Norton v. Vesta Coal Co.
Decision Date | 26 January 1933 |
Docket Number | No. 4877.,4877. |
Citation | 63 F.2d 165 |
Parties | NORTON, Deputy Commissioner, v. VESTA COAL CO. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Z. L. Dalby, of Washington, D. C., and Louis E. Graham, U. S. Atty., and W. J. Aiken, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellants.
William A. Challener and William A. Challener, Jr., both of Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellee.
Before BUFFINGTON, WOOLLEY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
The status of this case is thus stated by the court below:
That court, following Colonna's Shipyard v. Lowe, 22 F.(2d) 843 ( ), held the federal act does not apply in this case, and set aside the award. Thereupon the commissioner and the injured man took this appeal.
We here note the coal company is not seeking to avoid compensation to Rahn for his injury, but contends such compensation should be under the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act (77 PS § 1 et seq.).
The controlling federal statute involved provides the term "employer" means an employer any of whose employees are employed in maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock), and the contention is that Congress meant to include in the term "dry dock" a marine railway. We cannot make such assumption or speculation. We know clearly what in common speech a dry dock is. We also know what, in common speech, a marine railway is. In this regard see The Professor Morse (D. C.) 23 F. 803. While they are used for a like purpose, it by no means follows they are interchangeable terms. A contract to build, or rent, a dry dock would not be fulfilled in building a marine railway, and conversely, a contract to rent, or build, a marine railway would not be fulfilled by a dry dock. With these terms describing two different structures, it seems clear that, when Congress used the word "dry dock," it meant a dry dock in the common acceptation of the term, and did not intend to include any other thing. We rest on firm ground when we take Congress at its word. We enter into a field of speculation when we impute to Congress an intent to include something it did not say it included. The mention of one of a class is the exclusion of others. So regarding, the judgment below is affirmed.
I am constrained to dissent from the judgment of the court in the belief that, in order to understand the meaning of the statute and discern the intent of the Congress, its words should be read in the light of prior legislation on the subject.
Men, doing different kinds of work on and about ships at docks and in dry docks, sustained injuries of a character that brought them sometimes under state compensation acts, sometimes under maritime law, and at other times left them in doubt as to the law under which their injuries fell. In an endeavor to afford all these workmen of different classes complete and adequate redress, the Congress by the Act of October 6, 1917, 40 Stat. 395, and the Act of June 10, 1922, 42 Stat. 634, 28 USCA §§ 41 (3), 371, authorized states in certain cases to give relief under state workmen's compensation laws to workmen suffering injuries in maritime service. The Supreme Court regarded this legislation as an unauthorized attempt to delegate to state authority which was exclusively that of the United States in maritime matters, Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U. S. 219, 44 S. Ct. 302, 68 L. Ed. 646; Nogueira Case, 281 U. S. 128, 135, 50 S. Ct. 303, 74 L. Ed. 754, but intimated that the Congress might enact laws providing compensation for injuries to workmen when subject to federal jurisdiction. After this decision, rendered in 1924, the Congress, wanting a new law to cover injured workmen who could not be validly compensated under state laws, enacted the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, U. S. Code, title 33, chapter 18, § 901 et seq. (33 USCA § 901 et seq.), patently intended to avoid the constitutional infirmities in the previous legislation and to extend compensation for injuries to workers when they are within the federal jurisdiction and when they cannot be compensated under state laws. Wheeling Corrugating Co. v. McManigal (C. C. A.) 41 F.(2d) 593, 595; Obrecht-Lynch Corp. v. Clark (D. C.) 30 F. (2d) 144.
The act defines the requisite federal jurisdiction as follows:
This is another way of saying that compensation can be awarded under the act only when the contract or work is maritime and the tort or injury is maritime, recognizing, no doubt, that jurisdiction of courts of admiralty in matters of contract depends on the maritime character of the contract and in torts on the maritime...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Western Boat Bldg. Co. v. O'LEARY
...733. It said: "Appellants contend that a marine railway is not a dry dock within the meaning of the law, relying upon Norton v. Vesta Coal Co., 3 Cir., 63 F.2d 165, and Rohlfs v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, 190 Wash. 566, 69 P.2d 817, which are in point but not controlling. We held to th......
-
Rist v. Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co.
...1933, 65 F.2d 779. That one end of the ship was beached did not remove her from the navigable waters of the harbor. In Norton v. Vesta Coal Co., 3 Cir., 63 F.2d 165, relied on by plaintiff, the boat in question was entirely upon dry land, 75 feet from the water's edge. That case is not pert......
-
Avondale Marine Ways v. Henderson
...and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act for a death which occurred on a barge drawn up for repairs on a marine railway. Norton v. Vesta Coal Co., 3 Cir., 63 F.2d 165 was such a case and Judge Woolley dissented from a holding that a marine railway was not included in the statutory language, 'an......
-
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Lawson
...State law. * * *" Appellants contend that a marine railway is not a dry dock within the meaning of the law, relying upon Norton v. Vesta Coal Co., 3 Cir., 63 F.2d 165, and Rohlfs v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, 190 Wash. 566, 69 P.2d 817, which are in point but not controlling. We held to......