Hoke v. Glenn

• Decision Date: 23 December 1914
• Docket Number: (No. 587.)
• Citation: 83 S.E. 807,167 N.C. 594
• Parties: HOKE et al. v. GLENN et al.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

83 S.E. 807

167 N.C. 594

HOKE et al.

v.GLENN et al.

(No. 587.)

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 23, 1914.

1. Pleading (§ 193^*-2)—Complaint —Construction.

Under the Code rule that pleadings are to be liberally construed, a demurrer cannot be sustained to a complaint if in any portion of it or to any extent it presents facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, or if facts for that purpose can be fairly gathered from it, however inartificially it may have been drawn or however uncertain, defective, or redundant may be its statements.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Pleading, Cent. Dig. §§ 425, 428-435, 437-443; Dec. Dig. § 193.*]

2. Hospitals (§ 7^*)—"Charitable Institution"—Injury to Patients — Respondeat Superior—Selection of Servants—Negligence.

Though a hospital is a "charitable institution" and not within the rule respondeat superior, it nevertheless is liable for injuries to patients resulting from its negligence in the selection of its agents and servants.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Hospitals, Cent. Dig. § 13; Dec. Dig. § 7*

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Charitable Institution.]

Appeal from Superior Court, Haywood County; Justice, Judge.

Action by Amelia Hoke and others against E. B. Glenn and Clarence Barker Memorial Hospital to recover damages alleged to have been caused by the negligence of defendant Glenn, a physician, and of the hospital, where plaintiff was placed by Glenn for treatment for an injury. A demurrer by the hospital was overruled, and it appeals. Affirmed.

Harkins & Van Winkle, of Asheville, for appellant.

Smathers & Clark, of Canton, and Gilmer & Gilmer, of Waynesville, for appellees.

ALLEN, J. [1] It is the purpose of the Code system of pleading, which prevails with us, to have actions tried upon their merits, and to that end pleadings are construed liberally, every intendment is adopted in behalf of the pleader, and:

"A complaint cannot be overthrown by a demurrer unless it be wholly insufficient If in any portion of it, or to any extent, it presents facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, or if facts sufficient for that purpose can be fairly gathered from it, the pleading will stand, however inartificially it may have been drawn, or however uncertain, defective, or redundant may be its statements, for, contrary to the common-law rule, every reasonable intendment and presumption must be made in favor of the pleader. It must be fatally defective before it will be rejected as insufficient." Brewer v. Wynne, 154 N. C. 472, 70 S. E. 948.

Applying these principles to the pleadings, we are of opinion the demurrer was properly overruled, conceding that the defendant hospital is a charitable institution, and cannot therefore be held responsible for the negligent acts of its agents and employe's, because the complaint alleges that the hospital, as a corporation, was negligent in that it failed to exercise ordinary care in the selection of its agents, and that the plaintiff was injured by this negligence, and these facts are admitted by the demurrer.

We had occasion at this term, in Green v. Biggs, 83 S. E. 553, to consider the liability of private hospitals, maintained for profit and gain, to persons committed to their care, and, preliminary to the discussion, stated as the result of our investigations that:

"The principle seems to be generally recognized that a private charitable institution, which has exercised due care in the selection of its employes, cannot be held liable for injuries resulting from their negligence, and the rule is not affected by the fact that some patients or beneficiaries of the institution contribute towards the expense of their care, where the amounts so received are not devoted to private gain, but more effectually to carry out the purposes of the charity."

The clear inference from this statement of the law is that there is liability if due care is not exercised in the selection of agents and employes, and this is in line with the weight of authority. McDonald v. Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529; Joel v. Woman's Hospital, 89 Hun, 74, 35 N. Y. Supp. 37, and cases collected in note to Duncan v. Hospital, Ann. Cas, 1913E, 1129.

The reasons assigned for the nonliability of charitable institutions for the negligent acts of their employed vary greatly, and are stated very fully in the note to Parks v. Northwestern University, 4 Ann. Cas. 105, from which we quote:

"In Powers v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294 [47 C. C. A. 122, 65 L. R. A. 3721, it was said: 'One who accepts the benefit either of a public or of a private charity enters into a relation which exempts his benefactor from liability for the negligence of his servants in administering the charity; at any rate, if the benefactor has used due care in selecting those servants. To paraphrase the illustration: put by the learned judge before whom this case was tried, it would be intolerable that a good Samaritan, who takes to his home a wounded stranger for surgical care, should be held personally liable for the negligence of his servant in caring for that stranger. Were the heart and means of that Samaritan so large that he" was able not only to provide for one wounded man, but to establish a hospital for the care of a thousand, it would be no loss intolerable that he should be held personally liable for the negligence of his servant in caring for any one of those thousand wounded men. We cannot perceive that the position...