North Pacific Ins. Co. v. Christensen

Decision Date08 February 2001
Docket NumberNo. 68155-4.,68155-4.
Citation143 Wash.2d 43,17 P.3d 596
PartiesNORTH PACIFIC INSURANCE COMPANY, an insurance company doing business in Washington, Respondent, v. Robert E. CHRISTENSEN, III, an individual, and James R. Farmer and Pamela B. Farmer, husband and wife, Petitioners.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Steven Turner Russell, Koelker & Swerk, Seattle, for petitioners. Robert Neil Gellatly, Jr., Jennifer Suzanne Divine, Helsell, Fetterman, Seattle, for respondent.

IRELAND, J.

In this case, we must determine whether a passenger who causes an accident by unexpectedly grabbing the steering wheel of a motor vehicle is the operator of that vehicle for purposes of underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage. We hold that, under the facts of this case, the passenger assumed physical control of the vehicle. Therefore, the passenger was the operator of the vehicle for purposes of the UIM provisions of this particular policy.

FACTS

Robert Christensen, a 16-year-old student, was driving his family's car in traffic when Christensen's high school friend, Christopher Chase, reached over from the front passenger seat and grabbed the steering wheel. Chase caused the car to swerve across the center line and to collide with an oncoming vehicle.1 Christensen and others were injured in the collision. Chase was found guilty in juvenile court of vehicular assault.

At the time of the collision, Christensen was insured under a North Pacific Insurance Company (North Pacific) automobile policy issued to his parents, James and Pamela Farmer. The policy provided liability and underinsured motorist coverage. The limits of the liability coverage were exhausted to satisfy the claims of others injured in the accident.

Christensen submitted a UIM claim under this policy seeking to recover damages for his injuries on the grounds that Chase was the "operator" of the vehicle at the time of the collision, and therefore was an underinsured motorist.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Christensen requested arbitration of his UIM claim as an insured under the UIM coverage of the Farmers' North Pacific policy. North Pacific stated that Christensen "was insured under the policy by virtue of being a family member of the named insured." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 161. However, North Pacific denied coverage on the basis that Chase was neither the owner nor operator of the car in which he was traveling at the time of the accident. North Pacific asserts that Chase's action of grabbing the steering wheel did not make him an "operator" of the vehicle under the insuring clause of the North Pacific policy.

Christensen continued to assert a right to coverage. North Pacific then filed a declaratory judgment action in King County Superior Court, seeking a declaration that there was no coverage of Christensen's UIM claim under North Pacific's policy and that North Pacific, therefore, had no duty to pay benefits with respect to the claim.

Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted Christensen's motion, holding that Christensen's UIM claim was covered under North Pacific's policy. The trial court held that Chase was the operator of the vehicle, "even though Chase was not operating the vehicle with permission or with full control, or apparently with any common sense." CP at 215. The trial court entered judgment granting attorney fees and costs to Christensen pursuant to Olympic Steamship Co. v. Centennial Insurance Co., 117 Wash.2d 37, 811 P.2d 673 (1991).2

North Pacific appealed, arguing that the plain and unambiguous meaning of "operator" within the terms of its policy provision is the driver, and a passenger who grabs the steering wheel is merely interfering with the driver's operation of the car. The Court of Appeals agreed, reversed the trial court, and remanded to that court to grant summary judgment for North Pacific. N. Pac. Ins. Co. v. Christensen, 95 Wash.App. 447, 453-54, 975 P.2d 552 (1999).

This Court granted Christensen's petition for review of the Court of Appeals' decision.

ANALYSIS
Standard of Review

When reviewing an order for summary judgment, an appellate court engages in the same inquiry as the trial court. Mountain Park Homeowners Ass'n v. Tydings, 125 Wash.2d 337, 341, 883 P.2d 1383 (1994). Summary judgment is properly granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Clements v. Travelers Indem. Co., 121 Wash.2d 243, 249, 850 P.2d 1298 (1993). All facts and reasonable inferences are considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Taggart v. State, 118 Wash.2d 195, 199, 822 P.2d 243 (1992). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Mountain Park Homeowners Ass'n, 125 Wash.2d at 341, 883 P.2d 1383.

