Northwestern Consolidated Milling Company v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company
| Citation | 160 N.W. 1028,135 Minn. 363 |
| Decision Date | 19 January 1917 |
| Docket Number | 20,008 - (158) |
| Parties | NORTHWESTERN CONSOLIDATED MILLING COMPANY v. CHICAGO, BURLINGTON & QUINCY RAILROAD COMPANY |
| Court | Supreme Court of Minnesota (US) |
Action in the district court for Hennepin county to recover $965.80 the value of a carload of flour shipped over defendant's road to Bellington, West Virginia. The answer alleged that the shipment, after being delivered to defendant's connecting carriers, was destroyed in a flood of unexpected and great violence at Columbus, Ohio, and alleged that the bill of lading issued by defendant provided that no carrier in possession of the property should be liable for any loss thereof or damage thereto or delay caused by the act of God. The case was tried before Hale, J., who made findings and ordered judgment in favor of plaintiff for the amount demanded. From the judgment entered pursuant to the order for judgment, defendant appealed. Reversed.
Interstate commerce.
1. Interstate commerce is now governed exclusively by the laws enacted by Congress and by the common-law principles accepted and enforced by the Federal courts, to the exclusion of state laws and state rules and policies.
Carrier -- loss of shipment by act of God.
2. Under the rule applied in the Federal courts, unless the carrier is chargeable with some negligence other than delay in making the shipment, the destruction of the property by an act of God, not foreseen in time to guard against it absolves the carrier from liability.
Carrier -- negligence of carrier -- burden on shipper.
3. Where the carrier shows that the property was destroyed by an act of God, if the shipper claims that negligence of the carrier contributed to the loss, the burden is upon the shipper to prove such negligence.
Carrier -- evidence insufficient.
4. In the present case the evidence fails to establish any negligence other than delay, and the carrier is not liable.
Barrows, Stewart & Ordway, for appellant.
William Furst, for respondent.
Plaintiff, alleging the delivery to defendant of a carload of flour to be transported from Minneapolis, Minnesota, to Bellington, West Virginia, and the failure to deliver it at its destination or at all, sued defendant as the initial carrier for the value of the flour. Defendant admitted the contract to transport the flour and the failure to deliver it, but asserted that the flour had been destroyed while in transit by an act of God which released the carrier from liability for the loss. At the trial the allegations of the complaint were admitted, and the case was submitted to the court without a jury upon the complaint and the depositions taken by defendant. The court rendered judgment for plaintiff and defendant appealed therefrom.
The facts are not in dispute. The flour reached Columbus, Ohio, on March 19, 1913, and remained in the railroad yards at that place until March 25, on which date it was destroyed by an unprecedented flood. That the flood was of an unprecedented character is not questioned.
The liability of defendant is predicated upon the following finding of fact made by the trial court: "That through the unreasonable delay and concurrent negligence of the defendant's agents and connecting carriers the said flour was lost and destroyed by floods at Columbus, Ohio, on March 25th, 1913." The evidence is ample to sustain the finding that the delay at Columbus was unnecessary and unreasonable, and, if the carrier is liable where property destroyed by a flood would not have been in the path of the flood except for the negligent delay of the carrier, plaintiff is entitled to recover. This court, following the rule adopted by many state courts, held in Bibb Broom Corn Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. 94 Minn. 269, 102 N.W. 709, 69 L.R.A. 509, 110 Am. St. 361, 3 Ann. Cas. 450, in respect to property destroyed by a flood while being transported by a common carrier, that if the carrier negligently delayed the shipment, and the goods were overtaken in transit and damaged by an act of God which would not have caused the damage had there been no delay, he is liable even though the act of God could not reasonably have been anticipated.
Defendant contends that by the Hepburn Act and the amendments thereto Congress has assumed exclusive control over interstate commerce; that state laws no longer apply thereto; and that the Federal courts have established the rule that, where goods are destroyed by a flood or other act of God, the carrier is not liable therefor, even if the goods would not have been within the range of the destructive force except for the negligent delay of the carrier. We find defendant's contention well founded. That Congress has now taken exclusive control of the subject of interstate commerce, and that such commerce is now governed by the laws enacted by Congress and by the "common-law principles accepted and enforced by the Federal courts," to the exclusion of state laws and state rules and policies, is fully established. Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 33 S.Ct. 148, 57 L.Ed. 314, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 257; Southern Exp. Co. v. Byers, 240 U.S. 612, 36 S.Ct. 410, 60 L.Ed. 825; Atchison, T. & S.F Ry. Co. v. Harold, 241 U.S. 371, 36 S.Ct. 665, 60 L.Ed. 1050; Ford v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. Co. 123 Minn. 87, 143 N.W. 249; New York C. & H.R. Ry. Co. v. Beaham, 242 U.S. 43, 37 S.Ct. 43, 61 L.Ed. --
Where property is destroyed by an act of God, but would not have been within the range of the destructive force except for the negligent delay of the carrier, it is established as the rule accepted and enforced in the Federal courts that the act of God, not the negligent delay of the carrier, is the proximate cause of the loss, and that the negligent delay of the carrier is too remote as a contributing cause to entail liability upon him. Clark v. Barnwell, 12 How. (53 U.S.) 272, 13 L.Ed. 985; Railroad Co. v. Reeves, 10 Wall. (77 U.S.) 176, 19 L.Ed. 909; Western Transportation Co. v. Downer, 11 Wall. (78 U.S.) 129, 20 L.Ed. 160; St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. 139 U.S. 223, 11 S.Ct. 554, 35 L.Ed. 154; Thomas v. Lancaster Mills (C.C.A.) 71 F. 481, 19 C.C.A. 88; Cau v. Texas & P. Ry. Co. 194 U.S. 427, 24 S.Ct. 663, 48 L.Ed. 1053; New Orleans & N. Ry. Co. v. National Rice Milling Co. 234 U.S. 80, 34 S.Ct. 726, 58 L.Ed. 1223; Seaboard Air Line v. Mullin (Fla.) 70 So. 467.
In Railroad Co. v. Reeves, ...
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