North Dade Bar Ass'n v. Dade-Commonwealth Title Ins. Co., DADE-COMMONWEALTH

• Citation: 143 So.2d 201
• Decision Date: 26 June 1962
• Docket Number: No. 61-529,DADE-COMMONWEALTH,61-529
• Parties: NORTH DADE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., a non-profit corporation of Florida, and Joe E. Ludick, Appellants, v.TITLE INSURANCE CO., a Florida corporation; The Drummond-Blow Co., a Florida corporation; and National Title Insurance Co., a Florida, corporation, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 201

143 So.2d 201

NORTH DADE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., a non-profit corporation of Florida, and Joe E. Ludick, Appellants, v. DADE-COMMONWEALTH TITLE INSURANCE CO., a Florida corporation; The Drummond-Blow Co., a Florida corporation; and National Title Insurance Co., a Florida, corporation, Appellees.

No. 61-529.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

June 26, 1962.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 10, 1962.

Snyder, Young & Stern, North Miami Beach, and W. Barry Swope, Miami Shores, for appellants.

Sibley, Grusmark, Giblin, King & Levenson, Miami Beach, for appellees.

William H. Rogers, Jacksonville, Amicus Curiae.

Before PEARSON, TILLMAN, C. J., and CARROLL and HENDRY, JJ.

PEARSON, TILLMAN, Chief Judge.

The North Dade Bar Association, Inc., is a nonprofit corporation, the members of which constitute a voluntary, area bar association. All of the members of this voluntary association are also members of The Florida Bar as required by Section 2, Article 2, Integration Rule, The Florida Bar, 31 F.S.A. The North Dade Bar Association is one of the appellants here. Joe E. Ludick, the individual appellant, is a practing attorney in the North Dade area and is also a member of the North Dade Bar Association and The Florida Bar.

Dade-Commonwealth Title Insurance Company, The Drummond-Blow Title Company and National Title Insurance Company are all corporations for profit doing business in the North Dade area. They are the appellees. The North Dade Bar Association appeals the final decree which dismissed a complaint brought by it against the title companies; and appellant, Ludick, joins in the appeal and assigns as error that portion of the final decree which denied his petition to intervene as a party plaintiff. We reverse.

The voluntary bar association filed its complaint against the companies named seeking a declaratory decree as to whether certain claimed practices by the title companies constituted the practice of law. The complaint further prayed that if it were determined that the corporations were engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, the court would grant an injunction prohibiting such practice. Mr. Ludick sought to intervene. Subsequently, the circuit judge entered the decree appealed. The decree of dismissal set forth the basis of the court's decision:

'The court is of the opinion, and holds, that neither a private nonprofit corporation (such as the plaintiff) nor an individual lawyer has the standing to sue in a case of this character; and that such a suit may be instituted and maintained only by the integrated Florida Bar.

'Accordingly, the motions of the defendants Dade Commonwealth Title Insurance Co. and The Drummond-Blow Title Co. and the motion of the defendant National Title Insurance Co. for a decree on the pleadings are and each of them is, granted, without leave to the plaintiff to amend its complaint.

'The motion of Joe E. Ludick for leave to intervene is denied.'

The question of the jurisdiction of the circuit court to entertain an action of this type has not been raised. Nevertheless, because of the recent opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida (filed after the decree of dismissal herein appealed) in State of Florida ex rel. Florida Bar v. Sperry, Fla.1962, 140 So.2d 587, we think the question of jurisdiction must be considered. The Sperry case points out that under the Constitution of the State the Supreme Court has exclusive control over admissions to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted; and by virtue of this constitutional grant the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction of a petition filed by The Florida Bar to require one allegedly engaged in the unauthorized practice to show cause why he should not be enjoined from such practice.

Even though the holding of that case (as it pertains to jurisdiction) is that the Supreme Court of Florida has the power to prevent the practice of law by those who are not admitted to practice in Florida, it does not follow that such jurisdiction precludes the exercise of a like power by other courts of this State. See State v. Sullivan, 95 Fla. 191, 116 So. 255, 259. State ex rel. York v. Beckham, 160 Fla. 810, 36 So.2d 769, 772. We therefore proceed to a discussion of the questions presented by this appeal.