In the instant case, no material facts are in dispute. Thus, this Court decides whether a passenger who grabs the steering wheel is the "operator" of the vehicle for purposes of North Pacific's UIM policy language purely as a matter of law.

Statutory and Insurance Policy Language

Washington's UIM statute requires automobile insurance policies to insure "against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury, death, or property damage, suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle...." RCW 48.22.030(2). Such policies must provide coverage "for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles, hit-and-run motor vehicles, and phantom vehicles because of bodily injury, death, or property damage...." Id. (emphasis added).

The UIM provision of the North Pacific policy reads as follows:

We will pay damages which an insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle because of:
Bodily injury sustained by an insured and caused by an accident.

CP at 129 (italics added).3

As is shown above, North Pacific's policy language tracks the UIM statute. However, neither the statute nor the provision at issue defines the term "operator." Consequently, the case turns on the definition of this term.

The Meaning of "Operator"

The interpretation of insurance policy language is a question of law. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 102 Wash.2d 477, 480, 687 P.2d 1139 (1984). Undefined terms in an insurance policy "must be given a fair, reasonable, and sensible construction as would be given by an average insurance purchaser." Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Henault, 128 Wash.2d 207, 213, 905 P.2d 379 (1995).

"The terms of the policy must be understood in their plain, ordinary, and popular sense." Farmers Ins. Co. v. Miller, 87 Wash.2d 70, 73, 549 P.2d 9 (1976). "To determine the ordinary meaning of an undefined term, our courts look to standard English language dictionaries." Boeing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 113 Wash.2d 869, 877, 784 P.2d 507 (1990).

The Court of Appeals, applying the rule that courts may rely on the dictionary to determine the ordinary meaning of an undefined term, looked to Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1581 (1969):

"Operator" is defined as "one that produces a physical effect or engages himself in the mechanical aspect of any process or activity as ... [a] driver." A driver is "a person in actual physical control of a vehicle," and control means the "power or authority to guide or manage."

Christensen, 95 Wash.App. at 451-52, 975 P.2d 552 (footnotes omitted). The Court of Appeals then followed by stating that an operator is "the person who controls all the critical functions of operating a car the ignition, accelerator, brake, and steering." Id. at 452, 975 P.2d 552. However, an "operator" is not solely the person occupying the driver's seat, but rather is anyone who is "in actual physical control of a vehicle," having the "power to guide" it. The appellate court inserted unwarranted restrictions based on its own perception of what the "average insurance consumer" would understand. Id. While the appellate court correctly relies on the dictionary definitions, those definitions contain no suggestion that an "operator" must be a single person who is in command of all the controls of a car.

The flaw in the appellate court's analysis is also apparent in its subsequent observation:

While we agree that one who grabs the steering wheel usurps for an instant one part of operating a car, he is at most interfering with the driver's ability to completely control the car and is not in actual physical control of it.

Id. at 452, 975 P.2d 552.

The dictionary definitions do not impose limits on the "purpose, extent, or duration" of an operator's control over a vehicle. The appellate court erroneously includes restrictions as to purpose (one who "usurps" the wheel is "interfering with the driver's ability to completely control the car"), extent ("all the critical functions of operating a car"), and duration ("for an instant"). The ordinary meanings do not support such restrictions.

North Pacific argues that the customary meaning of a car's operator is the driver. While this meaning may be appropriate in common situations, Christensen responds that automobile insurance should also "afford protection for the broad range of unusual events that can occur to injure people during the operation of motor vehicles." Br. of Resp't at 6.

From a practical standpoint, narrowing the scope of "operator" to a single person who is in sole command of all the controls of a vehicle does not sufficiently address the real-life situations that arise while driving. Auto mishaps rarely result when drivers are in total control of all of the functions of their cars. Instead, accidents occur when there are failures to maintain complete control, including when a passenger unexpectedly grabs the steering wheel. Accidents can happen almost instantaneously when only one of the car's critical controls is compromised.

Here, Chase did not...

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