Norton v. Hamilton
| Citation | 89 S.E.2d 809,92 Ga.App. 727 |
| Decision Date | 11 October 1955 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,No. 35787,35787,1 |
| Parties | , 57 A.L.R.2d 426 J. H. NORTON, Jr., v. Elvie R. HAMILTON |
| Court | United States Court of Appeals (Georgia) |
Syllabus by the Court
The petition stated a good cause of action in tort for malpractice under Code, § 84-924; therefore, the court did not err in overruling the general and special demurrers.
Elvie Ruth Hamilton sued J. H. Norton, Jr. for damages. The petition, in substance, alleged: that on or about the month of February, 1954, the defendant, as a practicing physician and medical doctor, accepted the plaintiff, who was then pregnant with a child, as his patient and agreed to give the plaintiff such prenatal care and treatment as might be needed; to deliver the plaintiff's child and to give plaintiff such postnatal care as might be needed, all in accordance with modern up-to-date medical practice; that she relied on the defendant as a licensed physician and medical doctor to treat and advise her and to deliver her child and care for her after her child's birth in accordance with modern medical practice; that thereafter, the plaintiff was given prenatal treatment by the defendant on several occasions; that on June 18, 1954, at about 1 p. m. the plaintiff began having labor pains at regular intervals and, at her request, her husband went as her agent to the defendant and requested the defendant to come to the plaintiff's bedside for the purpose of ascertaining her condition and administering such treatment as might be required; that the defendant refused to visit the plaintiff as so requested, but instead advised and assured the plaintiff's husband that the plaintiff would not have her baby until July 2, 1954; that her labor pains continued throughout the afternoon and early night of June 18, 1954, and began to occur at shorter intervals and became more severe as the night moved on; that at about 1:00 a. m., on June 19, plaintiff's brother went to the defendant at the request of the plaintiff and as her agent and asked the defendant to come to the plaintiff's bedside for the purpose of ascertaining her condition and administering such treatment as might be required; that, in response to such request, the defendant did come to the plaintiff's bedside, at about 1:30 a. m. on June 19 and examined her and thereupon advised the plaintiff that her baby would not come until July 2, 1954, after which the defendant departed; that the plaintiff's labor pains continued throughout the early hours of the morning of June 19, becoming more severe and more frequent as time went on; that at about 6:00 a. m. on June 19, the plaintiff apprehended that because of her severe labor pains her baby could not be long in coming and, at her request, her brother again went to the defendant, advised him of the plaintiff's condition and that she was crying for the doctor, and requested the defendant to come to the plaintiff's bedside; that in reply to such request, the defendant refused to visit the plaintiff and again advised that the baby would not arrive until July 2, 1954, and that he would visit her later in the day of June 19; that when her husband arrived home from his job at about 7:30 a. m. on June 19, the plaintiff was suffering from constant labor pains and her condition had become such that she apprehended the arrival of her baby at any moment; that the husband, at the plaintiff's request and as her agent, thereupon went to the defendant, described the plaintiff's condition to the defendant and urgently requested the defendant to come at once to the plaintiff's bedside, whereupon, the defendant flatly refused to come to the plaintiff's bedside and told the plaintiff's husband that he did not have to come and that he would have nothing further to do with the plaintiff's case; that immediately after the defendant advised the plaintiff's husband that he would not come to the plaintiff's bedside and that he was abandoning her case, the plaintiff's husband attempted to obtain a physician to come to attend the plaintiff, but was unable to do so; the husband then departed by automobile for Rome, Georgia, in order to attempt to obtain the services of a physician there; that at about 9:00 a. m. on June 19, while the plaintiff's husband was away from the plaintiff's home attempting to obtain the services of a physician in Rome, Georgia, the plaintiff bore her child in her home without the aid of any physician or other person possessing skill or knowledge in the delivery of babies and without the aid of any modern drugs or medicines; that the defendant's refusal to come to the plaintiff and treat her, and his refusal to have anything more to do with her case, just prior to the birth of the plaintiff's child, constituted an unwarranted abandonment of the plaintiff; that the defendant, in the care and treatment of the plaintiff, was negligent and failed to exercise a reasonable degree of care and skill, and failed to bring to the exercise of his profession that reasonable degree of care and skill required by law in that the defendant could have determined by the exercise of reasonable care and skill when he examined the plaintiff at or about 1:30 a. m. on the morning of June 19, that the arrival of her baby was imminent and so have advised plaintiff; that the defendant, in the care and treatment of the plaintiff was negligent, and failed to exercise a reasonable degree of care and skill, and failed to bring to the exercise of his profession that reasonable degree of care and skill required by law: in advising the plaintiff at about 1:30 a. m. on June 19 that her baby would not be born until July 2, 1954; in refusing to come to the plaintiff's bedside when requested to do so at about 6:00 a. m. on June 19, in refusing to come to the plaintiff's bedside when requested so to do at about 7:45 a. m. on June 19, in...
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