The appeal turns upon the question of whether or not a voluntary bar association and an individual lawyer, or either of them, have a right to bring an action seeking to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. There are strong arguments for allowing a local bar association or an individual lawyer to call to a court's attention those who engage in the unauthorized practice of law. The local lawyer is closest to the problem. He sees and is affected by the continuing erosion of those fields of activity which are traditionally the area in which the lawyer works and makes his living. If enforcement of this matter is to be upon a complaint basis, who is in a better position to make the complaint than those upon the scene and vitally interested?

It is to ignore the obvious to overlook the fact that the local lawyer is the first to realize the economic loss which results from the unauthorized practice of law in his community. But it is nevertheless true that lawyers have no interest in any field of activity to the exclusion of the interests of the public. As so clearly expressed by Mr. Justice O'Connell in State of Florida ex rel. Florida Bar v. Sperry, Fla.1962, 140 So.2d 587, 595:

'The reason for prohibiting the practice of law by those who have not been examined and found qualified to practice is frequently misunderstood. It is not done to aid or protect the members of the legal profession either in creating or maintaining a monopoly or closed shop. It is done to protect the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by unqualified persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little, if any, control in the matter of infractions of the code of conduct which, in the public interest, lawyers are bound to observe.'

It appears, therefore, that it is the public's right to protection which is being asserted. Our question thus narrows: Does a voluntary bar association or an individual lawyer have standing in court to enforce this public right? ¹

Turning to the Florida cases, we find that voluntary bar associations and individual lawyers have been unchallenged in their capacity as plaintiffs in suits to restrain the unauthorized practice of law. The Florida Bar was integrated by rule of the Supreme Court in 1949. Petition of Florida State Bar Association, Fla.1949, 40 So.2d 902. In 1950, the appeal in Keyes Co. v. Dade County Bar Association, Fla.1950, 46 So.2d 605, was decided. It is apparent that although the opinion was subsequent to the integration rule, the action was instituted prior to the rule. We must assume from the opinion that no question was raised as to the right of the voluntary bar association to bring a suit to clarify the line of demarcation between the field of activity of the lawyer and that of the real estate broker. The injunctive order secured by the voluntary bar association was affirmed in part.

In Cooperman v. West Coast Title Company, Fla.1954, 75 So.2d 818, the original plaintiffs were members of The Florida Bar and officers of the St. Petersburg Bar Association. The Florida Bar was permitted to intervene in the trial court. The question of the capacity of the plaintiffs to sue is not discussed.

More recently, the Florida Supreme Court considered the case of Jacksonville Bar Association v. Wilson, Fla.1958, 102 So.2d 292. The suit was instituted by a member of The Florida Bar suing for himself and as a representative of a class described as 'all attorneys who are not members of the Jacksonville Bar Association * * *.' The issue was whether the local voluntary bar association could advertise its lawyer reference service. Again the question of the capacity of the individual lawyer to bring the action for declaratory decree was not questioned.

It thus appears that we have no direct precedent in Florida, but it can be said that the right of individual lawyers and voluntary bar associations to bring similar suits has not been questioned in the past.

We have examined the reported cases from several other jurisdictions as cited by the parties. In addition we have supplemented this list by further search. Those cases decided after the integration of the bar in the various states having done so are of particular interest.

We are impressed by the reasoning of the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas set forth in Bar Association of Dallas v. Hexter Title and Abstract Co., 175 S.W.2d 108 (Tex.Ct.Civ.App.1943). The court held that the rule of the Supreme Court of Texas relating to the State Bar of Texas was cumulative; and any interested lawyer or group of lawyers, or any bar association composed of licensed Texas lawyers, might avail themselves of the right to enjoin the unauthorized practice of law. The case was taken upon writ of error to the Supreme Court of Texas and the judgment...