Nunes v. Margate General Hosp., Inc., 82-1892

• Decision Date: 20 July 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-1892,82-1892
• Citation: 435 So.2d 916
• Parties: David NUNES, Appellant/Cross Appellee, v. MARGATE GENERAL HOSPITAL, INC., a Florida Corporation, Appellee/Cross Appellant.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 916

435 So.2d 916

David NUNES, Appellant/Cross Appellee, v. MARGATE GENERAL HOSPITAL, INC., a Florida Corporation Appellee/Cross Appellant.

No. 82-1892.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Fourth District.

July 20, 1983.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 25, 1983.

David S. Nunes of Law Offices of David S. Nunes, Ft. Lauderdale, for appellant/cross appellee.

Jon W. Zeder and Douglas M. Halsey of Paul & Thomson, Miami, for appellee/cross appellant.

GLICKSTEIN, Judge.

First, this is an appeal by a former part-time hospital employee claiming wrongful termination from a summary final judgment entered against him and in favor of the appellee hospital which is associated with Hospital Affiliates International, Inc. The material aspect of the disparate position between appellant, then a third year law student working a marathon-like schedule by day as an intern in the state attorney's office and throughout the weekends as an x-ray technician, and the multi-state hospital affiliate, hopefully becomes apparent hereinafter.

We are disadvantaged because of the combination of no reported transcript of the hearing on appellee's motion for summary judgment and no recitations by the trial court in its judgment. However, it is clear that summary judgment should not have been awarded in light of the accurate recitation of disputed facts contained in the response to appellee's motion filed by appellant's trial counsel. Appellant's deposition reflects that he expressed to the hospital's personnel director and chief technician, who were involved in his hiring, that his term of employment had to be definite; i.e., for the entire school year, as he could not--with his hectic schedule--look for another similar job during the school year. It is equally clear from his deposition that the personnel director and chief technician who interviewed him led him to believe that he would not be terminated during the school year unless he did "something really disasterous." In our view, such was competent evidence of a contract for a specific term, not just an "expectation" described by this court in Roy Jorgensen Associates, Inc. v. Deschenes, 409 So.2d 1188 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), and not employment for an indefinite term and terminable at will described in De Marco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 360 So.2d 134 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 367 So.2d 1123 (Fla.1979), aff'd, 384 So.2d 1253 (Fla.1980).

Notwithstanding evidence of a specified term of employment and a rejection by him of another hospital's offer of employment in reliance upon appellee's representation, appellant was apparently terminated shortly after commencing services and subsequent to his request for the additional compensation which he understood to be forthcoming as a benefit available to "permanent part-time employees" described in the hospital literature furnished him. As we view it, appellee was able to persuade the trial court that it was entitled to summary judgment, because appellant was a "permanent employee" terminable at will, whose signed application specifically recited:

"This agreement does not, of course, bind either party to any specific period of employment".

Because of the matters recited in appellant's deposition, whether appellant's employment was for a definite term was a matter for the trier...