Norton v. Benjamin
| Decision Date | 01 June 1966 |
| Citation | 220 A.2d 248 |
| Parties | Charles M. NORTON et al. v. Wortha BENJAMIN. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Robinson, Richardson & Leddy, by Edward T. Richardson, Jr., Portland, for plaintiffs.
Verrill, Dana, Walker, Philbrick & Whitehouse, by John W. Philbrick, Portland, for defendant.
Before WEBBER, TAPLEY, MARDEN, RUDMAN, and DUFRESNE, JJ.
Pursuant to 4 M.R.S.A. § 57 () and M.R.C.P. Rule 76B questions were certified by the District Court of the United States for the District of Maine.
The underlying facts as stated in the certification are as follows:
(a) On March 11, 1965, Charles M. Norton and Mary E. Norton filed a complaint against Wortha Benjamin, claiming damages for personal injuries and property damage sustained by the plaintiffs as the result of negligence of the defendant in an automobile accident between a car driven by the defendant Wortha Benjamin and a car driven by the plaintiff Charles M. Norton, in which the plaintiff Mary E. Norton was a passenger, at Eddington, Maine. (b) On May 4, 1965, the defendant Wortha Benjamin filed an answer to the complaint, which included a cross-claim against the plaintiff Charles M. Norton for indemnity or contribution of the amount of any damages recovered of the defendant by the plaintiff Mary E. Norton. (c) On August 18, 1965, the plaintiff Charles M. Norton filed an answer to the defendant's cross-claim. On September 22, 1965, the plaintiff Charles M. Norton filed an amended answer to said cross-claim, in which he pleaded as a bar to said cross-claim a general release given by the defendant Wortha Benjamin to the plaintiff Charles M. Norton. (d) On December 15, 1965, counsel for the plaintiff Charles M. Norton and counsel for the defendant Wortha Benjamin filed a stipulation of facts with respect to the execution of the release given by the defendant Wortha Benjamin to the plaintiff Charles M. Norton.
The general release pleaded in bar by plaintiff Charles M. Norton was in the following form:
'RELEASE AND SETTLEMENT OF CLAIM
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, THAT I, WORTHA G.
BENJAMIN of (Street) 27 Grand Avenue, (City or Town) Johnson City, (State) New York being of full age, and married for the sole consideration of EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY SIX AND 16/100-Dollars to me paid by or on behalf of Charles M. Norton, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do hereby release, acquit and discharge said party or parties from all claims and demands, actions and causes of action, damages, cost, loss of service, expenses and compensation on account of, or in any way growing out of personal injuries, whether known or unknown to me at the present time, and property damages resulting or to result from an occurrence that took place on or about the 29th day of September, 1963 at or near Route #9, Eddington, Maine by reason of a vehicle owned and operated by Wortha G. Benjamin being in collision with a vehicle owned and operated by Charles M. Norton and do hereby covenant to indemnify and save harmless said party or parties from and against all claims and demands whatsoever on account of, or in any way growing out of said occurrence, or its results, both to person and property.
It is further agreed that this Release expresses a full and complete SETTLEMENT of a liability claimed and denied, regardless of the adequacy of the aforesaid payment made, and that said payment and the acceptance of this Release shall not operate as an admission of liability on the part of anyone, nor as an estoppel, waiver, or bar with respect to any claim the party or parties released may have against the undersigned.
WITNESS my hand and seal this 24 day of October, 1963.
Witnesses:
FRANCIS J. CARNS
(Witness' Signature)
WORTHA G. BENJAMIN (L.S.)
(Signature)'
The parties have further stipulated the following facts:
1. On September 29, 1963, in the Town of Eddington, County of Penobscot, Maine, there was a collision between an automobile operated by plaintiff Charles M. Norton, in which plaintiff Mary E. Norton was a passenger, and an automobile operated by defendant-cross-claimant Wortha G. Benjamin. Attached to defendant Benjamin's automobile was a metal trailer loaded with camping equipment.
