Norris v. State, 2D00-1744.
| Decision Date | 11 April 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 2D00-1744.,2D00-1744. |
| Citation | 784 So.2d 1188 |
| Parties | Michael NORRIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Allyn M. Giambalvo, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jonathan P. Hurley, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
Michael Norris contends the statute of limitations barred his prosecution for possession of drug paraphernalia and possession of methamphetamine. We agree with him because the State failed to show that its delay in commencing the prosecution was not unreasonable.
The offenses leading to the instant charges occurred on April 3, 1995, and Norris was arrested the next day. He was diverted to drug court, but failed to appear on August 22, 1995, and a capias was issued. The State filed an information on April 9, 1996, upon which the court set an arraignment for April 22, 1996. No summons issued for Norris's appearance, and the capias remained outstanding until November 17, 1999, when he was arrested and brought to a first appearance. Norris moved to dismiss the charges, asserting the statute of limitations bar.
The 1993 statute in effect at the time of Norris's offenses controls. Brown v. State, 674 So.2d 738, 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Accordingly, the prosecution for Norris's misdemeanor and third-degree felony must have commenced within two years and three years, respectively, after he committed them. § 775.15(2), Fla. Stat. (1993). A prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons or other process is executed without unreasonable delay. § 775.15(5). The burden is on the State to demonstrate that a delay in the execution of a capias was not unreasonable. Brown, 674 So.2d at 740-741. An unexcused delay in serving appropriate process until after the statute of limitations has run bars prosecution for the offenses charged. Neal v. State, 697 So.2d 903, 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Under section 775.15(6), Florida Statutes (1993), the limitation period does not run during any time when the defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state, but in no case does that provision extend the applicable limitation period by more than three years. Brown, 674 So.2d at 738 n. 2.
Here, the State did not contradict...
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Williams v. State, 1D01-2079.
...Fla. Stat. (1995); Fleming, 524 So.2d at 1147; Coleman v. State, 655 So.2d 1239, 1239 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Norris v. State, 784 So.2d 1188, 1189 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Neal v. State, 697 So.2d 903, 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Bonel v. State, 651 So.2d 774, 776 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). The record does n......
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Hernandez v. State, 2D05-3463.
...that the prosecution is not barred by the statute of limitations. See State v. King, 282 So.2d 162, 164 (Fla.1973); Norris v. State, 784 So.2d 1188, 1189 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Neal v. State, 697 So.2d 903, 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). For these purposes, prosecution is commenced "when either an in......
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Cunnell v. State, 2D05-5539.
...an unreasonable delay. An unexcused delay in executing service bars prosecution for the offense charged. See Norris v. State, 784 So.2d 1188, 1189 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (citing Neal v. State, 697 So.2d 903, 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)). However, in accordance with section 775.15(6),3 a statute of l......
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Matos v. State
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