Norris v. State, 38710
| Decision Date | 05 October 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 38710,38710 |
| Citation | 250 Ga. 38,295 S.E.2d 321 |
| Parties | NORRIS v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
George M. Hubbard, John R. Calhoun, Kenneth D. Kondritzer, Calhoun & Associates, P. C., Savannah, for Marie A. C. Norris.
Dupont K. Cheney, Dist. Atty., Harrison Kohler, Asst. Dist. Atty., Hinesville, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Virginia H. Jeffries, Staff Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Marie A. C. Norris was indicted for shooting and killing her husband, Lieutenant Colonel Jimmy R. Norris, with a handgun. She appeals from her subsequent conviction of murder and sentence to life imprisonment.
(1) Appellant contends that the trial court erred in excusing a juror after learning that the juror was a convicted felon. After the jury and two alternatives had been selected, the State informed the court, during a hearing on a motion to suppress certain evidence, that one of the jurors was a convicted felon. The juror, having been brought before the court, acknowledged the felony conviction. The court then, on its own motion, excused the juror and replaced him with the first alternate. The State consented to this ruling, but the defense objected, contending that the juror was prima facie competent and that the defense was entitled to question him further as to the status of his conviction.
The trial court may, on its own motion, and in the exercise of sound discretion, excuse an incompetent juror at any time before evidence is given. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excusing the juror. Dodys v. State, 73 Ga.App. 483(1), 37 S.E.2d 173 (1946).
Nor was any reversible error committed in the selection of two alternate jurors. Appellant contends that Code Ann. § 59-907 was violated in that the State and the defense were allowed only one and two peremptory challenges, respectively. 1 The defense made no objection to the reduced number of strikes and thus waived its right to appeal the trial court's ruling; furthermore, the error, if any, was harmless.
(2) The trial court did not err in failing to order a psychiatric evaluation with respect to appellant's competency to stand trial, prior to trial.
Some three weeks prior to trial the court, pursuant to a motion filed by the State, issued an ex parte order requiring appellant to undergo a psychiatric examination. Defense counsel moved to stay the order, contending that the order should not have issued ex parte, that to require appellant to submit to an examination would violate her right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment, and that the order was premature inasmuch as no special plea of insanity had been filed on appellant's behalf. At a hearing on this motion defense counsel argued that there was no evidence which would justify subjecting appellant to a psychiatric evaluation; however, both parties agreed to a court-ordered evaluation of appellant, with the stipulation, agreed to by the State, that the State would not attempt to discuss the results of the evaluation with the examining psychiatrist prior to trial. The psychiatrist was to have inquired as to whether appellant was competent to stand trial and whether she was sane or insane at the time of the offense. 2
The scheduled examination did not take place, as the State next moved to stay the order, urging the court to reconsider the stipulation concerning the results of the examination. At a hearing on this motion, defense counsel stated that he would have no objection to a competency evaluation, but objected, on Fifth Amendment grounds, to any evaluation of her mental capacity at the time of the offense. The court concluded that its order should be modified to require only an examination as to competency to stand trial, at which point the State suggested that, if the defense did not intend to offer a special plea of insanity, a competency evaluation would not be necessary. Defense counsel then stated that the defense had no intention of filing a special plea prior to trial, that, as far as he knew, she was competent to stand trial, but that he could not predict how she would hold up under the stress of the trial itself. The trial court then rescinded all orders for a psychiatric evaluation, requesting that "... if either side knows any reason why the defendant should be examined prior to trial, you are to call this to the attention of the court."
Code Ann. § 27-1502 provides a statutory method for determining, by special jury trial, the mental competency of a criminal defendant to stand trial. As defense counsel declined to file a special plea of insanity, the only inquiry becomes whether the trial court erred in failing to order, on its own motion, a competency evaluation prior to trial. See Taylor v. State, 245 Ga. 501(1), 265 S.E.2d 803 (1980). The record shows that no evidence was presented to the court to indicate a need for a competency evaluation other than the circumstances of the killing itself, the State's theory being that appellant shot and killed her husband and then attempted to make it appear a suicide. Defense counsel stated at a hearing that the nature of the crime did not warrant a competency evaluation. The trial court made an exceedingly diligent effort to protect the appellant's rights in this matter, and we find no abuse of discretion. See Taylor, supra; Lewis v. State, 239 Ga. 732(2), 238 S.E.2d 892 (1977).
