Novak v. Board of Bar Examiners

• Decision Date: 10 April 1986
• Citation: 397 Mass. 270,490 N.E.2d 1183
• Parties: Lawrence P. NOVAK v. BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1183

490 N.E.2d 1183

397 Mass. 270

Lawrence P. NOVAK v. BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Suffolk.

Argued Jan. 9, 1986.

Decided April 10, 1986.

Henry P. Sorett, Boston, for plaintiff.

John F. Dunn, Boston, for defendant.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and NOLAN, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.

LYNCH, Justice.

In this case we consider whether S.J.C. Rule 3:01, § 3.3, as amended, 380 Mass. 942, 943 (1980) ¹ (concerning the necessary law school qualifications for taking the Massachusetts bar examination), should bar the plaintiff, who entered and graduated from law school before the rule was amended, from taking the bar examination where the amended rule now renders the plaintiff ineligible although he would have been eligible to take the examination under the previous rule. See S.J.C. Rule 3:01, § 3.3, 370 Mass. 908 (1976) (the previous rule). In September, 1984, after the plaintiff was denied permission to take the bar examination by the Board of Bar Examiners (board), the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County. Shortly thereafter, a hearing on the matter was held before a single justice. The single justice referred the case to the Supreme Judicial Court rules committee which declined to grant the plaintiff a waiver of the present rule. In June, 1985, after the filing of a statement of agreed facts by the parties, the single justice, on plaintiff's motion, reserved and reported the case to the full bench.

In August, 1977, the plaintiff graduated from the International School of Law ² in Virginia with the degree of juris doctor. ³ Although the law school was aggressively seeking American Bar Association (A.B.A.) accreditation at the time the plaintiff enrolled, it did not become so accredited until August 1, 1980, three years after the plaintiff's graduation. In September, 1983, the plaintiff's request for permission to take the Massachusetts bar examination was denied by the board because the law school he attended was not A.B.A. approved at the time of his graduation. The present rule provides that an applicant for admission to the bar "shall have graduated ... from a law school which, at the time of graduation, is approved by the [A.B.A.]" ⁴ (emphasis added). This amended rule became effective April 14, 1980. 380 Mass. at 942. Thus the plaintiff requested permission to take the bar examination three years after the present rule had been in effect. At the time of the plaintiff's enrollment as well as of his graduation from law school, however, the rule then in effect provided that an applicant for admission to the bar "shall have graduated from a law school which, at the time of filing the application, is approved by the [A.B.A.]" ⁵ (emphasis added). The parties agree that under the previous rule the plaintiff would be eligible to take the Massachusetts bar examination.

Two other individuals, both of whom graduated from the same law school as the plaintiff and were in the same graduating class, did receive permission to take the Massachusetts bar examination. According to the board's brief, ⁶ one individual sought the board's permission in January, 1980, to take the February examination. At that time, the previous rule governed and the board authorized the applicant to take the bar examination because A.B.A. approval of the law school was imminent. The applicant was unable to be present for the February examination and she reapplied in May, 1980, to take the next examination. Although the present rule had become effective in the interim and would have operated to exclude her from the examination, the board considered her January request as "continuing to the next July examination" and permitted her to take the exam. The other individual requested permission ⁷ to take the bar examination in June, 1978. As the prior rule was in effect and as the law school was not A.B.A. approved at the time of his application, the board denied his request. In November, 1980, he reapplied and the board refused him permission to take the bar examination. After an action was filed with a single justice of this court, the S.J.C. rules committee waived the requirements of the present rule.

The plaintiff argues that it is inequitable to apply the present rule and deny him an opportunity to take the bar examination where he relied on the rule as it existed when he entered and graduated from law school. He contends that he is "caught between the cracks of the bar admission rules," and that if he were a foreign law school graduate he would be given a chance to upgrade his education without necessarily repeating an entire law school program, see S.J.C. Rule 3:01, § 3.4, 382 Mass. 754 (1981), an opportunity not now open to him as the graduate of a domestic law school which was not A.B.A. approved at the time of his graduation. The plaintiff does not suggest that the present rule is constitutionally defective on its face. The plaintiff does, however, raise several constitutional challenges to the application of the present rule to him. Among these constitutional arguments, the plaintiff alleges a violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, based on the board's and the S.J.C. rules committee's ⁸ refusal to waive the present rule for the plaintiff despite the treatment of the two other applicants. We do not reach the plaintiff's constitutional arguments, however, because we grant him relief on other grounds.

The requirements of our rule presently in effect have been adopted by the vast majority of States. See A.B.A. Section of Legal Education & Admissions to the Bar, A Review of Legal Education in the United States--Fall 1984, at 75-81 (1985). The A.B.A. approval requirement itself, as well as a Board of Bar Examiners' or similar authority's refusal to waive the requirement, has been upheld by numerous State and Federal courts in the face of a variety of challenges, including constitutional ones. See, e.g., Application of Urie, 617 P.2d 505, 506-507 (Alaska 1980), and cases cited; Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners in re Hale, 433 So.2d 969 (Fla.1983); LaBossiere v. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 279 So.2d 288 (Fla.1973); In re...