Norton v. City of Chicago

• Decision Date: 10 December 1997
• Docket Number: No. 1-96-2684,1-96-2684
• Citation: 690 N.E.2d 119,293 Ill.App.3d 620
• Parties: , 228 Ill.Dec. 810 Don NORTON, Gerald Marlatt, William Knack, Ruth Knack, Jane Reames and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The CITY OF CHICAGO, Datacom System Corporation and Cook County, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 119

690 N.E.2d 119

293 Ill.App.3d 620, 228 Ill.Dec. 810

Don NORTON, Gerald Marlatt, William Knack, Ruth Knack, Jane Reames and all others similarly situated Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The CITY OF CHICAGO, Datacom System Corporation and Cook County, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 1-96-2684.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

First District, Third Division.

Dec. 10, 1997.

Rick Schoenfield, Schoenfield, Swartzman & Massin, Chicago, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney of Cook County, Chicago (Patricia M. Shymanski, Deputy State's Attorney, and Patricia M. Moser, Paul A. Castiglione and Donna M. Lach, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for Defendant-Appellee Cook County.

Justice CAHILL delivered the opinion of the court:

We review once again a long running dispute between plaintiffs and the lone remaining defendant, Cook County, about the legality of a $3 charge added to delinquent parking tickets in the City of Chicago between 1985 and 1986.

In an earlier appeal, we reviewed the trial court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss against all defendants: the city, the county, and Datacom System Corporation. See Norton v. City of Chicago, 267 Ill.App.3d 507, 204 Ill.Dec. 938, 642 N.E.2d 839 (1994) (Norton I ). We first upheld the dismissal of the city and Datacom. We then reversed the trial court's ruling that plaintiffs' suit was an impermissible collateral attack, finding that the record was "unclear whether final judgments were ever entered by the traffic court." Norton, 267 Ill.App.3d at 510, 204 Ill.Dec. 938, 642 N.E.2d 839. We held that the county's motion to dismiss under section 2-615 (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1996)) of the Code of Civil Procedure rather than section 2-619 (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1996)) should not have been granted. The trial court could not conclude, based on pleadings alone, that final judgments had been entered in traffic court. We held that the trial court erred in finding that the traffic court entered final judgments where the allegations of the county's motion to dismiss failed to establish final judgments. Norton, 267 Ill.App.3d at 511, 204 Ill.Dec. 938, 642 N.E.2d 839.

On remand, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment for the county.

The parties raise the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the suit is barred by the collateral attack doctrine; (2) whether the suit is barred by the voluntary payment doctrine; (3) whether the county retained money wrongfully obtained from plaintiffs; and (4) whether plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment interest. We reverse and remand.

The affidavits and depositions attached to the motions for summary judgment show that, through 1986, if a city parking ticket defendant did not pay the fine or appear in court after two notices, the ticket was listed by the clerk of the court as delinquent, but no default judgment was entered. If the ticket was later paid, the county received $3 of the money collected from each delinquent ticket. Before May, 1985, the $3 was taken from each fine paid to the city. In 1985, the city hired Datacom System Corporation to send demand notices and collect delinquent fines. A $3 surcharge was added to the total fine due. The surcharge was described on the notice as "court costs." The clerk of the circuit court passed on the money collected from this surcharge to the county.

The notices sent by Datacom read:

"You can obtain additional information about this notice ONLY by writing to the address listed above or by calling (312) 580-3400.

Our records indicate that the parking tickets listed below have not been paid. IF YOU DO NOT PAY THE TOTAL AMOUNT SHOWN BELOW IMMEDIATELY, THE CITY OF CHICAGO WILL TAKE FURTHER LEGAL ACTION AGAINST YOU. This may include preparing a verified petition in the Circuit Court of Cook County requesting that a DEFAULT JUDGMENT in the amount of $35 plus court costs be entered against you for each unpaid ticket.

You can avoid this action by mailing a check or money order in the total amount shown below. * * * No information will be given or payment accepted at Traffic Court." (Emphasis added.)

The demand notices were revised during a law suit (Horn v. City of Chicago, 85 C 6838, 1986 WL 15036 (N.D.Ill.1986)) in which the plaintiffs alleged that the demand notices violated their right to due process by failing to give sufficient notice that a hearing was available to contest their liability. See Horn v. City of Chicago, 860 F.2d 700 (7th Cir.1988). The $3 surcharge was relabeled a "statutory mailing fee." The revised demand notices read:

"You can obtain additional information about this notice ONLY by writing to the address listed, by calling (312) 580-3400, or by visiting the parking ticket information windows in City Hall * * *.