2. On or about October 24, 1963, defendant Wortha G. Benjamin executed a release to plaintiff Charles M. Norton in consideration of $876.16.
3. In the course of negotiations prior to the execution of said release, defendant Wortha G. Benjamin presented to a claim adjuster for plaintiff Charles M. Norton's insurer the following itemized bill of his claims:
Dick Blodgett, loss of salary $ 42.00
Motel room for Dick and myself 14 00
Phone calls to Boston and
home 5 80
Trailer hitch purchase 29 36
Trailer damage 20 00
Trailer top 40 00
Use of sister's car to pick up
trailer 125 00
Various camping equipment
including pots, pans
silverware, stoves 35 00
Damage to automobile 700 00
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$ 1,011.16
4. The adjuster subsequently made an offer of settlement in the amount of $876.16, which was accepted by defendant Wortha G. Benjamin, and constituted the consideration for the release. No discussion of contribution or indemnity took place between the adjuster and the defendant.'
The certificate propounds this question to this court:
Does the release given by the defendant cross-claimant Wortha Benjamin to the plaintiff Charles M. Norton, bar the cross-claim for contribution or indemnity brought by the defendant Wortha Benjamin against the plaintiff Charles M. Norton?
We answer in the affirmative. The form of release employed in the instant case has a very broad sweep and is clearly designed to adjust, settle and terminate all claims and demands which the releasor may have against the releasee arising from the accident. The release is not merely of the claims for personal injuries and property damage which the releasor may have suffered as a result of the accident. It goes further than that and leaves room for no ambiguity. The parol evidence rule has application and admits of no variation of the contract which the parties made. The rule is well stated in Spaulding v. American Realty Co., (1922) 121 Me. 493, 496, 118 A. 322, 323: 'Few rules in the law of evidence are of wider application than that declaring extrinsic evidence of preceding or accompanying negotiations inadmissible to vary or to contradict, or to subtract from or add to, the language of a written instrument which speaks for itself in definite and final terms, fraud not being advanced and proved.' The rule can cause hardship, at least in the sense that one may find himself held to a contract which proves unprofitable or disadvantageous. Where the contract is in the nature of a full settlement and a release of all claims for a consideration agreed upon, one may discover on the basis of hindsight the unwisdom of his bargain. But the law deems that society gains most from the certainty and finality of such settlements and permits the clarifying intention of the parties to be shown only when the language of the written agreement of release does not clearly and unmistakably state that which was agreed.
Several courts which have had occasion to decide whether or not a general release in broad and all inclusive terms will bar a right of contribution as between joint tort feasors have answered in the affirmative. In the leading case of Killian v. Catanese, (1954) 375 Pa. 593, 101 A.2d 379 a release was given employing general and inclusive language with respect to claims and demands and particularly the phrase 'especially the liability arising from an accident which occurred * * *.' (Emphasis supplied.) When the releasor sought to bring the releasee into the case as an additional defendant to respond to a suit brought against the releasor by a third party claimant, the court held the release to be an effective bar. The court noted that no attempt had been made by the parties to limit the scope of the release, and the word 'liability' in this context was of particular significance. In 1958 the Pennsylvania court had occasion to interpret a rather differently worded release in Kent v. Fair, 392 Pa. 272, 140 A.2d 445. Here the release was 'from any and all actions, causes of action, claims and demands for, upon or by reason of any damage, loss or injury, which heretofore have been or which hereafter may be sustained by us in consequence of an accident on or about July 11, 1954.' (Emphasis ours.) Here again the releasor sought to join the releasee as additional defendant and in this instance the court deemed the language of the release not broad enough to cover damages sustained by third persons and hence no bar to the releasor's attempted action. In distinguishing Killian it characterized the language of the release in that case as 'vastly more sweeping' and of 'practically limitless character.'
That the result in Kent was intended to be limited to its own facts and to the particular language...
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