Northwestern Lumber Co. v. Chehalis County

• Decision Date: 29 April 1901
• Citation: 25 Wash. 95,64 P. 909
• Parties: NORTHWESTERN LUMBER CO. v. CHEHALIS COUNTY et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

64 P. 909

25 Wash. 95

NORTHWESTERN LUMBER CO. v. CHEHALIS COUNTY et al.

Supreme Court of Washington

April 29, 1901

Appeal from superior court, Chehalis county; Charles W. Hodgdon Judge.

Injunction by the Northwestern Lumber Company against Chehalis county and C. N. Wilson, as treasurer, to enjoin the collection of certain taxes. From a decree in favor of defendants plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

TAXATION--OCEAN-GOING TUGS--WHERE TAXABLE--ASSESSORS--TITLE TO OFFICE--COLLATERAL ATTACK.

1. Ocean-going tugs owned by a lumber company, and exclusively used within the state, and managed and operated by residents of the state, are subject to state taxation, though such tugs are registered at a port situated in a foreign state.

TAXATION--OCEAN-GOING TUGS--WHERE TAXABLE--ASSESSORS--TITLE TO OFFICE--COLLATERAL ATTACK.

2. The objection that an assessor has no right to the office cannot be raised in a suit by a taxpayer to enjoin the collection of a tax based on an assessment made by such officer.

Sidney Moor Heath, for appellant.

W. H Abel, for respondents.

REAVIS C.J.

Suit to enjoin the collection of taxes levied upon property belonging to appellant in Chehalis county. The assessor listed and assessed to appellant some reservoirs and lines of pipes in the town of Hoquiam, and also listed and assessed three steam tugs,--the Traveler, Astoria, and Printer. The complaint states that the acts of the assessor were invalid, and questions his right to his office as assessor and alleges that he arbitrarily, fraudulently, and maliciously overvalued personalty in the waterworks; that the tugs were ocean-going tugs, and in use wherever charters were available; that each was registered, under section 4319, Rev. St. U.S., at the port of San Francisco, and was assessed and paid taxes in the state of California; that plaintiff was a corporation organized under the laws of California, and qualified to do business in the state of Washington. The superior court, after trial, found substantially the following facts: That the tugs Traveler, Astoria, and Printer and the waterworks were assessed at a fair cash valuation required by law; that all the property mentioned was a part of the taxable personal property situate in Chehalis county, and said tugs, and each thereof, were so blended with the personal property in general situated in said county that it was impossible to distinguish it therefrom; that such property, and the whole thereof, was controlled at Hoquiam by the resident management of the plaintiff corporation, and each of said tugs was and has been engaged in plying wholly within the waters of this state. It concluded that the tax was legal and justly due, and rendered judgment dismissing the action.

The material controversy here is the validity of the assessment upon the three tugs. Counsel for plaintiff urges that, as these tugs were registered in the port of San Francisco, they are not liable to taxation in this state. The question is not entirely free from doubt. In 1854 the right to tax a vessel engaged in interstate commerce was considered by the supreme court of the United States in Hays v. Steamship Co., 17 How. 596, 15 L.Ed. 254. The facts were that the steamship company was incorporated under the laws of New York; that all the stockholders were residents and citizens of that state that the principal office for transacting business was in the city of New York, but the company had agencies in the cities of Panama, New Grenada, and San Francisco, Cal., and had a naval yard and ship yard for repairs at Benicia, Cal.; that, on the arrival of the ships at the port of San Francisco, they remained no longer than to land passengers, mail, and freight, usually done in a day, and then proceeded to Benicia for repairs and refitting until the commencement of the next voyage, usually some 10 or 12 days; that the business they were engaged in was transportation of passengers and merchandise, treasure, and the United States mail between the city of New York and the city of San Francisco, by way of Panama, and between San Francisco and different ports in the territory of Oregon; that the company was the sole owner of the vessels, and no portion of the interests was owned by citizens of California; that the vessels were all ocean steamships, employed exclusively in navigating the ocean, and each of them was registered at the custom house in New York, where the owners resided; that taxes had been assessed upon all the capital of the company represented by the steamers in the state of New York under the laws of that state; that the vessels were assessed in the county of San Francisco, Cal., and the suit was to recover taxes paid under protest. The tax collector demurred to the complaint, and judgment was given for the plaintiffs. The court, in affirming the judgment, referred to the federal statutes of the 31st of December, 1792, and the 29th of July, 1850, which provide for the registration of vessels at the port which shall be at or nearest the owner, if there be but one, or, if more than one, nearest the place where the husband or the acting and managing owner usually resides, and also the provision for the recording of bills of sales, mortgages, and conveyances in the office of the collector of customs where the vessel is registered or enrolled, and observed: 'These provisions, and others that might be referred to, very clearly indicate that the domicile of a vessel that requires to be registered, if we may so speak, or home port, is the port at which she is registered, and which must be the nearest to the place where the owner or owners reside.' In speaking of the vessels, it was said: 'They are thus engaged in the business and commerce of the country, upon the highway of nations, touching at such ports and places as these great interests demand, and which hold out to the owners sufficient inducements by the profits realized or expected to be realized. And, so far as respects the ports and harbors within the United States, they are entered and cargoes discharged or laden on board, independently of any control over them, except as it respects such municipal and sanitary regulations of the local authorities as are not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the general government, to which belongs the regulation of commerce with foreign nations and between states. * * * Besides, whether the vessel, leaving her home port for trade and commerce, visits, in the course of her voyage or business, several ports, or confines her operations in the carrying trade to one, are questions that will depend upon the profitable returns of the business, and will furnish no more evidence that she has become a part of the personal property within the state, and liable to taxation at one port than at the others. She is within the jurisdiction of all or any one of them temporarily, and for a purpose wholly excluding the idea of permanently abiding in the state, or changing her home port.' Again, in Morgan v. Parham,...