* * * * * *

IF YOU DO NOT PAY THE TOTAL AMOUNT DUE WITHIN 15 DAYS, THE CITY WILL TAKE ACTION TO RECOVER PAYMENT IN A LARGER AMOUNT, AND MAY DEMAND THE MAXIMUM FINE ALLOWED BY LAW."

Plaintiffs here are among those who paid the surcharge in response to the notices. Plaintiffs allege that Cook County was unjustly enriched by collecting the surcharge.

We review a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill.2d 90, 102, 180 Ill.Dec. 691, 607 N.E.2d 1204 (1992). Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill.2d 229, 240, 95 Ill.Dec. 305, 489 N.E.2d 867 (1986).

Plaintiffs first argue that the trial court's ruling that their suit is an impermissible collateral attack on a preexisting judgment is barred by the law of the case. Plaintiffs argue that in Norton I, we decided, as a matter of law, that judgments were not entered in traffic court. We disagree.

The rule of the law of the case provides that where an issue has been litigated and decided, a court's unreversed decision on a question of law or fact settles that question for all subsequent stages of the suit. McDonald's Corp. v. Vittorio Ricci Chicago, Inc., 125 Ill.App.3d 1083, 1086-87, 81 Ill.Dec. 314, 466 N.E.2d 1116 (1984). A question of law decided on appeal is binding on the trial court on remand, and the appellate court if the case is appealed again. Martin v. Federal Life Insurance Co., 268 Ill.App.3d 698, 701, 205 Ill.Dec. 826, 644 N.E.2d 42 (1994).

In Norton I, we held that the trial court could not conclude from the pleadings on the section 2-615 motion to dismiss that final judgments had been entered in traffic court. The ruling did not resolve the issue or preclude the trial court from reconsidering the question if the county presented evidence of final judgments on a motion for summary judgment. On remand, the county offered evidence not presented in Norton I. The county offered deposition testimony explaining how the cases against plaintiffs were disposed of by the clerk of the court. The county's offer of evidence to show that the traffic court's method of disposing of these cases was "tantamount" to final judgment complied with the directions of this court on remand.

We next address the trial court's finding that final judgments were entered in the underlying cases, precluding collateral attack in this case.

A final judgment can only be attacked by direct appeal or in traditional collateral proceedings defined by statute. Malone v. Cosentino, 99 Ill.2d 29, 32-33, 75 Ill.Dec. 401, 457 N.E.2d 395 (1983). Once a judgment is final, issues that could have been raised are barred in subsequent proceedings. Malone, 99 Ill.2d at 33, 75 Ill.Dec. 401, 457 N.E.2d 395.

The county offered proof that after plaintiffs paid fines, their cases were no longer active before the traffic court. Although no judicial action was taken, the clerk recorded the dispositions of paid tickets in the same way he recorded those disposed of judicially--by removing them from the clerk's "violator file." The county claims that the clerk's removal of cases from the violator file amounts to a "final judgment for purposes of closing the case." In support, the county argues that section 27-387(b) of the Municipal Code of Chicago (Code) authorized the clerk to "enter final dispositions on cases where payments were mailed to the [c]lerk." Section 27-387(b) (1984) provides:

"Upon the filing of such traffic violation complaint in the Municipal Court of Chicago as aforesaid, said complaint may be disposed of only by trial in said court or other official action by a judge of said court, including forfeiture of bail or by payment of a fine to the traffic violations bureau of said court." Chicago Municipal Code § 27-387(b) (repealed July 12, 1990).

We first note that the language of section 27-387(b) does not support the county's reading. The Code does not authorize the clerk to enter "final dispositions," but says that complaints for traffic violations may only be disposed of by trial or "other official action by a judge." Second, even if the clerk's administrative action was authorized, the question of whether that action amounts to a final judgment remains unanswered. The county cites no case, except Stelzik v. City of Chicago, 85- CH-7631 (Cir.Ct. Cook Co. January 21, 1986), to support the view that disposing of a case without judicial action amounts to a final judgment. An unpublished order of a trial court is without precedential value. Harvard State Bank v. County of McHenry, 251 Ill.App.3d 84, 92, 190 Ill.Dec. 99, 620 N.E.2d 1360 (1993).

Plaintiffs do not contest the conclusion that payment of the tickets and the surcharge disposed of the cases before the traffic court. But plaintiffs argue that only a judge can enter a final judgment. See Towns v. Yellow Cab Co., 73 Ill.2d 113, 119, 22 Ill.Dec. 519, 382 N.E.2d 1217 (1978) (defining "judgment" as "a determination by the court on the issues presented by the pleadings which ascertains and...