(3) Appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to halt the trial and order a hearing as to appellant's competency to stand trial, or a psychiatric evaluation of her competency. Appellant further contends that the court erred in ruling her competent to stand trial.
During testimony on the second day of the trial defense counsel informed the court that appellant was sick. She was taken out of the courtroom and examined by a court-appointed physician. The physician reported to the Court shortly thereafter that appellant was in acute distress, hyperventilating, "scared to death," and exhibited symptoms of a peptic ulcer. He recommended that she be hospitalized overnight for testing and observation, and the court agreed.
The following morning the physician reported his findings to the court. He stated that the results of all tests were completely normal, and that, in his opinion, there was no physical reason why she could not continue with the trial. He indicated that she was under extreme mental distress and that he had given her some medication to calm her down; and that "... she is in a condition where she might take some drastic means," and should be kept under close surveillance by "somebody responsible." Questioned by the court with respect to the effects of the medication on the appellant, he stated that it would not impair her ability to cooperate with counsel or give testimony at trial. The court then revoked her bond to insure her safety and ruled her competent to stand trial.
Prior to the resumption of testimony defense counsel moved for a postponement of the trial so that he could present an oral motion for a special plea of insanity. In overruling the motion, the court noted that appellant had been out on bond awaiting trial for almost a year, yet no evidence of any medical problems had been brought to the court's attention prior to trial. The court found "... no basis at all for terminating the trial," observing that it is not unusual for one on trial for murder to exhibit signs of stress, and that the doctor had testified that nothing was physically wrong with appellant. As to the doctor's expression of concern that appellant might take some drastic action, the court stated that it had revoked her bond as a means of insuring her safety.
On the afternoon of the same day, appellant took the stand and gave lengthy and coherent (if not convincing) testimony.
In Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975), the Supreme Court stated: "[A]s to federal cases, we have approved a test of incompetence which seeks to ascertain whether a criminal defendant 'has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding--and whether he has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. at 402 [80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824].
"In Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 [86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815] (1966), we held that the failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant's right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his due process right to a fair trial.
"... The import of our decision in Pate v. Robinson is that evidence of a defendant's irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial are all relevant in determining whether further inquiry is required, but that even one of these factors standing alone may, in some circumstances, be sufficient." 420 U.S. at 172, 180, 95 S.Ct. at 904, 908.
Appellant raised the defense of insanity at the time of the offense and offered the testimony of two phychiatrists in support of that defense. The psychiatrists gave no opinion as to appellant's competence to stand trial, and the trial judge made his ruling on appellant's competency without the benefit of their testimony, which came later in the trial. We will review their testimony as to appellant's history of mental problems and her general mental state to determine whether, in combination with her demeanor at trial, these factors raised a sufficient doubt as to her competence at trial to require the trial judge to exercise his discretion and continue the trial pending a competency evaluation.
The psychiatrists testified that appellant's medical history showed multiple references to hyperventilation, combined with pain for which no organic basis could be found, and that this was a sign of a long-standing emotional disturbance. They testified that, based on...
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Morrow v. State
...to render his attorneys such assistance as a proper defense to the indictment preferred against him demanded. See Norris v. State, 250 Ga. 38, 40(3), 295 S.E.2d 321 (1982). Mental competency is a question of fact. Strickland v. State, supra at 221(3), 275 S.E.2d 29. Assuming that the psycho......
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...to such proceedings and whether he is capable of rendering his counsel assistance in providing a proper defense. Norris v. State, 250 Ga. 38(3), 295 S.E.2d 321 (1982). See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960). The constitutional requirement of trial compe......
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Lawrence v. State, S94A1756
...at 133, 112 S.Ct. at 1814(II). Likewise, this Court deemed it unnecessary to reach the issue when it was presented in Norris v. State, 250 Ga. 38(4), 295 S.E.2d 321 (1982). Other jurisdictions that have addressed the subject of the medication of defendants during trial have recognized that ......
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Humphrey v. Walker
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