North Carolina Corp. Comm'n v. Harnett County Trust Co

• Decision Date: 06 October 1926
• Docket Number: (No. 99.)
• Citation: 134 S.E. 656
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION COMMISSION. v. HARNETT COUNTY TRUST CO.

134 S.E. 656

(192 N.C. 246)

NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION COMMISSION.

v.HARNETT COUNTY TRUST CO.

(No. 99.)

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Oct. 6, 1926.

Appeal from Superior Court, Harnett County; Sinclair, Judge.

Action by the State of North Carolina, on the Relation of the North Carolina Corporation Commission, against the Harnett County Trust Company and others, in which Marshall T. Spears and another, as receivers, and A. R. Suggs, on behalf of creditors, depositors, and stockholders, brought suit against J. R. Baggett and others. From a judgment sustaining the demurrer of the defendant Baggett, the receivers and Suggs appeal. Reversed.

The Harnett County Trust Company was a banking corporation and was closed by order of the Corporation Commission on April 26, 1923. Marshall T. Spears and C. S. Hicks were appointed permanent receivers, and under and by virtue of an order made by Judge Daniels at the November term, 1923, of the Harnett superior court, said receivers were directed to institute a civil action against the directors and officers of the bank to enforce an alleged liability of said officers and directors for negligent management of the bank. Thereafter, in pursuance of said order, the receivers and A. R. Suggs, a depositor and stockholder of the bank, brought a suit against the defendant J. R. Baggett and other officers and directors of the bank, and filed a complaint. The defendant J. R. Baggett demurred to the complaint for that:

"Said complaint or pleading does not set forth facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against said J. R. Baggett, in that said pleading does not at any time allege that said J. R. Baggett was an officer of said Harnett County Trust Company with authority in any way to affect the action of said trust company in any way or to represent same in any of the transactioins complained of."

The demurrer was sustained, and from the judgment sustaining said demurrer there was an appeal.

Seawell & McPherson and Hoyle & Hoyle, all of Sanford, for appellants.

BROGDEN, J. Does the complaint state a cause of action against the defendant?

It is an accepted rule of law and one established by the overwhelming weight of authority that:

"It is the purpose of the Code system of pleading, which prevails with us, to have actions tried upon their merits, and to that end pleadings are construed liberally, every intendment is adopted in behalf of the pleader, and a complaint cannot be overthrown by a demurrer unless it be wholly insufficient. If in any portion of it, or to any extent, it presents facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, or if facts sufficient for that purpose can be fairly gathered from it, the pleading will stand, however inartificially it may have been drawn or however uncertain, defective, or redundant may be its statements, for, contrary to the common-law rule, every reasonable intendment and presumption must be made in favor of the pleader. It must be fatally defective before it will be rejected as insufficient.' " Hoke v. Glenn, 167 N. C. 594, 183 S. E. 807, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 250; Brewer v. Wynne, 154 N. C. 472, 70 S. E. 947.

It is also universally held in this jurisdiction that a defendant admits as true every material fact alleged in the complaint properly pleaded. Trust Co. v. Wilson, 182 N. C. 166, 108 S. E. 500.

It was alleged in the complaint that the defendant was the solicitor of the bank...