar. 17, 2008) (granting summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiff's FLSA and FLSA retaliation claims on the basis of sovereign immunity); Bornick v. Sondalle, 179 F.Supp.2d 941, 949 (E.D.Wis. Nov. 20, 2001) (finding that employee's FLSA retaliation claim against state employee was barred by Eleventh Amendment).

Furthermore, contrary to Plaintiff's argument, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected the theory that a state may impliedly or constructively waive sovereign immunity. See, College Sav. Bank, 119 S.Ct. 2219 and Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (overruling Parden, 377 U.S. 184). In addition, Briggs has been called into doubt in that it predates both Seminole Tribe, which expressly rejected Parden's theory of implied consent to suit on which the Briggs court relied, and Welch's imposition of a plain statement requirement that was not then or later met in respect of FLSA suits. Abril, 145 F.3d at 190 n. 16.

Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's FLSA claims are barred because Defendants are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment and the exceptions to such immunity do not apply. Even if Plaintiff's claims are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, they would still fail onthe merits, as discussed below.

Wage and hour claim not cognizable under FLSA

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges he was required "to use up any overtime accrued during the same payroll period of such accrued" and was given "no other option than to take off work so that neither compensatory time could be accrued nor that overtime wages would be paid." (Compl., ¶¶ 10-11) (Mem. in Supp., pp. 6-7) However, the FLSA does not prevent employers from managing employee work schedules during the week to prevent the accrual of federal overtime. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 585-86 (2000) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)). See also, Local 889, American Federal of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Council 17 v. Louisiana, 145 F.3d 280, 284-86 (5th Cir. 1998) (state may require corrections officers requesting leave to deplete accrued balances of federal overtime prior to using state vacation time). Thus, Plaintiff's claim is not cognizable under the FLSA.

Injunctive relief

Plaintiff seeks to enjoin Defendants from further implementation or use of the flextime program against him and others similarly situated. Defendants argue Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief should be dismissed because only the Secretary of Labor is authorized to seek an injunction under the FLSA, citing Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Systems, Inc., 750 F.2d 47, 51 (8th Cir. 1984) and Kayser v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 912 F.Supp.2d 803, 807 (E.D. Mo. 2012) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 211). (Mem. in Supp., p. 7) In response, Plaintiff relies on Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), which held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against state officials in their official capacity for prospective injunctive relief from ongoing violations of federal law. (Mem. in Opp., p. 5)

Where a federal statutory scheme evidences an implicit or explicit intent to exclude Ex parte Young actions, such claims are barred. Union Electric Co. v. Missouri Department of Conservation, 366 F.3d 655, 658 (8th Cir. 2004). See also...